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This paper presents a model and evidence regarding the incidence of independent contractors and the self-employed. It focuses on the rights to control the work routine as an important issue distinguishing employee and non-employee workers. The conditions under which it is optimal for the buyer of labor services to control the work routine (and use employees) and when is it desirable for the seller to have control are considered. The model emphasizes the costs of measuring worker output vs. monitoring worker effort, worker expertise, and worker investment and is tested with Current Population Survey data merged with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The empirical findings are broadly consistent with the approach. Independent contractors tend to be in jobs that are harder to monitor and having more worker expertise such as jobs involving more intellectual skills, having a greater variety of duties, and requiring more worker expertise and training. This is even more true of the other self-employed. We also review existing empirical research on self-employment, discussing how it fits into our baseline model and evaluating the arguments to explain independent contractors and self-employment. These include a desire to reduce fringe benefits, demand and staffing uncertainty, wanting to avoid lawsuits for wrongful termination, a desire to protect a reputation for not laying-off employees, credit constraints, and worker desire for flexibility. There is strong evidence that credit constraints have a substantial influence on self-employment status and likewise for worker desire for job flexibility. The literature suggests that the desire to avoid payment of fringe benefits, demand and staffing variability, and avoidance of potential wrongful dismissal lawsuits induces firms to use more temporary agency workers but does not seem to affect the use of independent contractors.

The confidence in the qualifications and independence of the audit activities and professionals has been lost due to the financial scandals that have arisen over time. These scandals in the accounting and auditing fields caused both enterprises and investors to suffer from large amounts of losses and thus the need for reliable financial statements and corporate governance increased.

Both investors and decision-makers need independent assurance to achieve transparent, reliable, and impartial financial information. The fulfillment of this requirement is possible through independent auditing activity and independent audit firms. Business management shall carry out the selection of independent auditors based on various criteria (fee, reputation, audit team, relations, etc.). In addition, it may also be necessary to periodically change an independent audit firm due to rotation or other reasons (fee, disputes, relationships, etc.).

In this study, a ranking of the importance level of the evaluation criteria, for the selection and change of the independent audit firm in an enterprise in Borsa İstanbul (BIST) 100 in Turkey, was conducted. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), which is one of the multicriteria decision-making techniques, was used for ranking. In the hierarchy established for the selection of the independent audit firm, the main criteria of the “audit fee” and the “reputation and qualifications of the audit firm” have been established. According to the findings obtained as a result of binary comparisons, the first four ranks among sub-criteria are “provision of international service,” “quality of technical expertise of audit firm,” “industry expertise of audit firm,” and “suitability of fee offered by audit firm.”

For the change of audit firm, four main criteria “audit fee,” “disputes arising during the audit process,” “relations with the audit firm,” and “rotation” are taken into consideration. For sub-criteria, first four criteria were “rotation of independent audit firm,” “rotation of independent auditor,” “audit firm’s inability to adequately practice proactive audit approaches,” and “inadequate communication.”

To explore the importance of the board of director nomination process (that is, who nominates a given director for a position on the firm’s board) for the voting outcomes, disciplining of management, and overall monitoring quality of the board of directors.

We exploit a recent regulation passed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requiring disclosure of the board nomination process. In particular, we focus on firms’ use of executive search firms versus allowing internal members (often simply the CEO) to nominate new directors to serve on the board of directors.

We show that companies that use search firms to find board members pay their CEOs significantly higher salaries and significantly higher total compensations. Further, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly less likely to fire their CEOs following negative performance. In addition, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly more likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and see abnormally low returns from this M&A activity. We instrument the endogenous choice of using an executive search through the varying geographic distance of companies to executive search firms. Using this instrumental variable framework, we show search firm-identified independent directors’ negative impact on firm performance, consistent with firm behavior and governance consequences we document.

Given the recent law passage, we are the first to directly analyze the nomination process, and show a surprisingly large predictive effect of seemingly arm’s-length nominations. This has clear implications for thinking carefully through how independence is defined in the director nomination process.

The main purpose of the study is to examine the influence of family directors on the firm performance of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. This study provides empirical evidence on the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority interests in the concentrated ownership setting.

