Search results

Supply chain vulnerability (SCV) analysis is vital for manufacturers globally because it creates a pathway for building resilient supply chains in uncertain environments. This study aims to identify drivers of SCV in the Indian manufacturing sector.

Sixteen drivers were identified from the literature review and followed by expert interviews. Interpretive structural modeling was used to determine the hierarchical structural relationship among identified SCV factors.

It was found that risk is not a board room agenda. Misaligned performance measures with incentives and lack of risk dashboard are the causal factors of SCV. Supply chain security, centralized production and distribution and lack of trust in the supply chain were driven factors.

This provides new insights to assess and prioritize initiatives for supply chain sustainability in terms of continuing business operations. The structural model provides a systemic view of SCV and helps reduce vulnerability.

The global economy has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has placed greater responsibility on companies to fulfill their obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) amid the crisis. This chapter investigates the role of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) attributes in improving a firm's CSR in the emerging economy of Jordan and how the COVID-19 pandemic modifies this relationship. Using a Jordanian sample of 655 firm-year observations during the 2014–2021 period, the research results show that older CEOs, well-educated CEOs, CEOs' remuneration, and CEOs' ownership positively correlate with CSR reporting. However, long-tenured CEOs are associated with lower CSR initiatives. The subsample analysis findings also validate the significance of CEO attributes in improving CSR practice during the COVID-19 pandemic compared to the prepandemic period. These findings are beneficial for the regulatory setters to understand better whether CEO attributes are linked to engagement in CSR-related information. This research is among the limited number of studies that have explored how CEO attributes impact CSR reporting for the stakeholder's welfare. Moreover, it uniquely concentrated on contrasting the findings before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to governance theory, choosing an effective supply chain (SC) governance mechanism can balance the interests and conflicts between enterprises and help them achieve their performance goals. However, incentive and relational governance have not been fully studied in improving enterprise cooperative performance (ECP). This study aims to examine the relationship between incentive and relational governance in general, the direct effects of combined governance strategy (CGS; the combination dimension of the above two governance mechanisms) on ECP and the mediating effects of SC ambidexterity on CGS and ECP in particular.

To test the hypotheses, this study implements hierarchical linear regression and bootstrap with a survey data set of Chinese manufacturing enterprises.

Results demonstrate that incentive and relational governance can generate complementary effects through enabling and compensating mechanisms, and their combination, that is, CGS, can promote ECP more than a single governance approach; CGS is conducive to solving the SC ambidexterity dilemma and can simultaneously enhance SC alignment and adaptability, thus further improving ECP; and SC ambidexterity plays an intermediary role between CGS and ECP.

The present study examines the complex interaction between incentive governance, relational governance, SC ambidexterity, and ECP. Implications for theory and practice are that formulating appropriate CGS can develop SC ambidexterity and improve ECP.

This study reveals the green building development path and analyzes the optimal government subsidy equilibrium through evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation. This was done to explore the feasible measures and optimal incentives to achieve higher levels of green building in China.

First, the practice of green building in China was analyzed, and the specific influencing factors and incentive measures for green building development were extracted. Second, China-specific evolutionary game models were constructed between developers and homebuyers under the market regulation and government incentive mechanism scenarios, and the evolutionary paths were analyzed. Finally, real-case numerical simulations were conducted, subsidy impacts were mainly analyzed and optimal subsidy equilibriums were solved.

(1) Simultaneously subsidizing developers and homebuyers proved to be the most effective measure to promote the sustainability of green buildings. (2) The sensitivity of developers and homebuyers to subsidies varied across scenarios, and the optimal subsidy level diminished marginally as building greenness and public awareness increased. (3) The optimal subsidy level for developers was intricately tied to the building greenness benchmark. A higher benchmark intensified the developer’s responsiveness to losses, at which point increasing subsidies were justified. Conversely, a reduction in subsidy might have been appropriate when the benchmark was set at a lower level.

The expeditious advancement of green buildings holds paramount importance for the high-quality development of the construction industry. Nevertheless, the pace of green building expansion in China has experienced a recent deceleration. Drawing insights from the practices of green building in China, the exploration of viable strategies and the determination of optimal government subsidies stand as imperative initiatives. These endeavors aim to propel the acceleration of green building proliferation and materialize high-quality development at the earliest juncture possible.

