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The learning outcomes of this study are as follows:▪ evaluate the difficulties of entry-level women entrepreneurs in the South African farming industry;▪ appreciate the entrepreneurial journey of a women entrepreneur in the farming industry;▪ assess the role of networking and support programmes in prompting women entrepreneurs in South Africa;▪ understand the role of diversification in building a sustainable business in today’s COVID-19-affected economic environment;▪ make an informed decision regarding how COVID-19 had negatively affected the farming industry; and▪ critically evaluate which options are available for women entrepreneurs to overcome the negative effects of COVID-19 and remain sustainable businesses.

In April 2021, managing director and co-owner Beverley-Anne Joseph, was considering the long-term business strategy options for Zelpy, her hop farm business outside George, a town in the Western Cape, South Africa. As the first black woman hop farmer in Africa, she had run a successful business supplying hops to South African Breweries (SAB), a subsidiary of the global conglomerate Anheuser-Busch InBev (AB InBev). To date, her hop farming business had not been impacted by the South African Government’s COVID-19 lockdowns that impacted the sale of alcoholic beverages. However, it had given her a wake-up call as to the risk of having most of her eggs in one basket. She now had to consider how to diversify her farming business to minimise risk.

MBA, Masters in Management, Postgraduate Diploma in Business and Executive Education short courses.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

CSS 3: Entrepreneurship.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Boeing and Airbus, the leading manufacturers of large aircraft, were locked in a battle for market share that drove down prices for their new planes. At about the same time, the two industry heavyweights began developing new aircraft families to address the future market needs they each projected.

Aircraft take many years to develop, so by the time the new planes made their inaugural flights, significant changes had occurred in the global environment. First, emerging economies in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere were growing rapidly, spawning immediate and long-term demand for more aircraft. At the same time, changes to the market for air travel had created opportunities for new products. These opportunities had not gone unnoticed by potential new entrants, which were positioning themselves to compete against the market leaders.

In October 2007, the Airbus superjumbo A380 made its first flight. The A380 carried more passengers than any other plane in history and had been touted as a solution to increased congestion at global mega-hub airports. Four years later the Boeing 787, a smaller long-range aircraft, was launched to service secondary cities in a point-to-point network.

The case provides students with an opportunity to analyze the profit potential of the global aircraft manufacturing industry in 2002 and in 2011. Students can also identify the actions of participants that weakened or intensified the pressure on profits within the industry.

Audio format (.mp3 file) available with purchase of PDF. Contact cases@kellogg.northwestern.edu for access.

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

In recent years Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest investment banks in the United States, had grown increasingly reliant on its fixed income trading and underwriting division, which served as the primary engine for its strong profit growth. The bank had also significantly increased its leverage over the same timeframe, going from a debt-to-equity ratio of 23.7x in 2003 to 35.2x in 2007. As leverage increased, the ongoing erosion of the mortgage-backed industry began to impact Lehman significantly and its stock price plummeted. Unfortunately, public outcry over taxpayer assumption of $29 billion in potential Bear losses made repeating such a move politically untenable. The surreal scene of potential buyers traipsing into an investment bank's headquarters over the weekend to consider various merger or spin-out scenarios repeated itself once again. This time, the Fed refused to back the failing bank's liabilities, attempting instead to play last-minute suitors Bank of America, HSBC, Nomura Securities, and Barclay's off each other, jawboning them by arguing that failing to step up to save Lehman would cause devastating counterparty runs on their own capital positions. The Fed's desperate attempts to arrange its second rescue of a major U.S. investment bank in six months failed when it refused to backstop losses from Lehman's toxic mortgage holdings. Complicating matters was Lehman's reliance on short-term repo loans to finance its balance sheet. Unfortunately, such loans required constant renewal by counterparties, who had grown increasingly nervous that Lehman would lose the ability to make good on its trades. With this sentiment swirling around Wall Street, Lehman was forced to announce the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S. history, listing assets of $639 billion and liabilities of $768 billion. The second domino had fallen. It would not be the last.

This case covers the period from the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan to the conversion into bank holding companies by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, including the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America. The case explains the new global paradigm for the investment banking industry, including increased regulation, fewer competitors, lower leverage, reduced proprietary trading, and-potentially-reduced profits.

Fingerhut, based in Minnetonka, Minnesota, is a direct-marketing company that sells a smorgasbord of consumer goods through an array of specially targeted catalogs. In November 1996, an article in the Star Tribune, a major Minneapolis newspaper, drew attention to a class-action lawsuit pending against Fingerhut that suggests the firm made its profits by exploiting the poor. Several civil rights groups rallied around the suit and submitted amicus curiae in favor of the litigation. The case illustrates issues in ethics and management communication. Discussions focus on the constituencies. Is Fingerhut exploiting its customers or providing them with an affordable method of obtaining valued consumer goods on credit? Do retailers have a duty to offer products at reasonable prices? Are the high interest rates reasonable given the risk? What are the options: pawn shops, rent-to-own? What is the profile of the typical Fingerhut customer? Discussions also focus on the issues communicating to the constituencies. How much damage will the lawsuit do to Fingerhut's image as an ethical, socially conscious company? What communication strategies can the firm employ? Should it react to the lawsuit? What should it tell its employees?

This case looks at the design and implementation of a risk management strategy. It reviews the early moves by Great Plains Energy (GPE) to establish a corporate-wide Enterprise Risk Management program. The corporate Chief Risk Officer is Andrea Bielsker. Andrea appointed Jana Utter to take charge of coordinating the design and implementation of the ERM program. Utter faces a number of challenges. She has had to first conceptualize the program given the charge by the Board of Directors, then design a process by which she identifies the risks that the corporation faces, assist in designing measures for the risks, and work with the various divisions and functional areas to put processes in place to mitigate the identified risks.

This case describes management's sequential reevaluation of Marriott's debt capacity and the decision about how to invest this unused debt. Videotape #5556, “Strategic Leadership,” is designed for use with this case (see Videotape Bibliography).

In March 2007 C. James Prieur, CEO of insurance provider Conseco, was faced with a crisis. The front page of the New York Times featured a story on the grieving family of an elderly woman who had faithfully paid for her Conseco long-term care (LTC) policy, only to find that it would not pay her claims. Her family had to pay for her care (until her recent death), which unfortunately resulted in the loss of the family business. The family was now very publicly pursuing litigation. For a company that depended on thousands of employees, investors, and independent agents who sold the insurance plans, this reputational risk was a serious threat. On top of this immediate crisis, all signs in the industry were pointing to the fact that the LTC business itself was not viable, yet over the years Conseco had acquired a number of LTC insurance providers. Students are asked to analyze not only what Prieur’s priorities should be in addressing the immediate crisis but also the risks inherent in the LTC industry and how this might affect Conseco’s success as a business moving forward

After reading and analyzing the case, students will be able to:

• Analyze the risks in the long-term care insurance industry

• Distinguish the various types of risk that caused a company’s crisis and recognize the potential for contagion

• Brainstorm how the risks faced by Conseco could have been avoided or better contained

• Recommend the first steps C. James Prieur and the Conseco leadership team should take to rectify the New York Times article crisis

Analyze the risks in the long-term care insurance industry

Distinguish the various types of risk that caused a company’s crisis and recognize the potential for contagion

Brainstorm how the risks faced by Conseco could have been avoided or better contained

Recommend the first steps C. James Prieur and the Conseco leadership team should take to rectify the New York Times article crisis