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This study aims to investigate the impact of mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) on Chinese listed firms’ insider trading, as well as the moderating effects of firm characteristics on this impact. The economic mechanism behind this impact is also explored.

This study conducts a regression analysis on firms associated with mandatory and voluntary audit partner rotation based on 2009–2019 firm data and examines whether corporate insiders of these two types of firms increase their share sales within 12 months before their financial statements are submitted to a new rotated auditor.

Client firms’ corporate insiders increase their share sales within 12 months before their financial statements are submitted to a new mandatory rotated auditor. In addition, such an association is less pronounced for client firms that changed from Big 4 auditors to those with higher financial constraints. This is more pronounced for client firms with higher information asymmetry. The economic mechanism of the finding is that is the MAPR implementation reduces earnings management activities from client firms. Moreover, client firms’ buy-and-hold stock returns decline in the first year after MAPR.

This study should assist investors, corporate shareholders and Chinese policymakers. Investors can be well protected through the adoption of MAPR because upcoming auditors enhance the audit quality of clients by restraining managers’ manipulation of reported earnings and declining firms’ insider trading afterwards. Investors, Chinese policymakers and corporate shareholders should pay more attention to firms’ financial report quality, auditor selection, financial situation, corporate governance and the information environment. Explicitly, firms with less transparent financial report quality, non-big 4 auditors and fewer financial constraints are more likely to be involved in insider trading.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, none of the extant studies have examined the impact of MAPR on insider sales. This study extends the research on the effect of the audit process on firm market performance by investigating the impact of audit partner rotation policy on insider trading behaviors.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of insider trading on analyst coverage and the properties of analyst earnings forecasts. Given the central role of analysts for information diffusion in stock markets, advancing understanding of the role insider trades may play in analyst coverage and forecasts, especially in the context of a changing legal environment (e.g. the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure [Reg FD]), should be a worthy goal.

To address the research questions, the authors run regressions in which the authors identify and control for as many possible determinants of analyst coverage and forecasts (e.g. firm size, information asymmetry and earnings performance) that are correlated with insider trades. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, the authors use three approaches. First, the authors extend the sample period to the post-Reg-FD period in which managers are not allowed to provide private information to financial analysts. Second, the authors measure analyst coverage in a window that is lagged by insider trades. Third, the authors employ firm-fixed-effects regressions in all the multivariate tests. Finally, following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), the authors conduct the impact threshold for a confounding variable test to assure that all regression analyses are indeed immune to the potential correlated-omitted-variable bias.

The authors find that the level of analyst coverage is positively related to the intensity of insider trades and that analyst coverage is more strongly associated with insider purchases than with insider sales. The authors also find that the positive association between analyst coverage and insider trades is less pronounced after the passage of Reg FD. Further investigations reveal that analysts revise their earnings forecasts upward following insider purchases, the informativeness of analyst forecast revisions significantly increases following insider purchases and optimistic bias in analyst forecast revisions is reduced as a result of insider purchases; the authors do not find similar evidence for insider sales.

A large body of insider trading literature (Johnson et al., 2009; Badertscher et al., 2011; Thevenot 2012; Skaife et al., 2013; Billings and Cedergren 2015; Dechow et al., 2016) provides evidence that insiders actively trade on their private information, such as their foreknowledge of price-relevant corporate events. This literature suggests that insider trades are potentially value-relevant and are informative about a firm’s future prospects. However, less research attention has been paid to investigating how insider trades might affect market participants’ (especially sophisticated participants’) behavior. This study contributes to understanding the role that insider trading may play in shaping analyst behavior.

