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The EU prudential regime for investment firms comprising the Directive (EU) 2019/2034 (IFD) and Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 (IFR) introduces a fit-for-purpose capital framework for investment firms. The capital impact on the practice of investment management can be material depending on firms’ specific business models and risk profiles, which may require them to take strategic decisions with respect to the services they provide. Despite the importance of this issue for the practice of investment management, there exists no study among the existing studies that focuses on this issue. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature.

This paper reviews the calibration approaches the European Banking Authority (EBA) has used by exploring the deficiencies of the regime with respect to the calibration of categorization thresholds and coefficients that are used by the EBA to calculate regulatory capital requirements.

This paper sets out that the choice of the relevant percentile for setting the firm categorization thresholds was not based on any theoretical rule. It also discusses that the calibration of the K-factors was subjective and lacked consistency. In addition, it criticizes the sample that the EBA used for business model coverage on the grounds that it was unbalanced, resulting in certain K-factors driving the overall capital impact.

Further research is needed on the calibration of thresholds as this will remain a crucial factor for the effectiveness of the new regime. In particular, a more data-driven and transparent approach would be necessary to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the thresholds.

This paper leads to the policy implication that, despite its merits that overweigh its shortcomings, potential market competition and financial stability issues that may stem from inconsistencies and a general lack of objectivity in certain aspects of the regime should not be underestimated by the EU policy makers.

The present paper contributes to the existing knowledge primarily by reviewing the EBA’s calibration approaches with respect to the K-factor coefficients and firm categorization thresholds, concluding that lack of objectivity and precision in the relevant methodologies could distort capital allocation decisions in the practice of investment management.

This study aims to generalize the following result of McDonald and Siegel (1986) on optimal investment: it is optimal for an investor to invest when project cash flows exceed a certain threshold. This study presents other results that refine or extend this one by integrating timing flexibility and changes in cash flows with time-varying transition probabilities for regime switching. This study emphasizes that optimal thresholds are either overvalued or undervalued in the absence of time-varying transition probabilities. Accordingly, the stochastic nature of transition probabilities has important implications to the search for optimal timing of investment.

The purpose of this study is to investigate nonlinearities in the behavior of investment expenditure. Conventional wisdom suggests that Tobin’s Q criterion is an important explanation of investment behaviour that bridges the financial and real sides of the economy. However, the empirical evidence in support of Q as a means of explaining aggregate business investment is rather weak. We answer a number of questions about the relationship between investment expenditure and Q. In particular, is the relationship governed by non-linearities? If so, what is the nature of the non-linearities present?

The rationale for paying closer attention to non-linearities is based on the presence of information asymmetries and possible dependence of adjustments on non-linearities with respect to factors such as fixed costs, threshold effects and irreversibility, which are entertained in the investment literature. Using the non-linear vector error-correction model procedure advocated by Hansen and Seo, we show that in the context of the US economy, investment has a long-run relationship with Q that is based on threshold error correction.

There are asymmetries present with respect to error correction or the speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. We find that investment expenditure only responds significantly to long-run disequilibrium from Q during a particular regime. Such a regime is characterised by long-run disequilibrium based on high or rising investment expenditure compared with a relatively weak stock market.

The authors provide new insights into the relationship between Tobin’s Q and real investment. In contrast to previous work, they find that error correction based on the adjustment of real investment is regime-specific and function of the size of departures from long-run equilibrium. The tests also allow for the identification of periods when error correction has occurred. Not only are these insights significant for future research on financial crises, market volatility and the impact of debt, but for policymaking purposes as well.

Purpose – To study the allocation in equity markets of sovereign wealth funds’ (SWF) investments with respect to other institutional investors. To analyze the role of political regimes in the sending and recipient countries as a determinant of the allocation of SWF investments.

Methodology/approach – We use mutual funds’ investments as a benchmark for SWF investment allocations. We collect data of SWF and mutual fund equity investments at the firm level and analyse them on a geographical and sector basis. We compare target investments for these two groups by looking at the political regime in the sending and recipient country, using different political indicators (Polity IV, Bertelsmann). We provide a comparison of SWFs and pension funds based on governance features related to investment.

