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This chapter focuses on the use of outcome-based performance management systems within public administration. It reports two qualitative case studies from respectively the Danish Tax and Customs Administration and the Swedish Tax Agency. Both of these administrations use outcome-based performance management systems to steer subsets of their administrative work. The chapter shows that the systems respond to broader demands for accounting for outcomes, yet, the systems also operate in very different ways. The Danish case shows a quantitative system which measures on a daily basis, the Swedish case shows a qualitative system which measures on a four to five-year basis. What is striking about both cases is that they balance meeting the demands for accounting for diffuse outcomes, with developing measurements that ‘fit’ local contingent concerns. While much of the current research on performance management systems in public administration is critical and stresses the downsides of such systems, this chapter shows that these systems should not always be assumed to be connected to gaming, strategic behaviour and/or reductionism. Instead, the performance management systems can be seen as attempts to reconcile and make ends meet in ‘post-bureaucratic’ organisations that are increasingly expected to account for rather diffuse and abstract outcomes and expected at the same time to steer and prioritise daily administrative work.

This chapter examines performance management, which has arguably been the kernel of New Public Management inspired version of public sector reform. The first part is a literature review that looks at experiences of performance management in both developed and developing countries. It looks at the difficulty in transferring public sector reforms from developed to developing countries. This is followed by the evaluation of performance management in the post-1994 public service in South Africa. Both the individual and organisational performance systems are highlighted, followed by an analysis of performance management reforms. There is a well-developed performance management system but the empirical data and qualitative reports found that it has not worked particularly well. There are concerns around a number of issues, including the measurement of targets; the signing of performance targets; a focus on outputs rather than outcomes; a lack of harmonisation between individual and organisational performance; a lack of capacity of managers, which in some cases is due to unskilled patronage appointments; a focus on compliance rather than performance; and a lack of accountability.

In order for a facilities management (FM) organisation to make effective use of the results of performance measurement it must be able to make the transition from measurement to management. It must also be able to anticipate needed changes in the strategic direction of the organisation and have a methodology in place for effecting strategic change. Successful accomplishment of these two tasks represents the foundation of good performance management. This paper explores baselines for moving from performance measurement to performance management and provides a discussion of how the FM performance assessment can be used to manage the FM function effectively.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the situation of performance management, to be more precise, the usage and attitudes towards pay‐for‐performance on the example of Estonian schools and brings out practical implications for implementing pay‐for‐performance in Estonian general educational schools.

Altogether 298 headmasters and 2,165 teachers participated in this research. The goal of the research was to map the situation of the usage of pay‐for‐performance in Estonian schools and to find out teachers' and headmasters' opinions about the most effective pay‐for‐performance system.

Despite the great expectations of performance management and pay‐for‐performance, it is not being used in many Estonian general educational schools. However, the findings of this research show that both headmasters and teachers have quite positive attitudes towards pay‐for‐performance that gives a favourable platform for implementing pay‐for‐performance in the Estonian educational sector.

The study was mainly quantitative with only a few open questions, which raises limitations for finding complete answers and explanations to questions raised. Therefore, case studies need to be done to find answers to some interesting research questions.

With the view to raising the performance of the Estonian educational system and to guarantee its sustainability, a new course concerning schools' and pupils' individual development must be taken. It can be achieved through performance management and pay‐for‐performance, which also helps to raise teachers' motivation. A central feature of the pay‐for‐performance is that pay must be in accord with performance and must provide an incentive to promote the success of the organisation.

Scanning both the academic and popular business literature of the last 40 years puzzles the alert reader. The variety of prescriptions of how to be successful (effective, performing, etc.) 1 Organizational performance, organizational success and organizational effectiveness will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.1 in business is hardly comprehensible: “Being close to the customer,” Total Quality Management, corporate social responsibility, shareholder value maximization, efficient consumer response, management reward systems or employee involvement programs are but a few of the slogans introduced as means to increase organizational effectiveness. Management scholars have made little effort to integrate the various performance-enhancing strategies or to assess them in an orderly manner.

This study classifies organizational strategies by the importance each strategy attaches to different constituencies in the firm’s environment. A number of researchers divide an organization’s environment into various constituency groups and argue that these groups constitute – as providers and recipients of resources – the basis for organizational survival and well-being. Some theoretical schools argue for the foremost importance of responsiveness to certain constituencies while stakeholder theory calls for a – situation-contingent – balance in these responsiveness levels. Given that maximum responsiveness levels to different groups may be limited by an organization’s resource endowment or even counterbalanced, the need exists for a concurrent assessment of these competing claims by jointly evaluating the effect of the respective behaviors towards constituencies on performance. Thus, this study investigates the competing merits of implementing alternative business philosophies (e.g. balanced versus focused responsiveness to constituencies). Such a concurrent assessment provides a “critical test” of multiple, opposing theories rather than testing the merits of one theory (Carlsmith, Ellsworth & Aronson, 1976).

