Search results

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach provides more effective risk discrimination than the standardized approach when calculating regulatory capital for retail credit risk exposures.

The author uses four retail credit data sets to compare regulatory capital appropriation using the IRB approach and the standardized approach. The author follows the regulatory capital calculation method recommended under Basel III. For the IRB approach, the author uses a logistic regression to determine the probability of default.

The results suggest that the IRB approach provides more effective risk discrimination across individual exposures, which allows more regulatory capital to be held against riskier exposures and less regulatory capital to be held against less risky exposures. The author further argues that the Basel III output floor, as presently constructed, may disincentivize the use of the IRB approach and further diminish the value of secured lending under the IRB approach. To address this issue, the author offers two simple adjustments to the current design of the output floor.

While studies have argued the idea of risk-sensitive regulatory capital, the author has not observed any research that empirically compares the risk-sensitivity of regulatory capital across retail credit exposures, which makes up a significant portion of many banks’ credit exposures. This study also highlights what appears to be a major point of concern for the output floor, which is set to be phased in starting January 2022. This is of particular value because this point has not appeared to receive any attention in the literature thus far.

This study aims to render a fundamental assessment of the Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) approach by taking readings of the Australian banking sector since the implementation of Basel II and comparing them with signals from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. The IRB approach to capital adequacy for credit risk, which implements an asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model, plays an important role in protecting the Australian banking sector against insolvency.

Realisations of the single systematic risk factor, interpreted as describing the prevailing state of the Australian economy, are recovered from the ASRF model and compared with macroeconomic indicators. Similarly, estimates of distance-to-default, reflecting the capacity of the Australian banking sector to absorb credit losses, are recovered from the ASRF model and compared with financial statistics and external credit ratings. With the implementation of Basel II preceding the time when the effect of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was most acutely felt, the authors measure the impact of the crisis on the Australian banking sector.

Measurements from the ASRF model find general agreement with signals from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. This leads to a favourable assessment of the ASRF model for the purposes of capital allocation, performance attribution and risk monitoring. The empirical analysis used in this paper reveals that the recent crisis imparted a mild stress on the Australian banking sector.

Given the range of economic conditions, from mild contraction to moderate expansion, experienced in Australia since the implementation of Basel II, the authors cannot attest to the validity of the model specification of the IRB approach for its intended purpose of solvency assessment.

Access to internal bank data collected by the prudential regulator distinguishes this paper from other empirical studies on the IRB approach and financial crisis of 2007-2009. The authors are not the first to attempt to measure the effects of the recent crisis, but they believe that they are the first to do so using regulatory data.

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the supervisory policy adopted by the Basel Committee for the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation. The pathology of the new “securitisation framework” is carefully highlighted to facilitate a general understanding of what constitutes the current state of computing adequate capital requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although a simplified sensitivity analysis of the varying levels of capital charges depending on the security design of asset securitisation transactions is incorporated, the author does not engage in a profound analysis of the benefits and drawbacks implicated in the new securitisation framework.

Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.

Methodology/approach – After evaluating, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the effectiveness of capital requirements reforms and progress in implementing existing regulatory accords, the chapter discusses the procyclical effects of Basel regimes, and suggests a reform proposal.

Findings – Minimum bank capital requirements proposals in developing countries should be complemented by the adoption of an incremental, size-based leverage ratio.

Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to enlarge the academic and policy debate related to bank capital regulation, with a particular focus on the situation of developing countries.

This paper proposes a method that estimates credit ratings by mapping empirical probability of default (PD) and standardized historical financial ratios. Unlike standard approaches such as the parametric logit model. discriminant analysis. neural network. and survival function model. the proposed approach has an advantage of offering a multiple credit rating categories. as opposed to either default or not default. of obligors. It would provide an useful information to practitioners because the probability of default for each credit rating category is a critical input under New Basel Capital Accord. Emoirical results based upon the historical PD and financial ratios of Korean savings bank industry from 2000 and 2003 suggest that the industry’s average credit rating belong to a speculative grade. that is BB and below.

In addition, the computed transition matrix indicates that volatility of transition matrix fluctuates substantially each year and the orobability of staying in the same rating category at the end of the year tended to be much smaller than the average reported by the rating agencies for the overall Korean companies. The proposed method can easily be applied to industries other than savings bank industry.

The IRB capital requirements of Basel II define the minimum level of capital that the bank has to retain to cover the current risks of its portfolio. The major risk that many banks are facing is credit risk and Basel II provides an approach to calculate its capital requirement. It is well known that Pillar I Basel II approach for credit risk capital requirements does not include concentration risk. The paper aims to propose a model modifying Basel II methodology (IRB) to include name concentration risk.

The model is developed on data based on a portfolio of Greek companies that are financed by Greek commercial banks. Based on the initial portfolio, new portfolios were simulated having a range of different credit risk parameters. Subsequently, the credit VaR of various portfolios was regressed against the credit risk indicators such as Basel II capital requirements, modified Herfindahl Index and a non-linear model was developed. This model modifies the Pillar I IRB capital requirements model of Basel II to include name concentration risk.

As the Pillar I IRB capital requirements model of Basel II does not include concentration risk, the credit VaR calculations performed in the present work appeared to have gaps with the Basel II capital requirements. These gaps were more apparent when there was high concentration risk in the credit portfolios. The new model bridges this gap providing with a correction coefficient.

The credit VaR of a loan portfolio could be calculated from the bank easily, without the use of additional complicated algorithms and systems.

