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Purpose: This study is concerned with media representation of crime in the Israeli press. It examines the pattern of offenses reported in two daily newspapers of seemingly different characteristics, the “elitist” Haaretz and the “popular” Israel Hayom. Methodology/approach: Crime reports appeared in the news pages during November 2016 were content analyzed in both newspapers by using a coding scheme, which operationalized several variables relating to type of crime, characteristics of offenders and victims, and court proceedings. Findings: Violent and sex offenses featured disproportionately in the news reports in both newspapers, while conventional property offenses were under-reported relative to their prevalence in official crime statistics. In terms of the characteristics of offenders and victims, the vast majority of offenders portrayed in crime stories were adult Jewish males. Women were more likely to appear as victims of crime rather than perpetrators, and more likely to appear as victims of sex offenses rather than other offenses. Research limitations: This study was based on an analysis of crime stories which appeared in two newspapers during one-month period of time. Future research should extend the sample size and collect data from a longer period of time and from additional media outlets. Originality/value: Media coverage of crime stories has not yet been researched in Israel. Beyond the interest in the Israeli case or the potential contribution to comparative global knowledge, the value of the study may lie in expanding the lens of scholarship of media’s construction of crime.

This chapter uses the poliheuristic theory of decision-making to analyze the decisions of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The study examines a series of Netanyahu’s decisions regarding the peace process during 1996–2014. Using Applied Decision Analysis (ADA), this study demonstrates that Netanyahu ruled out alternatives that failed to satisfy alternatives on the non-compensatory decision dimension – his political survivability. The prime minister’s final choices were made from the remaining options according to their ability to maximize net benefits with respect to Netanyahu’s ideological concerns.

This study aims to examine changes in the discourse concerning Israeli tourism to Turkey between 2000 and 2014.

Drawing on the concept of geographic imagination and using a critical cultural discourse analysis of travel stories published in the Israeli media, the authors analyze the extent to which changes have both reflected and resulted from changing relations between the two countries.

The analysis reveals that before 2010, Turkey was depicted in largely positive geo-cultural terms, imagined as a desired cosmopolitan, culturally “authentic” destination, which elicits feelings of joy and peacefulness. More recent narratives, however, highlighted its negative geopolitical qualities, underscoring its anti-Israel stance and invoking a fearful discourse of political and ethno-religious radicalization.

The study makes three contributions. First, by attending to the significance of perceptions in the social construction of tourist destinations it brings the fields of tourism and cognitive geography into a closer dialogue. Second, by using a critical discourse analysis it highlights the changing cultural contexts within which places are imagined and constructed by tourists. Finally, by uncovering the geographic complexities that undergird the discursive construction of places as tourist destinations, it illustrates how everyday narratives change over time, reflecting the dynamic nature of inter-state relations.

The American agricultural economist Marion Clawson advised the Israeli government during 1953–1955. Clawson, a protégé of John D. Black and Mordecai Ezekiel, criticized the government for ignoring economic considerations, and stated that Israel’s national goals – defense, Negev Desert irrigation, immigrant absorption via new agricultural settlements, and economic independence – were mutually contradictory. His major recommendations were to improve the realism of Israel’s agricultural plan; end expensive Negev irrigation; enlarge irrigated farms eightfold; freeze new settlements until the number of semi-developed settlements falls from 300 to 100; and limit new Negev settlements to 10 over 5–7 years. Thus, Clawson ignored political feasibility and made value judgments. Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol and Minister of Agriculture Peretz Naphtali rejected Clawson’s recommendations because they ignored Israel’s national goals. By September 1954, Clawson shifted towards greater pragmatism: He acknowledged that foreign advisors should not question the national goals or make value judgments, and sought common ground with the Ministry of Agriculture. At his initiative, he wrote Israel Agriculture 1953/54 in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture. Israel Agriculture was a consensus document: Clawson eschewed recommendations and accepted that the government might prioritize non-economic goals. In proposing Israel Agriculture, Clawson made a pragmatic decision to relinquish some independence for (potentially) greater influence. Ultimately, Clawson was largely unsuccessful as an advisor. Clawson’s failure was part of a general pattern: Over 1950–1985, the Israeli government always rejected foreign advisors’ recommendations unless it was facing a severe crisis.