In the high tolerance level applied for this study (be among the top 80% of the industry) only a handful of organizations managed to sustain such a balanced strategy over the whole observation period. Continuously monitoring stakeholder demands and crafting suitable responsiveness strategies must therefore be a focus of successful business strategies. While such behavior may not be a sufficient explanation for organizational success, it certainly is a necessary one.

This his paper focuses on a specific aspect of Value‐Based Management (VBM), the design of performance measurement systems. This remains an important challenge not only in Management Accounting but also in Human Resources Management. Performance measurement on various levels of organisation should be aligned to value creation, and management compensation should be tied to the achievement of targets set to these measures according to VBM proponents. In the present article definitions of concepts and issues associated with the design of performance measurement systems are discussed. Furthermore, the paper presents a review of four tools available to measure and manage intangible resources: human resource accounting, economic value‐added (EVA), balanced scorecard (BSC) and intellectual capital (IC). The role of non‐financial measures is also analysed from a VBM framework. Finally, some concluding remarks are highlighted in the last section.

This paper seeks to extend the analysis of performance management regimes by Bouckaert and Halligan to other countries in order to contribute to the developing theory of forms and challenges in public sector performance management.

The state of performance management and the context in which it has evolved is assessed in seven different countries using dimensions drawn from Bouckaert and Halligan's work along with elements from earlier work by Pollitt and Bouckaert. These are summarized in a table and comparisons made to generate additional insights into the factors that influence the shape and speed of public management evolution.

The paper finds that the Bouckaert and Halligan framework for analyzing public sector performance management is useful, albeit with some modifications. Specifically, it finds that administrative culture is a key factor influencing the speed of reform and that the attitude of elites (politicians and civil servants, in most cases) is also a vital piece of the puzzle that was not included in Bouckaert and Halligan, but did appear in the earlier framework of Pollitt and Bouckaert. It also finds evidence that economic and political crises occurring together accelerate the introduction of integrated performance management systems, but that trust in government does not appear to be a significant factor. Finally, the paper observes that, absent political crisis/commitment, governments will prioritise “external” performance measures such as customer service, participation and transparency objectives over “internal” performance measures such as financial, staff management and whole of government reporting.

The countries studied provide a rare insight into lesser‐known performance management regimes and the use of the Bouckaert and Halligan framework allows for comparisons to earlier (and future) research. The findings will be of interest to scholars in public administration reform and performance management.

This chapter presents a contextual model of human resources management (HRM). The hallmarks of this model are that (1) the most advantageous HRM practices vary conditionally upon strategic considerations; (2) each organization has multiple substrategies within it, and each substrategy is aligned with a unique bundle of HRM practices; (3) within each organization, three substrategies are associated with three subsystems; and (4) in terms of contributing to sustainable competitive advantage, the innovation subsystem is the most valuable regardless of the organization in question.

The introduction of performance-related pay with performance management in the state school sector of England and Wales represents a considerable change in the school management system. After 2000, all teachers were subject to annual goal setting performance reviews. Experienced teachers were offered an extended pay scale based on performance instead of seniority, and to gain access to the new upper pay scale, teachers had to go through a ‘threshold assessment’ based on their professional skills and performance. This paper reports the results of a panel survey of classroom and head teachers which started in 2000 just before implementation of the new system, and then after one and after four years of operation. We find that both classroom and head teacher views have changed considerably over time, from initial general scepticism and opposition towards a more positive view, especially among head teachers by 2004. We argue that the adoption of an integrative bargaining approach to performance reviews explains why a growing minority of schools have achieved improved goal setting and improved pupil attainments as they have implemented performance management. Pay for performance has been one of the measures of organisational support that head teachers could bring to induce changes in teachers’ classroom priorities. We argue that the teachers’ case shows that a wider range of performance incentives than previously thought can be offered to employees in such occupations, provided that goal setting and performance measurement are approached as a form of negotiation instead of top-down.

This paper seeks to provide a method which increases the chance of successful implementation and use of a performance management system (PMS). This method should incorporate both the instrumental and behavioral sides of performance management, be based on a solid theoretical foundation, and have been proven in practice.

The method is called the strategic performance management development cycle, which consists of three stages: design a strategic management model; design a strategic reporting model; and design a performance‐driven behavioral model. The workings of the cycle are illustrated with a case study of a publishing company which used the method during the implementation of a new PMS.

Applying the strategic performance management development cycle makes it possible for an organization to create in a short time period a new PMS, which will then improve the organization's results dramatically.

During the implementation of a PMS an organization has to expressly pay attention to all three stages of the strategic performance management development cycle, in order to increase the chance of a successfully implemented and used PMS.

It has been reported that 56 percent of PMS implementations fail, meaning that these implementations do not result in a PMS that is used regularly by all people in the organization. This article describes an implementation approach which is based on a solid theoretical foundation, has been proven in practice, and will give organizations a better chance of a successful PMS implementation.