Findings – We find that the fear that sovereigns with political motivations use their financial power to secure large stakes in OECD countries is not confirmed by the data. SWF investment decisions do not differ greatly from those of other wealth managers. Although there can be differences in the allocation, political regimes in the recipient countries do not play a role in explaining the allocation of sovereign wealth funds.

Social implications – Investment from public institutions, such as sovereign wealth funds, can have significant implications at the economic and social level. Sovereign funds are potential sources of capital for emerging economies, and therefore can enchance economic growth. It is important to understand to what extent public institutional investors behave differently from private investors. The “political bias” is not a relevant factor for sovereign funds, or for other institutional investors, for allocating their capital. More often than not, their asset allocation strategies converge with other large investors, these being driven by financial and not political bias.

Originality/value of the chapter – The chapter is an original contribution providing a firm-level analysis of equity holdings for two groups of institutional investors. Moreover, it emphasizes the political dimension of institutional investments, highlighting the priorities and constraints of public investors participating in financial markets. The chapter suggests that SWFs do not discriminate by the political regime of the recipient country in their asset allocation.

I survey applications of Markov switching models to the asset pricing and portfolio choice literatures. In particular, I discuss the potential that Markov switching models have to fit financial time series and at the same time provide powerful tools to test hypotheses formulated in the light of financial theories, and to generate positive economic value, as measured by risk-adjusted performances, in dynamic asset allocation applications. The chapter also reviews the role of Markov switching dynamics in modern asset pricing models in which the no-arbitrage principle is used to characterize the properties of the fundamental pricing measure in the presence of regimes.

This paper aims to examine the Chinese investment anomaly and dissect it from a perspective of rational expectation framework.

Characteristic-based sorting and Fama–MacBeth two-stage cross-sectional regression are adopted to test the relationship between corporate investment and expected returns in both portfolio and individual stock levels. Under the framework of pricing kernels, an investment-based common risk factor is constructed to test the role of risk played in the negative investment-return relationship. Moreover, a Markov regime switching model is adopted to investigate the time-varying risk premium across market regimes.

Empirical results provide ample evidence showing that there is a negative relationship between investment and expected returns in the Chinese stock market. The new investment-based risk factor is found to capture the return differences across characteristic-based portfolios. In addition, risk premium of the new risk factor is not only statistically positive throughout the sample period, but also has an asymmetry that is higher during market downturn but lower under bull market.

This paper merely tests the hypotheses derived from rational school.

Investment strategies based on characteristic-sorted portfolios should be adjusted to different market regimes.

First, this paper provides comprehensive empirical results by adopting different methodologies for investigating the investment anomaly in China. Second, an investment-based factor is constructed specifically for the Chinese stock market for the first time. Finally, this is the first paper to investigate the asymmetric risk premium across the Chinese bear and bull regimes by using a multivariate Markov regime switching model.

Governments throughout the world have sought, and are seeking, to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and, for that purposed, have liberalized their national regulatory frameworks for FDI and established a strong international investment law regime. However, there are signs that, as a result of a number of important developments (which are being discussed in some detail in this chapter), governments are re-evaluating their stance toward FDI, or at least certain types of it. This re-evaluation has found its expression in a number of regulatory changes that may eventually lead to a regime that balances the rights of investors and host countries in a manner that places more emphasis on maintaining policy space for host-country governments while still protecting foreign investors.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it identifies the latest trends in investment treaty making and determines the degree to which these trends affect the regulatory space of nation states. Second, it situates the conflict between investment protection and national sovereignty on the level of investment treaties within the wider theoretical framework of the debate between neoliberalism and neorealism in the field of international relations.

This research paper uses qualitative content analysis of international investment treaties with the aim of comparing a sample of new investment treaties with a sample of treaties from a previous generation.

The findings of the paper indicate that the language of investment treaties signed recently tends to promote greater regulatory space for the nation states compared to previous generation of treaties. However, the analysis also suggests that the changes still offer significant leeway to investment tribunals in interpreting the new treaty language, which could mean that the move towards greater national sovereignty in international investment law will not be as significant as many suggest.

Originality of the paper consists mainly in explicit connection it makes between international investment law and the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism in international relations theory.