Prior research (Frankel and Li, 2004; Lustgarten and Mande, 1995; Carpenter and Remmers, 2001; Seyhun, 1990) maintains that insider sales are less informative about a firm’s future prospects than are insider purchases because insider sales might take place for the liquidity and diversification purposes. By probing the stock price responses to insider selling activities, Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jeng et al. (2003) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) infer that insider selling is not informative about future firm performance. However, for such an inference, the authors cannot rule out the possibility that insider sales do convey value-relevant information, but the stock market does not react correctly to such trading information (Beneish and Vargus, 2002). Because the authors focus on examining analysts’ responses to insider sales, and analysts are supposed to be sophisticated in information processing, this study adds more compelling evidence for the notion that insider sales convey less information about a firm’s future prospects than do insider purchases.

There is an ongoing debate about the benefits and drawbacks of insider trading. Opponents of insider trading view insider trades as inequitable and immoral and assert that restricting insider trades curbs resource misallocation and benefits the whole society. Proponents contend that insider trading accelerates the price discovery process, increases market efficiency (Leland, 1992; Bernhardt et al., 1995; Choi et al., 2016) and may even play a role in rewarding and motivating executives (Roulstone, 2003; Denis and Xu, 2013). The authors add to this debate by documenting that insider trading increases the amount of information valuable to analyst research activities and helps enhance analyst services.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to offer firm-level evidence of a positive association between insider trades and analyst coverage. By accounting for the post-Reg-FD regime, this paper is also the first to provide evidence on how analysts, in the absence of access to management’s private information because of the regime change by Reg FD, react to insider trades.

The purpose of this paper is to conduct an empirical analysis of the trading performance of US corporate insiders.

Based on the volume weighted average price (VWAP), the authors propose a metric to measure the trading performance of US corporate insiders: trading alpha. This metric is clean of the contamination effect from insiders' own trades. The authors apply this metric to examine whether insiders can beat the market when they trade.

It is found that corporate insiders achieve positive trading alpha on both purchases and sales of stocks on average. The existence of a positive trading alpha is robust to controlling for firm, trading and insider characteristics. More importantly, evidence is found for the persistence in corporate insiders' trading performance. Those insiders who traded well in the past continue to trade well over time. Those who well execute in purchases of stocks also perform well in sales.

This paper extends the notion of beating the market from the investment profession to the trading profession. Skyrocketing corporate insider trades provide a natural setting under which to examine the trading performance. The findings that: insiders can beat the market on average when they trade; and there exists persistence in the insiders' trading performance over time and along trading directions are novel and new to the literature. This paper also has bearing on how to evaluate professional traders.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how insiders’ trades are executed and whether and how outside investors can mimic outperforming insiders and reap substantial portfolio returns that withstand the erosion from adjustments for both the standard factors and stock characteristics in the asset pricing literature.

The authors design a metric for measuring insiders’ trade execution quality: the trading alpha. The authors run regression analysis to control for trade difficulty, insider reputations and the corporate role ranks of insiders and document the existence of the abnormal trading alpha. The authors further form portfolios based on the abnormal trading alpha and document a significant abnormal return that is robust to both standard asset pricing factors model and the stock characteristics adjustments.

Outperforming insiders at the aggregate level resemble value investors who trade on long-term fundamental information, trade patiently and earn rents from providing liquidity. Outside investors can mimic the outperforming insiders and reap significant abnormal portfolio returns.

Data limitations on insider trades and their association/interaction with their brokers prevent us from having a conclusive investigation of the trading skill hypothesis. The authors hope to further research along the lines of the trading skill hypothesis as compared to investment style hypothesis with more detailed data about the brokers used by insiders.

The findings can be applied for money management profession in that outsider investors can monitor the trading execution and construct portfolios based on the adjusted abnormal trading alpha. The resulting portfolio has been documented to be highly profitable after risk adjustments using standard asset pricing factors as well as stock characteristics.

Professional money managers and outsider investors should be able to benefit from the findings in this paper and use the proposed trading alpha metric to construct and rebalance real-time investment portfolios.

