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The purpose of this paper is to develop a multistakeholder scale for assessing an excellent human resource (HR) function to demonstrate the extent to which it is focused on creating value from the perspective of its key internal and external stakeholders.

At the first stage, an in-depth literature review was conducted to extract the best practices for an excellent HR function. Then, to test the validation of the developed framework, it was sent to HR academics and practitioners in different countries. The survey responses were analyzed using the methods of the structural equation modeling (SEM) and confirmatory factorial analysis.

This study proposes an excellent HR multistakeholder assessment scale consisting of ten criteria based on the perceptions of internal and external HR stakeholders.

This study suggests a framework for assessing overall HR excellence based on the perceptions of key internal and external HR stakeholders. In addition, it is recommended that future researchers empirically test the developed scale across various industries and firm sizes.

HR managers, by using this framework, could continuously assess their HR excellence and compare their HR excellence with other companies’ HR excellence in the industry and then plan for continuous improvement in different HR areas to improve their stakeholders’ experiences.

This paper identifies the enablers and results of an excellent HR department and designs a multistakeholder feedback scale to better understand key internal and external HR stakeholders’ perceptions.

The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.

This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.

The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.

This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.

The green building (GB) market is maturing after years of practice; therefore, incentives for promoting GB should be adapted to reflect the market transformation. Adapting incentives can positively influence stakeholders' motives, which in turn change stakeholders' behavioural intention towards GBs. Hence, this study aims to examine the parameters influencing the decision to adopt GB and to ascertain how incentive mechanisms promote the uptake of GB in South Africa.

Using a scoping literature review and a sequential mixed research method, primary data were acquired from GB experts in four South African provinces. In analysing the quantitative data, the factors were ranked hierarchically using the mean ranking technique and factor analysis was computed to identify the underlying GB incentives. The qualitative data were analysed using content analysis.

The results indicate that incentive payment from a utility energy efficiency programme, rebates and discounts relating to environmentally friendly materials and products and providing grants to homeowners and developers to go towards certification were the most essential monetary incentives for promoting GB. In the category of non-monetary incentives, recognition of consultant team members and developers and free marketing/good publicity were the most important incentives. The incentive mechanisms were subsequently categorised as “Economic incentives” and “Reward scheme and technical support”.

This study was confined to four metropolitan areas in South Africa. Nevertheless, the outcomes have practical implications for GB projects in general and may serve as a good reference for other provinces in South Africa.

The findings of the study are a valuable resource for stakeholders such as the government, municipal assemblies, professional bodies and the Green Building Council of South Africa (GBCSA) in developing effective incentive mechanisms to promote GB adoption. This study adds to the body of knowledge relevant to GB incentivisation in South Africa.

Research on the effect of executive equity incentives is equivocal. Based on agency theory, some scholars take the convergence of interest logic to highlight the benefits of executive equity incentives. In contrast, others adopt the entrenchment logic to emphasize the increased agency costs. This study attempts to reconcile the debate on executive equity incentives and integrates the opposing views to unveil how executive equity incentives impact corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance.

Using the panel dataset of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2022, this study integrates the convergence of interest and entrenchment logic to examine how executive equity incentives affect CSR performance.

We find that the relationship between executive equity incentives and CSR performance follows an inverted U-shaped form. According to the convergence of interest logic, executive equity incentives reduce agency costs when allocating resources to engage in CSR activities and enable firms to increase their CSR investments, ultimately realizing increased CSR performance. After a threshold, however, the accumulation of extensive equity incentives causes the entrenchment effect, resulting in declined CSR performance. Our empirical results also shed new light on its contingent perspective – the inverted U-shaped relationship is attenuated when firms’ stock liquidity is high.

This study attempts to reconcile the debate on executive equity incentives and integrates the opposing views to unveil the inverted U-shaped relationship between executive equity incentives and CSR performance. Our study opens promising avenues for further research on corporate governance and CSR strategies.

This study aims to investigate whether integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices mediates the relationship between executive incentive compensation and the financial performance of Islamic and conventional banks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

This study used multiple regression models to analyze the effectiveness of ESG practices as a mediating variable in explaining the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance between 2015 and 2021. The sample consisted of 57 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the MENA region, and the data were collected from the Thomson Reuters database (Data Stream).

This research paper showed the positive and significant mediating effect of the ESG practice on Banks’ financial performance. Thus, banks’ financial and stock market profitability is influenced by ESG information disclosure. This finding shows that taking ESG into account improves the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance.

The results may interest academic researchers, regulators and policymakers and would support stakeholders and decision-makers who wish to discover how executive incentive compensation affects financial performance in banks.

This study contributes to previous literature by studying the mediating effect of ESG practices on the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance. Indeed, the originality of this research paper is justified by the scarcity of studies and, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, constitutes one of the first attempts to examine this relationship via a mediating variable, i.e. ESG.

This study aims to validate the link between production manipulation and a firm’s performance variability (fundamentals and stock returns). It explores whether executives' risk-taking incentives encourage production deviations around the normal level during uncertainty.

Utilizing panel data of manufacturing firms from Compustat over three decades, the study investigates production management practices during economic uncertainty. The Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU) is employed as a key metric. The empirical strategy involves documenting the effect of economic uncertainty on overproduction and underproduction, examining the role of executive compensation and assessing the impact on risk.

The research finds that risk-taking incentives increase over/underproduction, particularly amplifying the extent of underproduction during uncertainty. Production deviation rises, indicating that firms take greater risk by engaging in abnormal business operations. The study’s results are robust against various econometric methods, emphasizing the influence of risk-taking incentives on corporate production decisions.

