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Based on the background of the restricted stock has gradually replaced stock option and has become the mainstream equity incentive model in China, this paper aims to investigate the which factors affect the choice of equity incentive model, and the impacts of equity incentive model.

The theoretical analysis is based on the game theory between shareholders and top executives. The empirical analysis is based on the detailed data of equity incentives in China’s listed companies from 2006 to 2017; the logit method and least square method are implemented to estimate the regression coefficients and Black–Scholes options pricing model to estimate the value of restricted stock/option granted to the CEO.

This paper documents that enterprises with serious agency problems, high investment risks, high stock price synchronicity and great executive power are significantly and positively related to restricted stock. The main empirical findings still hold after several robust tests. In addition, restricted stock can significantly improve corporate performance when the performance evaluation index is strict and the validity period is long, while for the sample group with loose performance index and short validity period, restricted stock significantly reduces corporate performance.

This paper analyzes the “black box” of equity incentive model selection from the stakeholders’ game perspective by constructing a game theory model to investigate the reasons for the choice of equity incentive model in various situations, which enriches the research in this field. Moreover, this paper finds that restricted stock has both incentive and welfare characteristics, and the rationality of performance appraisal goals is the key factor leading to the difference in incentive effects. Overall, the research indicates that only well-designed equity incentive plans can improve corporate performance, which contributes to regulators and practitioners to form a rational understanding of restricted stock model and provides a reference for their decision-making.

Research on makers and innovation has been equivocal regarding whether maker innovation is driven by internal motivation or external incentives. The motivation view favors the intrinsic motives of makers, whereas the incentive view supports external economic incentives. The authors combine both views to explore how innovation tournaments promote the product innovation outcomes of different creative and entrepreneurial makers, using economic incentives (money) or social incentives (love).

The authors interviewed 42 makers and collected a panel dataset of 29,823 makers from the largest digital maker community in China using a Python crawling program. The authors analyzed the data using multiple methods, including cluster analysis, discriminant analysis, factor analysis and negative binomial regression.

Compared with entrepreneurial makers, the product productivity of creative makers is inferior, but their product popularity is greater. The social incentive of innovation tournaments promotes the product productivity and popularity of creative makers compared with that of entrepreneurial makers, but the economic incentive is contradictory. In addition, social and economic incentives interact to generate inconsistent influences.

The study identifies creative and entrepreneurial makers and contributes to user innovation and innovation tournaments by integrating motivation and incentive views.

This study aims to examine the effects of local tournament incentives on environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure and the quality of such disclosures among Chinese A-share listed companies. Furthermore, it seeks to investigate the moderating roles of CEO duality, institutional investors’ shareholding and product market competition in this relationship.

This study uses a quantitative approach, and data from A-share listed companies in China spanning from 2012 to 2021. To test the proposed hypotheses, the authors conduct hierarchical regression analysis along with a series of robustness tests to ensure the validity of our findings.

The findings of this study indicate that local tournament incentives have a positive impact on companies’ propensity to disclose ESG information, yet they negatively influence the quality of these disclosures. Additionally, the presence of CEO duality and product market competition attenuate this relationship, whereas the shareholding of institutional investors serves to strengthen it.

This study’s findings can aid policymakers and regulators in China and other emerging economies in policies that promote high-quality ESG information disclosure, taking into account local tournament incentives. Furthermore, the study underscores the importance of maintaining robust corporate governance structures within firms to ensure that CEOs’ self-serving motivations do not undermine ESG disclosure.

This study adds to the ongoing discourse on the significance of ESG disclosure in emerging economies by analyzing the influence of executive promotion incentives on ESG disclosure from an external labor market standpoint. By exploring the potential self-serving motivations of CEOs in promoting ESG values and practices within organizations, this paper addresses a gap in the existing literature.

The increasing prevalence of a wide range of infectious diseases, as well as the underwhelming results of vaccination rates that may be traced back to problems with vaccine procurement and distribution, have brought to the fore the importance of vaccine supply chain (VSC) management in recent years. VSC is the cornerstone of effective vaccination; hence, it is crucial to enhance its performance, particularly in low- and middle-income countries where immunization rates are not satisfactory.

