The Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Behavior of Financial Analysts of US Firms: An Empirical Analysis

International Corporate Governance and Regulation

ISBN: 978-1-78756-536-4, eISBN: 978-1-78756-535-7

ISSN: 1569-3732

Publication date: 1 November 2018

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance (focused on some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer duality) on financial analysts’ behavior in US. Results from panel data analysis for 294 US listed firms observed from 2007 to 2014 show that several attributes of the board of directors and audit committee have no effects on the number of analysts who are following the firm and the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings also suggest that firms with independent and large boards and blockholders ownership benefit of more analyst following. In addition, it is proven that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic and more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities have larger quoted spreads but of lower quality for the ones which have greater independent board members and institutional investor’s holding.

Keywords

Citation

Bouteska, A. (2018), "The Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Behavior of Financial Analysts of US Firms: An Empirical Analysis", International Corporate Governance and Regulation (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 20), Emerald Publishing Limited, pp. 131-172. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220180000020006

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Emerald Publishing Limited

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