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The sudden rise of the socio-political importance of security that has marked the twenty-first century entails a commensurate empowerment of the intelligence apparatus. This chapter takes the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 as a vantage point from where to address the political significance of this development. It provides an account of the powers the Act grants intelligence agencies, concluding that it effectively legalizes their operational paradigm. Further, the socio-legal dynamics that informed the Act lead the chapter to conclude that Intelligence has become a dominant apparatus within the state. This chapter pivots at this point. It seeks to identify, first, the reasons of this empowerment; and, second, its effects on liberal-democratic forms, including the rule of law. The key reason for intelligence empowerment is the adoption of a pre-emptive security strategy, geared toward neutralizing threats that are yet unformed. Regarding its effects on liberal democracy, the chapter notes the incompatibility of the logic of intelligence with the rule of law. It further argues that the empowerment of intelligence pertains to the rise of a new threat-based governmental logic. It outlines the core premises of this logic to argue that they strengthen the anti-democratic elements in liberalism, but in a manner that liberalism is overcome.

This paper aims to examine the anti-corruption policy of the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria, to determine whether the policy is working and/or has produced unintended effects. The Federal Executive Council is the body comprising all the Ministers of the Federation, including the President and Vice President.

The analysis took the form of a desk study, which analysed various documents and reports such as the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2008-2016, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004, the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act, 2016, the Public Interest Disclosure and Witness Protection Bill, 2017 and the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations, 2012.

This paper determined that the anti-corruption policy of the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria could achieve its desired objectives if the following recommendations are implemented: research grants which are sent to Nigerian universities by international and corporate bodies should be exempted from the current treasury single account arrangement. This would enable universities to easily access the funds and disburse the same to qualified students. The Federal Government should follow the guidelines laid down in Section 270 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 for plea agreements. In other words, the prosecution should only offer a plea bargain to a person who has been charged with an offence. The prosecution should not receive and consider a plea bargain from a person who has not been charged with an offence. Any attempt to water down the effect of Section 270 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 may weaken the ongoing fight against corruption and money laundering because criminals will be encouraged to continue looting public funds. The Financial Action Task Force Recommendations (Recommendation 3) requires that criminal sanctions for natural persons convicted of money laundering should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The Federal Government of Nigeria should introduce a Bill to the National Assembly that would provide a clear framework for the use of investigatory powers by law enforcement, the security and intelligence agencies and other public authorities. This includes the interception of communications, the retention and acquisition of communications data, the use of equipment interference and the retention and use of bulk data by the security and intelligence agencies. The Bill must establish a number of safeguards against the arbitrary or unlawful use of investigatory powers by the executive. The UK’s Investigatory Powers Act, 2016, for example, established a number of safeguards for the retention and acquisition of communications data. Authorisations for obtaining communications data will have to set out why accessing the communications data in question is necessary in a specific investigation for a particular statutory purpose and how it is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved. A police officer who receives information from a whistleblower about money hidden in an apartment should apply to a Court or Justice of the Peace within the local limits of whose jurisdiction he/she is for the issue of a search warrant before conducting a search on the said premises. This procedure is in line with Section 143 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 and the Court of Appeal decision in Hassan v. E.F.C.C. (2014) I NWLR (Pt. 1389) 607 at 625. The Public Interest Disclosure and Witness Protection Bill, 2017 should be given accelerated consideration in the House of Representatives based on its urgency and significance for the Federal Executive Council’s whistleblowers policy.

This paper focusses on the anti-corruption policy of the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria from 29 May 2015 to 10 June 2017. It does not address the older policies.

This paper offers a critical analysis of the new anti-corruption policy of the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria. The paper will provide recommendations on how the policy could be strengthened. This is the only paper to adopt this kind of approach.

The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) has been provided with the statutory authority to demand the attendance of suspects at its offices and also to demand that information is supplied, irrespective of whether or not the suspect has been charged with a criminal offence. It has been held that the provisions of Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) do protect the defendant from self‐incrimination, and the UK government has been successfully challenged at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) over these issues. The powers conferred on the SFO remain in place, but these must now be viewed in the context of the Human Rights Act 1998, which became law in the UK in October 2000; unless the powers of the SFO are reviewed by Parliament, it would seem to be the courts who will take responsibility in the UK for ensuring that the rights of suspects are upheld.

International wholesale financial markets have long been used to exploiting the cutting edge of technology to find more efficient ways of doing business. But now new electronic technologies are changing the structure and dynamics of markets themselves as seldom before, and the rate of change is increasing. To enable financial markets and the investors and entrepreneurs who use them to obtain maximum benefit, governments and regulators need to be careful not to constrain these developments by reference to traditional structures and standards which may no longer be appropriate. They should instead embrace the benefits which change brings, and radically re‐examine legal and regulatory frameworks in the light of the evolving landscape of opportunity and risk. This re‐analysis should take into account that the transparency and competitiveness of e‐commerce is bringing about a new alignment between investor protection, market stability and commercial advantage. Policy should be developed in partnership with users of the markets. The authorities will also need to take into account how new technologies are, as never before, globalising world markets — competitive advantage will go to wherever the most market‐friendly equilibrium is struck and maintained between commercial freedom and regulation.

This paper aims to present results of a study that focused on the question of how computer and data experts think about Internet and social media surveillance after Edward Snowden’s revelations about the existence of mass-surveillance systems of the Internet such as Prism, XKeyscore and Tempora. Computer and data experts’ views are of particular relevance because they are confronted day by day with questions about the processing of personal data, privacy and data protection.

The authors conducted two focus groups with a total of ten experts based in London. As London is considered by some as the surveillance capital of the world, and has a thriving Internet industry, it provided a well-suited context.

The focus group discussions featured three topics that are of crucial importance for understanding Internet and social media surveillance: the political economy surveillance in general; surveillance in the context of the Snowden revelations; and the question what the best political reactions are to the existence of a surveillance-industrial complex that results in political and economic control of the Internet and social media. The focus groups provided indications that computer and data experts are pre-eminently informed on how Internet surveillance works, are capable of critically assessing its implications for society and have ideas about on what should be done politically.

Studies of privacy and surveillance after Edward Snowden’s revelations have taken on a new dimension: Large-scale covert surveillance is conducted in a collaborative endeavour of secret services, private communications corporations and security companies. It has become evident that a surveillance-industrial Internet surveillance complex exists, in which capitalist communications and security corporations and state institutions collaborate.

This paper aims to critically analyse the existing framework on assets tracing and recovery in Nigeria. It will thereafter provide analysis of the asset and recovery measures of advanced countries such as the USA and the UK. The results from the analysis will yield maximum insight and help the Nigerian Government to make better policies and laws on assets tracing and recovery.

This paper will rely on primary and secondary data drawn from the public domain. It will also rely on documentary research.

This paper determined that the Nigeria asset recovery scheme is likely to be more effective if Nigeria adopts the approach of the UK and the USA.

This paper will suggest new ways for assets tracing and recovery. The suggested approaches/methods are being used in advanced countries such as the UK and the USA.

Previous research papers have extensively discussed the problems faced with assets tracing and recovery from a prohibitive and investigative standpoint. This paper will discuss the topic from a preventive standpoint with little focus on investigative mechanisms.