In this paper, the authors focus on VSC performance improvement of India by proposing supply contracts under demand uncertainty. The authors propose three contracts – wholesale price (WSP), cost sharing (CS) and incentive mechanism (IM) for the government-operated immunization program of India.

The authors' findings indicate that IM is capable of coordinating the supply chain, whereas the other two contracts are inefficient for the government. To validate the model, it is applied to a real-world scenario of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in India, and the findings show that an IM contract improves the overall efficiency of the system by 23.72%.

Previous studies focused mainly on the influenza VSC industry within developed nations. Nonetheless, there exists a dearth of literature pertaining to the examination of supply contracts and their feasibility for immunization programs that are administered by the government and aimed at optimizing societal benefits. The authors' findings can be beneficial to the immunization program of India to optimize their VSC cost.

The green building (GB) market is maturing after years of practice; therefore, incentives for promoting GB should be adapted to reflect the market transformation. Adapting incentives can positively influence stakeholders' motives, which in turn change stakeholders' behavioural intention towards GBs. Hence, this study aims to examine the parameters influencing the decision to adopt GB and to ascertain how incentive mechanisms promote the uptake of GB in South Africa.

Using a scoping literature review and a sequential mixed research method, primary data were acquired from GB experts in four South African provinces. In analysing the quantitative data, the factors were ranked hierarchically using the mean ranking technique and factor analysis was computed to identify the underlying GB incentives. The qualitative data were analysed using content analysis.

The results indicate that incentive payment from a utility energy efficiency programme, rebates and discounts relating to environmentally friendly materials and products and providing grants to homeowners and developers to go towards certification were the most essential monetary incentives for promoting GB. In the category of non-monetary incentives, recognition of consultant team members and developers and free marketing/good publicity were the most important incentives. The incentive mechanisms were subsequently categorised as “Economic incentives” and “Reward scheme and technical support”.

This study was confined to four metropolitan areas in South Africa. Nevertheless, the outcomes have practical implications for GB projects in general and may serve as a good reference for other provinces in South Africa.

The findings of the study are a valuable resource for stakeholders such as the government, municipal assemblies, professional bodies and the Green Building Council of South Africa (GBCSA) in developing effective incentive mechanisms to promote GB adoption. This study adds to the body of knowledge relevant to GB incentivisation in South Africa.

The use of pay for performance (P4P) as an instrument to incentivise quality improvements in health care is at a crossroads in high-income countries but has remained a commonly used tool in low- and middle-income countries. The authors aimed to take stock of the evidence on effectiveness and design from across income settings to reveal insights for the future design of performance payment across income contexts.

The authors identified Cochrane literature reviews of the use of P4P in health care in any income setting, tracked the development in the quantity and quality of evidence over time, and compared the incentive design features used across high-income countries compared to low- and middle-income countries.

The quantity and quality of the evidence base have grown over time but can still be improved. Scheme design varies across income settings, and although some design choices may reflect differences in context, the authors find that incentive designers in both income settings can learn from practices used in the other setting.

The research and literature on P4P in high-, low- and middle-income countries largely operate in silos. By taking stock of the evidence on P4P from across income settings, the authors are able to draw out key insights between these settings, which remain underexplored in the literature.

Frontline workers (FLWs) constitute a critical part of the implementation cadre within public policies, serving a significant role in the last-mile delivery of public goods and services. FLWs under public programs in low and middle-income countries like India are offered different compensation structures that range from full-time salaries, piece rate honorariums, contractual engagements, to no remuneration. Whilst the rationale for offering different compensations vary, are certain structures more successful in encouraging FLWs to perform a prosocial task? Further, can certain structures encourage FLWs to perform beyond the incentivized policy mandate?

Investigating workers' prosocial effort within policy implementation, the authors conducted a randomized lab-in-the-field inquiry with 344 Anganwadi-based workers (workers under the nutrition policy) in western India. These FLWs were engaged to perform a novel real-effort task that was tied to different incentive structures and their performance was adjudged based on measurable quantity, effort and quality parameters.

Results demonstrate that uncompensated workers invest the greatest amount of effort whilst compromising on task quality, and vice-versa for subjects receiving pay-for-performance compensation. Programs must account for policy focus when offering compensations: volunteer engagement may be counterproductive for quality focus and to the adherence to ancillary task mandates like nature/quality of beneficiary interaction. On the other hand, the distribution of products (like health goods) can rely on volunteer effort.