The model is constructed in such a way as to provide an approximation of credit VaR satisfactory for business loan portfolios whose risk parameters lie within the range of those in a realistic bank credit portfolio and without the application of Monte Carlo simulations.

This analysis asks whether regulatory capital requirements capture differences in systematic risk for large firms and micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). The authors explore whether bank capital regulations intended to support SMEs’ access to borrowing are effective. The purpose of this paper is to find out whether the regulatory design (particularly the estimate of asset correlations) positively affects the lending process to small and medium enterprises, compared to large corporates.

The authors investigate the appropriateness of bank capital requirements considering default risk of loans to MSMEs and distortions in capital charges between MSMEs and large firms under the Basel III framework. The authors compiled firm-level data to capture the proportions of MSMEs and large firms in Italy during 2000–2014. The data set is drawn from financial reports of 708,041 firms over 15 years. Unlike most empirical studies that correlate assets and defaults, this study assesses a firm’s creditworthiness not by agency ratings or by sampling banks but by a specific model to estimate one-year probabilities of default.

The authors found that asset correlations increase with firms’ size and that large firms face considerably greater systematic risk than MSMEs. However, the empirical values are much lower than regulatory values. Moreover, when the authors focused on the MSME segment, systematic risk is rather stable and varies significantly with turnover. This analysis showed that the regulatory supporting factor represents a valuable attempt to treat MSME loans more fairly with respect to banks’ capital requirements. Basel III-internal ratings-based approach results show that when the supporting factor is applied, the Risk-Weighted-Assets (RWA) differences between MSMEs and large firms increase.

The implications of this research is that banking regulators to make MSMEs support more effective should review asset correlation estimation criteria, refining the fitting with empirical evidence.

The asset correlation parameter stipulated by the Basel framework is invariant with economic cycles, decreases with borrowers’ probability of default and increases with borrowers’ assets. The authors found that those relations do not hold. This way, asset correlations fall below parameters defined by regulatory formula, and SMEs’ credit risk could be overstated, resulting in a capital crunch.

The original contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the gap between empirical and regulatory capital charge remains high. When the authors examined the Basel III-IRBA, results showed that when the supporting factor is applied, the RWA differences between MSMEs and large firms increase. This is particularly strong for loans to small- and medium-sized companies. Correctly calibrating asset correlations associated with the supporting factor eliminates regulatory distortions, reducing the gap in capital charges between loans to large corporate and MSMEs.

Capital is key to any financial institution. Companies in other industries need capital to buy property and production equipment. For financial institutions, the primary function of capital is to cover unexpected credit and market risks losses, because risk of such losses inevitably accompanies a bank’s core business of lending money and making markets. David Rowe, Dean Jovic and Richard Reeves explain why it is crucial for financial institutions to build an advanced economic capital framework and how that plays into current initiatives to implement the Basel II Capital Accord.

The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) was published in June 2004. This modification of the regulatory framework for banking institutions raises the question to what extent real estate financing will be impacted and how market participants can be adequately prepared. Aims to examine the impact of Basel II on the future pricing and availability of debt capital and on the cost of capital in real estate financing and to present possible reactions for real estate developers.

This research paper follows a deductive approach. First, the New Basel Capital Accord and the main features of commercial real estate financing are presented. On a normative level, the implications for developers are explained. Since no information regarding the behaviour of market participants in commercial real estate financing was available, the authors have ascertained the relevant questions within the framework of an empirical analysis. A total of 205 banking institutions were asked to fill out a survey pertaining to commercial real estate financing. The results of this survey are partly presented and interpreted.

The availability and the pricing of debt capital will be risk‐adjusted and will depend on the amount of regulatory equity banks will have to hold in reserve for a credit engagement. The cost of debt capital in real estate financing will rise due to systemic reasons of the New Basel Capital Accord. Banks are/will be very restrictive with regard to credit allowances. The use of the positive leverage effect will become more difficult. Structured financing, particularly the use of private equity, is the best way to fill a potential financing gap.

The paper is a timely investigation of a significant regulatory framework that is of world‐wide significance. The New Basel Capital Accord is introduced in its fundamental structure and the two relevant rating approaches are described and put into context. The paper reduces the complexity of the comprehensive and sophisticated Basel Capital Accord. Based on the facts that have been analysed, recommendations of how real estate developers can react to the changes in financing that lie ahead are given.

Introducing radical changes to the methodologies for the determination of capital requirements, the final stage of the Basel III standards, which is referred to as “Basel IV” by the industry, will be a significant challenge for the global banking sector. This article reviews the main components of the new framework, analyses its ongoing implementation in the European Union and discusses its potential impact on banks, putting forward policy recommendations.

This article uses primary sources such as the publications by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and the European Commission. It also reviews the secondary sources, including both academic articles and analyses by various stakeholders. However, this article does not undertake any empirical analysis.

This article discusses that Basel IV will introduce strategic, operational and regulatory challenges for banks in scope. It also identifies a number of areas which are subject to further debate in the European Union such as the enhanced due diligence requirements under the new credit risk framework; governance, reporting and control rules under the operational risk framework; exemptions for certain derivative transactions under the credit valuation adjustment framework and the level of application of the capital floors within banking groups. This article concludes that the global implementation of the reforms by all jurisdictions and transposition into national banking laws concurrently with the European Union in line with the Basel Committee's implementation timeline is important from a financial stability standpoint.

The article presents an up-to-date and comprehensive review of the practical implications of Basel IV standards. It analyses the implementation of the standards in the case of the European Union, reviews the potential policy implications and presents recommendations for risk management practitioners.