Outperforming insiders at the aggregate level resemble value investors who act on long-term fundamental information, trade patiently and earn rents from providing liquidity. From the perspective of investment implications, outside investors can mimic the outperforming insiders and reap substantial portfolio returns that withstand the erosion from adjustments for both the standard factors and stock characteristics in the asset pricing literature.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish whether director trades provide information to investors about the future prospects of the company they form part of and thus reduce the information asymmetry beyond what is already conveyed in the financial statements.

Director Dealings were dealt with as an investment strategy by looking at past transactions of directors executed between January 2005 and December 2014 on the Malta Stock Exchange (MSE) and evaluating whether there was an increase in returns for investors who copy director trades. The study focused on whether short-term abnormal returns for up to 12 months after the transaction date, being either a buy or a sale, were made by directors in Malta when trading in their own companies.

The results show that in the short-term period of up to 12 months after the transaction date, Maltese directors do transmit information to the market both when they purchase shares in their own companies and also when they sell shares. The interesting fact about the study is that in Malta sale transactions are more valuable to the outsiders than purchase transactions. Apart from this, the results also show that some companies which are listed on the MSE are more indicative as to their future performance than others. It was ultimately concluded that even though there are informational asymmetries between directors in a company and outsiders, an outsider cannot trade solely by following director trades. The implications of the findings are discussed.

This study attempts to determine the level of significance that each insider trade has on the Maltese market, what each director trade conveys to the said market and if these trades are valuable to the outside investors even though such investors do not have knowledge of the grounds upon which the directors trade.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the trading patterns of corporate insiders, both managing and non-managing, around the announcement dates of securities class action lawsuits and related legal settlements.

The authors use market model event study methodology to examine the impact of class action litigation and settlement announcements on the stock prices of sued firms. The authors then determine the extent of abnormal insider trading surrounding such announcements by comparing insider trading activity (volume and transaction counts) to prior insider trading in the same firm, and to a matched sample of firms not experiencing such litigation announcements. A multivariate framework is utilized to provide further insight into the determinants of such abnormal insider trading.

The authors establish that class action litigation and settlement announcements have a significant impact on the stock prices of sued firms, and that foreknowledge of these events appears to be used by insiders to earn abnormal profits. Moreover, results indicate that managing insiders exhibit higher opportunistic abnormal trading activity than non-managing insiders. Multivariate analysis shows that size, prior firm returns, and the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are important determinants of such insider trading.

This appears to be the first paper to analyze insider trading surrounding class action settlement announcements, and raises concerns about the ethical conduct of certain insider groups while highlighting the importance of access to private information, even amongst insiders themselves.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the underlying option impacts an insider’s propensity to purchase and sell before corporate announcements, the proportion of insiders’ trading after announcements relative to before announcements, and the insider’s profitability around corporate announcements.

The authors test whether the timing information and option have impacted on the tendency of insider trade, the percentage of all shares traded by insiders in the post-announcement to pre-announcement periods and the average cumulative abnormal stock returns during the pre-announcement period.

Insiders’ propensity to trade before announcements is higher for stocks without options listed than for stocks with traded options. This result is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. The proportion of insiders’ trade volume after announcements relative to before announcements in stocks that have not options listed is higher than those in stocks with traded options. The positive relationship between the insiders’ signed volume and the informational content of corporate announcements is stronger in stocks without traded options than in stocks with options listed. Insider trades prior to unscheduled announcement are more profitable than those before scheduled ones.

The paper examines whether there is a difference between the effects of optioned stock and non-optioned stock. Roll et al. (2010) use the relative trading volume of options to stock ratio (O/S) to proxy for informed options trading activity. Future research could explore the impact of O/S. Moreover, the authors examine how insiders with private information use such information to trade in their own firms. Mehta et al. (2017) argue that insiders also use private information to facilitate trading (shadow trading) in linked firms, such as supply chain partners or competitors. Therefore, future research could consider the impact of shadow trading.