The model is grounded in China’s green building practices, which makes the conclusions drawn more specific. Furthermore, research results provide practical references for governments to formulate green building incentive policies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between CEOs' inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage of the firms they manage, with the aim to examine whether CEO incentives play a role in corporate risk-taking.

The authors investigate the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (CIDH) (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage (DOL) of the firms they manage. Using a sample of 11,145 US firm-year observations over the period 2006–2017, the authors find a strong negative association between CIDH and DOL. Additional analyses reveal that the relationship between CIDH and DOL is more pronounced in firms with heightened agency issues, powerful CEOs and for CEOs with stronger professional networks. The results are robust to various sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

The authors find strong evidence confirming the expected negative association between CEO inside debt and DOL suggesting that firms with higher inside debt tend to maintain lower levels of operating leverage. These findings continue to hold with the alternative measure for the inside debt and operating leverage, and across a range of tests designed to rule out the possibility that the primary findings are in any way driven by potential endogeneity. In addition, the findings demonstrate that the presence of manager-shareholder agency conflicts can strengthen the inside debt–DOL relationship suggesting the strong role of inside debt in reducing firm risk.

Findings in this paper have implications for design of compensation structures so that corporate boards can establish incentives as a tool for risk management. A limitation of this study is that it is focused on one market, i.e. US listed companies, so the findings may not be applicable on a global scale.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that links firm-level management of operating leverage through design of CEO inside debt incentives (two obvious choices for risk-reduction at the CEOs’ disposal include reducing financial risk through reduction of firm leverage and reducing operating risk through reduction of operating leverage). While use of firm leverage as an instrument of choice has been explored in the past, use of operating leverage to achieve risk reduction when CEO possess high inside holding, has received very little attention.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).

Based on agency and upper echelons theory, the heterogeneous monitoring function of specific types and the nature of institutional investors on board composition, compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics will be focused.

The author found that most studies have referred to archival studies, analyzed the impact of board governance on IO, focused on CEO characteristics, neglected IO heterogeneity and advanced regression models to address endogeneity concerns. In line with the theoretical framework, the relationship between total IO and board governance is heterogeneous. However, specific types such as foreign, dedicated and pressure-resistant institutions represent active monitoring tools and push for increased board governance.

The author provided useful recommendations for future research from a content and methodological perspective, e.g. the need for analyzing the impact of IO on sustainable board governance and other characteristics of top management team members, e.g. the chief financial officer.

As many regulatory bodies implemented regulations to promote shareholder rights and board governance, this literature review highlights the connections of both corporate governance mechanisms. Managers should conduct a careful and timely investor analysis and change the composition and compensation of the board of directors in line with institutional investors’ preferences.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on IO and board governance, whereas the author structured the heterogeneous variables and results within the structured literature review. The authors guides researchers, regulatory bodies and business practice in this corporate governance topic.

The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.

This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.

The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.

This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.

This study aims to observe and discuss an emerging disintermediation in transportation, finance and health care, and explain how these three key areas depend on intermediary institutions that are the fruit of modern corporate governance conditions that find their roots in classical sociological theory.

The authors review and incorporate a diversity of research literature to explain the likelihood for the development and continuation of disintermediation.

The authors map two sociological perspectives (Emile Durkheim’s theory of interdependence and Herbert Spencer’s theory of contracts) to two modern corporate governance theories (resource dependence theory and agency theory). The authors then discuss the challenging social situation resulting from modern corporate governance and show how these conditions create the potential for a continuum of disintermediation across the specific and crucial economic sectors of transportation, finance and health care.

The implications of this theoretical integration can help organizational leaders navigate complex social and strategic issues and prepare for the consequences that may result from the emerging disintermediation.

Research and interest in food loss and waste (FLW) have increased, but barriers stand in the way of firms engaging in food recovery efforts. The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of how firms overcome these barriers.

This study followed a qualitative, field-study-based research design in which 23 decision-makers at food-based organizations were interviewed. Quotes were extracted and categorized to develop a conceptual model of the food recovery process.

The conceptual model that evolved helps to explain decision-making related to FLW across the following dimensions: barriers to food recovery, incentives to overcome the barriers, internal processes for engaging in food recovery and external relationships influencing internal incentives and processes. In addition, the barriers and incentives were divided into operational and managerial issues.

Building on the barriers to food recovery in prior research, we explored the processes that help firms overcome these barriers. The model developed in this study is an important step toward addressing these processes and relationships. It can serve as a foundation for a variety of future studies of food recovery.