Samples of the study are 112 PLCs in year 2006. Two measures of firm performance are used: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Managerial ownership refers to the percentage shareholdings of executive directors with direct and indirect holdings. It was further categorized into family ownership and non-family ownership.

In relation to ROA, managerial ownership is found positively significant. The results also show that the positive relationship between managerial ownership is contributed by the managerial-non-family ownership. In relation to Tobin’s Q, the results show a U-shape with turning point at 31.38% for managerial ownership and 28.29% for the managerial-family ownership. The results found significant and positive relationships between managerial ownership and both measures of firm performance which indicates that managerial ownership and family ownership yield greater efficiency.

The study highlights the effects of corporate governance on ROA and Tobin’s Q are somewhat different. It provides some evidence on the need to use appropriate measure of firm performance. The significant relationship supports the argument of Chami (1999), Fama and Jensen (1983), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and empirical evidence of Lee (2004) that family ownership enhances monitoring activities.

Differentiating the types of managerial ownership into family and non-family categories enriches our knowledge about who actually contributes to the improved performance.

This paper presents an empirical analysis of trade credit supplied by Japanese manufacturing firms and General Trading Companies. After reviewing major trade credit models and relevant Japanese literature, empirical tests examine the applicability of existing trade credit theories. Results indicate existing trade credit theory has little power to explain the level of trade credit supplied by Japanese firms. Instead, support is found for the information and risk sharing models in the Japanese keiretsu literature and the financial channeling process by which lending institutions supply General Trading Companies with liquidity that is, in turn, supplied to manufacturing firms.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance (focused on some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer duality) on financial analysts’ behavior in US. Results from panel data analysis for 294 US listed firms observed from 2007 to 2014 show that several attributes of the board of directors and audit committee have no effects on the number of analysts who are following the firm and the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings also suggest that firms with independent and large boards and blockholders ownership benefit of more analyst following. In addition, it is proven that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic and more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities have larger quoted spreads but of lower quality for the ones which have greater independent board members and institutional investor’s holding.

I test empirically the hypothesis that the monitoring role of the board of directors depends on the severity of the agency problems and the amount of information needed to monitor. I show that in high growth firms, where the agency conflicts are low and managers are likely to reveal more information to get advice, boards are more independent but less likely to monitor, while in low growth firms, boards are less likely to be independent, but the relationship between firm value and board independence is strong. Overall, boards become more independent but monitor less as firms’ growth opportunities increase, suggesting that managers trade off the amount of information released to the board to get a better advice and to mitigate the monitoring role of the board.

This chapter proposes that corporate lawyers be studied as committed to their clients, asking how they advance exercises of power by those whom they have chosen to represent. Currently, corporate lawyers are studied as independent from their clients, asking how they resist client demands. Such research continues despite repeated findings that corporate lawyers are not independent. This chapter explains the puzzling persistence of independence by cultural understandings of both professionalism and law. It recovers a submerged historic voice in which corporate lawyers are judged by their position in a network of relations. It argues that it was the organization of the corporate law firm as a factory which allowed it to become a professional ideal. Market competition has led corporate law firms to move away from a factory model to one in which commitment to clients, not independence from them, is the organizing principle.

We survey top managers of Fortune 1000 companies to learn if industry practitioners agree with the findings of academic research on specific corporate governance issues. We focus on board composition and size, executive/director compensation and ownership, firm performance, and other issues. The results suggest that the views of responding managers appear at odds with other empirical evidence provided in the literature on the majority of the issues examined. In addition, respondents are often unable to offer an opinion about whether they agree or disagree with specific corporate governance issues.

This chapter uses panel data techniques to analyze the impact of corporate governance and competition on performance of the firms operating in Muslim and non-Muslim economies. Also analyzed the corporate data of 3,158 firms operating in five non-Muslim economies and 1,785 firms operating in five Muslim economies. It is observed from the results that most of the firm-level variables have similar behavior with firm performance irrespective of ownership structure. It is also found that direct majority-owned firms are more profitable as compared to independent firms irrespective of the operating region. Further, it is also observed that operating environment, specifically governance system, has significant impacts on firm performance.