The study brings together various compensation schemes operating at the field level, under one study using an LFE methodology within the context of policy implementation in India.

This study aims to empirically test the effects of key characteristics of performance-based contracting (PBC) (i.e. reward/payment scheme, increased supplier autonomy and transfer of responsibilities) on supplier goal commitment.

This study developed a conceptual model applying goal-setting theory (GST), expectancy theory (ET) and job characteristics theory (JCT). Survey data were collected and analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM) to establish a validated measurement instrument for testing the hypotheses.

The findings revealed that PBC positively affects supplier goal commitment due to its unique characteristics, which translates into improved supplier performance. Furthermore, this study validated the mediating role of goal alignment and felt accountability operating between PBC characteristics and supplier goal commitment.

This study explored the buyer–supplier relationship from the supplier's standpoint. Using a more inclusive data set, future research may involve a dyadic analysis and focus on the effects of the following factors on the supplier goal commitment: relational aspects (e.g. trust and collaboration), the risk transfer from the buyer to the supplier, different incentive schemes and successful PBC implementation factors.

This study presents new, validated insights for contract selection, design and management. It underlines the importance of choosing the proper contract, having the appropriate contract design based on the desired outcomes and effective contract management by exhibiting the psychological/behavioral effect of fundamental PBC characteristics.

PBC represents an active research stream, but its psychological/behavioral implications are understudied. Therefore, this research puts forth a conceptual framework with multiple testable hypotheses illustrating the relationship between PBC and supplier goal commitment.

Construction projects have become increasingly long, complex and costly with waste and inefficiencies and often fail to achieve the desired results. Integrated project delivery (IPD) is believed to change these problems. A reasonable and fair profit distribution mechanism is a critical factor for ensuring the success of the IPD projects. This study aims to investigate the strategies of all participants in the profit distribution of an IPD project with respect to the factor of the effort level.

This study describes the influence of owners and participants on profit distribution due to their respective efforts in the IPD project alliance. The influence of effort level on profit distribution is discussed based on the Holmstrom-Milgrom model of asymmetric information game theory and principal-agent theory, combined with incentive compatibility (IC) constraints and individual rationality (IR) constraints.

The results show that the optimal level of effort by each participant optimizes the profit distribution of an IPD project. At the same time, in the revenue incentive contract, the effort level of the participants is positively correlated with the profit distribution, proportional to their contribution coefficient and inversely proportional to the square of the cost of their creative activities in terms of effort. Each party of an IPD project can adopt a series of measures to improve their own effort level and choose the optimal level of effort based on the profit distribution, while satisfying their own utility maximization.

This study introduces the Holmstrom-Milgrom model in the principal-agent theory to explore the influence of the effort level on profit distribution in IPD projects. The quantitative model can contribute to establish a fair and efficient profit distribution scheme for the IPD projects.

This study aims to estimate Pakistan’s export potential in new and existing export products, as well as their potential destination markets.

This study uses a nonparametric approach based on demand, supply and easiness factors for estimating export potential at disaggregated product and destination levels.

A significant number of new export products (extensive margin) and existing products (intensive margin) are identified that have export potential. The estimated unrealized export potential at extensive margins is $2bn and at intensive margins is $5bn. The range of new products included value-added products, semifinished products and intermediate products. Surprisingly, there is high potential to diversify in China and export existing products more intensively in the EU. Moreover, the potential at extensive margins is regional diverse compared to intensive margins.

The methodology used in this paper only provides export potential for short-to-medium term period because the global demand conditions are varying. Also, the mineral and resource-based products cannot be included in the analysis because their exports are heavily dependent on the availability of natural resources.

The findings have important policy implications in terms of providing guidelines for government policies related to industrial development, international trade and export promotion at the product and destination level. Overall, the study reveals that traditional sectors lack room for product diversification. As the existing export incentives favor major industries. To foster diversification, existing incentives must be redesigned to cover new products or sectors. Moreover, China has the greatest potential for product diversification, while Europe has the greatest potential to export current products more intensively. Further research is needed to simulate trade policy scenarios and estimate demand, supply and ease factors in export potential.

This study provides a unique perspective on export potential assessment at disaggregated product and destination levels, reinforcing the importance of redesigning trade policies and export incentives separately for export diversification.