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We introduce a multi-level model of the dependence of interfirm network topologies on the distribution and commonality of information in a network and the information strategies pursued by its member firms. Network topology, information properties of the network, and firm-level action within the network form dynamic, recursive, cross-level relationships – information properties in the network determine firm-level action, which in turn impacts the network topology and information properties. We derive predictions about the kinds of information strategies that firms are likely to adopt and succeed with in different information regimes, and about the kinds and short- and long-run dynamics of network topologies expected under different information regimes. Our model sheds new light on network topologies as a dependent variable that can be explained by network-level information regimes and firm-level information strategies.

The goal of interfirm contract research is to examine how formal contracts impact transaction success, firm relationships, and ultimately individual and collaborative firm performance when two or more firms interact. Most contract literature uses an economic lens to examine contracts: the property rights perspective, agency theory, and TCE. Property rights-based contract research (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967; Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; Cheung, 1969) examines how efficient property rights assignment mitigates ex ante hazards. Similarly, agency theory-based contract research (e.g., Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Harris & Raviv, 1979) investigates how incentive alignment between the principal and agent leads to the mitigation of ex ante hazards. In contrast, TCE-based research (Williamson, 1975, 1985) examines contractual safeguards to mitigate both ex ante and ex post hazards (e.g., Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1990; Crocker & Reynolds, 1993). Because the three economic perspectives dominate, most research addresses how contracts are used to mitigate ex ante or ex post hazards. Therefore, many topics still need to be investigated to enhance our understanding of interfirm contracting.

Firms tend to transfer more knowledge in technology joint ventures compared to contractual technology agreements. Using insights from new institutional economics, this chapter explores to what extent the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer is sensitive to an evolving industry norm of collaboration connected to the logic of open innovation. The chapter examines 1,888 dyad-year observations on firms engaged in technology alliances in the U.S. information technology industry during 1980–1999. Using fixed effects linear models, it analyzes longitudinal changes in the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer, and how such changes vary in magnitude across bilateral versus multipartner alliances, and across computers, telecommunications equipment, software, and microelectronics subsectors. Increases in industry-level alliance activity during 1980–1999 improved the knowledge transfer performance of contractual technology agreements relative to more hierarchical equity joint ventures. This effect was concentrated in bilateral rather than multipartner alliances, and in the software and microelectronics rather than computers and telecommunications equipment subsectors. Therefore, an evolving industry norm of collaboration may sometimes make more arms-length governance of a technology alliance a credible substitute for equity ownership, which can reduce the costs of interfirm R&D. Overall, the chapter shows that the performance of material practices that constitute innovation ecosystems, such as interfirm technology alliances, may differ over time subject to prevailing institutional norms of open innovation. This finding generates novel implications for the literatures on alliances, open innovation, and innovation ecosystems.

Interfirm contracts are a ubiquitous economic institution in market economies. In this study, we examine the determinants of one important aspect of interfirm contracts – contract duration. We begin with Joskow's (1987) study that demonstrated that contract duration is governed by mechanisms that economize transaction costs. Our study extends Joskow's study in several ways: First, while Joskow's study focuses on one particular area of extreme resource dependence, between the coal mine and the power company, we examine patterns of contract duration and their determinants across broader economic sectors, thereby providing a more general test of the key ideas in transaction cost economics. Second, we investigate the role of social institutions as a distinct mechanism underlying the design of contract duration, especially in terms of mitigating risks and transaction costs. Finally, by situating our study in China, we extend the research context beyond industrialized market societies to a transitional economy where interfirm contracts are an emerging economic institution. The empirical study is based on the analyses of information on 877 contracts from 620 firms collected in two Chinese cities, Beijing and Guangzhou, in 2000.

This study provides a comprehensive framework of adaptation in triadic business relationship settings in the service sector. The framework is based on the industrial network approach (see, e.g., Axelsson & Easton, 1992; Håkansson & Snehota, 1995a). The study describes how adaptations initiate, how they progress, and what the outcomes of these adaptations are. Furthermore, the framework takes into account how adaptations spread in triadic relationship settings. The empirical context is corporate travel management, which is a chain of activities where an industrial enterprise, and its preferred travel agency and service supplier partners combine their resources. The scientific philosophy, on which the knowledge creation is based, is realist ontology. Epistemologically, the study relies on constructionist processes and interpretation. Case studies with in-depth interviews are the main source of data.

This paper offers a set of introductory propositions of associations among organizational culture, firm actions and outcomes, business-to-business (B2B) relationships, and interfirm networks. This paper briefly introduces the eight main papers in this volume and describes the unique and valuable contribution each makes to the business marketing and purchasing literature. Hopefully your reading of this volume will provide the same take-away conclusion as my own: the papers come together to provide rich and provocative propositions and findings about how participants in B2B relationships interact and make sense of worlds.

Markets-as-networks (MAN) theorists contend, at least tacitly, the significance of business relationships to the firm – that is, business relationships contribute somewhat to corporate survival or growth. One does not deny the existence of significant business relationships but sustain, in contrast to the consensus within the MAN theory, that relationship significance should not be a self-evident assumption. For significance cannot be a taken-for-granted property of each and every one of the firm's business relationships. The authors adopt explicitly a critical realist meta-theoretical position in this conceptual paper and claim that relationship significance is an event of the business world, whose causes remain yet largely unidentified. Where the powers and liabilities of business relationships (i.e., relationship functions and dysfunctions) are put to work, inevitably under certain contingencies (namely the surrounding networks and markets), relationship effects ensue for the firm (often benefits in excess of sacrifices, i.e., relationship value) and as a consequence relationship significance is likely to be brought about. In addition, relationship significance can result from the dual impact that business relationships may have on the structure and powers and liabilities of the firm, that is, on corporate nature and scope, respectively.

A key argument in transaction cost economics (TCE) is that transactions are aligned with governance structures so as to effect a discriminating – mainly transaction cost economizing – match (Williamson, 1991). The archetypical problem in TCE is the vertical integration or “make-versus-buy” decision, and the focus of transaction cost economizing in this context is on mitigation of “holdup” problems associated with investments in specific assets (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985). However, this asset specificity condition in only one example (albeit a significant one) of a more general class of contractual hazards. Indeed, in his most recent discussion of the TCE agenda, Williamson (1996, p. 3) suggests that “identification, explication, and mitigation of contractual hazards – which take many forms, many of which long went unremarked – are central to the exercise.”

Destinations have in the scholarly literature been labeled as communities of interdependent organizations that collectively coproduce a variety of products and services. The paradigm comes close to describing destinations as firms which are embedded in interfirm networks. Recent studies provide crucial insights into an understanding of destinations' orchestration and structuration as coproducing interfirm networks. However, systematic knowledge about how these systems evolve and develop is lacking. This chapter addresses this issue and elaborates how the concepts of scale-free and small-world networks together can explain the process of destination evolution. The discussion also suggests how such theorizing can spur avenues for future research.

This paper exposes the development of markets-as-networks theory from formal inception in the mid-1970s until 2010 state-of-the-art, en route presenting its historical roots. This largely European-based theory challenges the conventional, dichotomous view of the business world as including firms and markets, arguing for the existence of relational governance structures (the so-called “interfirm cooperation”) in addition to hierarchical and transactional ones.