While providing valuable insights, the study acknowledges inherent limitations, including factors influencing production decisions beyond risk-taking incentives. Further research could explore additional determinants for a comprehensive understanding.

The findings highlight the potential dark side of executive compensation that motivates suboptimal risk-taking decisions, impacting risk, cost of capital and firm performance. Policymakers and compensation committees can use these insights to design efficient systems that mitigate moral hazard problems associated with productivity changes.

The study emphasizes the broader social implications of production manipulation under uncertainty. It prompts discussions on the ethical considerations of managerial opportunism, its potential consequences for stakeholders and market dynamics.

This study contributes to the literature by examining the role of economic uncertainty on production manipulation and the influence of risk-taking incentives. It extends the earnings management literature by considering real activity manipulation and emphasizing the importance of decomposing production deviation into positive and negative values.

This study aims to investigate how a French multinational enterprise (MNE) is developing employee stock ownership (ESO) in its subsidiaries in Peru and Mexico, both Latin American countries with deep social and economic inequalities.

This is a qualitative case study which conducted interviews with representatives of the French MNE and its subsidiaries in Peru and Mexico.

The employee stock purchase plans offered by the company to its employees support the achievement of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) 1, 8 and 10 in these countries.

The authors argue that MNEs could become flagships in the SDG achievement in emerging economies.

By contributing to better workplace outcomes and enhanced corporate performance, ESO is in line with SDG 8. ESO also fulfills SDGs 1 and 10 by allowing employees to build up savings and wealth, whose lack is the main source of inequality and poverty. Reciprocity and binary economics theories explain these relationships.

We study the potential effects of pension underfunding on corporate investment, financial constraints and improved employee bonding using 10 Pacific-Basin countries (including the United States, Australia, and eight Asian countries) at heterogeneous economic development stages and different regulatory environments. We document that corporate pensions are significantly underfunded in most countries of our sample in the period of 2001–2017, when interest rates were ultralow in most countries. In addition, firms from countries with stronger employee protection and more generous retirement benefits tend to show higher levels of underfunding in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans. To the extent of pension underfunding imposing constraints on corporate investment, we find that firms in these countries can face more constraints on investment when their pension is underfunded.

Drawing insights from institutional theory, this paper aims to examine whether and to what extent banks have reconfigured their management control systems (MCSs) in response to growing institutional pressures towards sustainability, understood as environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues.

The authors conducted an exploratory study at the three largest Italian banking groups to shed light on changes made in MCSs to account for ESG issues. The analysis is based on 12 semi-structured interviews with managers from the sustainability and controls areas, as well as from other relevant operational areas particularly concerned with the integration process of ESG issues. Additionally, secondary data sources were used. The Malmi and Brown (2008) MCS framework, consisting of a package of five types of formal and informal control mechanisms, was used to structure and analyse the empirical data.

The examined banks widely implemented numerous changes to their MCSs as a response to the heightened sustainability pressures from regulatory bodies and stakeholders. In particular, with the exception of action planning, the results show an extensive integration of ESG issues into the five control mechanisms of Malmi and Brown’s framework, namely, long-term planning, cybernetic, reward/compensation, administrative and cultural controls.

By identifying the approaches banks followed in reconfiguring traditional MCSs, this research sheds light on how adequate MCSs can promote banks’ “sustainable behaviours”. The results can, thus, contribute to defining best practices on how MCSs can be redesigned to support the integration of ESG issues into the banks’ way of doing business.

Overall, the findings support the theoretical assertion that institutional pressures influence the design of banks’ MCSs, and that both formal and informal controls are necessary to ensure a real engagement towards sustainability. More specifically, this study reveals that MCSs, by encompassing both formal and informal controls, are central to enabling banks to appropriately understand, plan and control the transition towards business models fully oriented to the integration of ESG issues. Thereby, this allows banks to effectively respond to the increased stakeholder demands around ESG concerns.

Excessive borrowing significantly contributes to pushing businesses towards default and their transition into zombie enterprises. Despite government efforts to implement deleveraging policies and guide bank credit flows, it’s essential to delve into the internal dynamics that steer the borrowing behavior of these zombie enterprises at a micro level. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the issue, this study focuses on examining the incentives that drive corporate executives of zombie enterprises to consistently engage in large-scale borrowing from banks.

In this study, panel data analysis is utilized, incorporating firm-, industry- and year-fixed effects. Drawing from data pertaining to listed companies in China spanning from 2007 to 2020, we employ a one-by-one identification method to pinpoint zombie enterprises. Ultimately, a total of 2,533 samples of zombie enterprises were obtained.

The results indicate that as bank loans to zombie enterprises increase, executive monetary compensation decreases, while on-the-job consumption by executives increases, and they are less likely to be forced into rotation. Mechanism testing reveals that corporate performance partially mediates the relationship between bank loans and executive monetary compensation, but this mediation is ineffective for on-the-job consumption and job rotation. Further investigation suggests that the property rights nature of central enterprises and modified audit opinions can exacerbate the adverse impact of bank loans on the monetary compensation of zombie corporate executives, without significantly affecting on-the-job consumption or job rotation. Conversely, executive power does not enhance the positive effects of bank loans on monetary compensation or on-the-job consumption, but it diminishes the negative impact of bank loans on the forced rotation of zombie executives.

These results indicate that while bank loans may have a negative impact on corporate value, they function as safeguards for the positions and interests of executives. As a result, bank loans serve as incentives for executives of zombie enterprises.

This study holds theoretical significance as it explores the motivations behind non-performing loans in high-borrowing enterprises, sheds light on corporate governance challenges encountered by zombie enterprises and provides policy insights aimed at addressing the underlying causes of persistent non-performing loans in high-borrowing enterprises, including zombie enterprises.