Since the insider’s propensity to buy before announcements in stocks without options listed is larger than in stocks with traded options and the relationship is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones, the efforts of regulators should focus on monitoring insider trading in stocks without options listed prior to unscheduled announcements.

First, Lei and Wang (2014) find that the increasing pattern of insider’s propensity to trade before unscheduled announcements is larger than that before scheduled announcements. The authors document the underlying option has impacted the insider’s propensity to purchase and sell, and the relationship is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. Second, related studies show insider’s trading activity has shifted from periods before corporate announcements to periods after corporate announcements to decrease litigation risk. This paper find the underlying option has influenced the proportion of insiders’ trading after announcements relative to before announcements when the illegal insider trade-related penalties increase.

This paper aims to investigate the main motivations for Italian insiders to trade relevant stakes of their companies, specifically assuming that most transactions are driven by speculative intents. According to an information asymmetry hypothesis, insiders, having a superior information set, may better detect the temporary under or overvaluation of stocks. Moreover, when insider trading law is not well enforced, insiders may take advantage of relevant and undisclosed information. In both cases, such transactions would convey an important signal to uninformed traders.

In order to determine whether insiders are able to earn abnormal returns, a standard event study methodology is used and, then, a profitable mimicking portfolio strategy is proposed.

The paper finds statistical evidence of a positive relationship between the change of holdings and the sign of market movement: excess returns are earned after a positive increase of relevant stakes and negative abnormal returns follow an opposite insiders' strategy. In particular, we find significant excess returns between the first and the third month following insiders' transactions. Market response is generally higher for insiders' purchases rather than sales and for insiders owning more than 50 per cent of the company.

As at European level laws on insider trading have been updated recently, future research could study this phenomenon after 2002, investigating if new laws were able to guarantee strong efficiency of the Italian market.

This paper is interesting because it is one of the few studies on insider trading carried out outside the USA.

The aim of this paper is to examine how informed traders, i.e. transient institutional investors that actively trade on information to maximize investment profits, use insider trading signals in addition to accounting numbers to mitigate future abnormal returns.

Using a sample of 44,843 firm‐quarters from 1988 to 2001 in the USA, the paper examines how informed investors use insider trading signals and the extent to which the use of these signals by informed investors impacts insiders' future abnormal returns from trading.

This study finds that the change in transient institutional ownership in the next‐quarter is positively associated with net insider trading in the current quarter, after controlling for accounting information (including total accruals, unexpected earnings, etc.). In addition, this study finds that insider profits decrease in transient institutional ownership, consistent with the notion that trading by informed investors limits insider profits.

The institutional ownership data are only available on a quarterly basis, which may not capture institutional investors' immediate response to insider trading signals.

This study provides systematic evidence on how informed traders use insider trading signals. This study adds to existing knowledge of the information environment of institutional investors by showing that transient institutional investors use insider trading signals in addition to accounting information in making investment decisions. Moreover, this study contributes to the literature on the determinants of insider profits by providing evidence that informed trading by investors has incremental power to explain insider profits.

Due to insufficient disclosure on open market share repurchases in the USA, at any given point in time, outside shareholders have no knowledge of whether their firm is executing open market share repurchase trades. It is hypothesized that such information disparity between outside shareholders and insiders of a repurchasing firm creates asymmetric opportunities for insiders to time their sell trades in a period when the firm is engaged in buyback trading of its own shares. Insiders have an incentive to sell when the firm is in the market supporting the price by repurchasing its shares. The purpose of this study is to examine this hypothesis (insider timing hypothesis) by investigating insiders' trading activities during the periods of corporate share buyback trading.

Multiple regression analyses are used to explore relations among trades by insiders, corporate share buyback trades, and a number of other control variables.

This study finds evidence that insiders do increase the net number of shares sold in a fiscal quarter when the firm is in the market engaged in share buyback trading.

This study suggests the possibility of insiders' opportunistic trading behavior during the periods of corporate open market share buyback trading.