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Hospitals are complex organisations accounting for most of total health expenditure. They play a critical role in providing care to patients with high levels of need. A key policy concern is that patients receive high quality care. Policymakers have attempted to influence hospital quality in different ways. This chapter focuses on three key policy levers: the extent to which hospital competition and higher hospital tariffs (of the DRG type) can stimulate quality, and whether non-profit hospitals provide higher or lower quality than for-profit ones. The chapter outlines key methodological challenges and selectively reviews the main findings from the literature. While several studies suggest that hospital competition reduces mortality rates for heart attack cases when hospital tariffs are fixed (under a DRG system), at this stage is unclear whether the effect holds across a range of quality indicators. Moreover, the limited literature on hospital mergers tends to suggest that hospital quality does not change following a merger. Finally, whether non-profit hospitals provide higher or lower quality varies across regions and institutional arrangements. The economic theory suggests several mechanisms with opposite effects on quality. To guide policy, future work needs to further unpack the various mechanisms through which these three key policy issues affect hospitals incentives.

The health care industry has been influenced by changes in the market structure and new technological developments during the recent decades. With the new technological developments in medicine, some less complex care moved out of the hospitals that led to decrease in demand for inpatient services. This recent change in hospital care created excess capacity in hospital markets, and therefore hospitals started to explore potential financial gains through horizontal consolidations. This has resulted in a wave of mergers in 1990s, which transformed the US, Canadian and European hospital markets. This, in turn, created concerns among policy makers and researchers in terms of its welfare implications.

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to examine the diffusion of a new surgical procedure with lower per-case cost and how its diffusion path is affected by the simultaneous introduction of a new drug class that may be an effective treatment to prevent surgery. In particular, we examine whether a process of technology substitution exists that influences the diffusion process of the surgical technology. Given their different cost implications, the interaction of these two different technologies, surgery and drug intervention, is relevant from the perspective of health expenditure. This is of particular interest in health care as technology adoption and diffusion has been cited as a major driver of expenditure growth. Such expenditure growth has been increasingly targeted through the use of market-orientated policy tools aimed at increasing efficiency. Our research is thus addressing the question of how economic incentives influence the diffusion process and we discuss the impact of a set of incentives on hospital behavior.

Design/methodology – Hospital admission data for the financial years 1998/1999 to 2007/2008 in England are used to empirically test the contribution of prescription uptake and market-oriented reforms. Dynamic panel data models are used to capture any changes in technology preference during the period of study.

Findings – Our results suggest that the hospital sector exhibits a strong new technology preference, tempered by the interaction of competition for patients and the ability of the primary care sector to substitute treatments.

Value/originality – Given the current fast technological change, we examine the technological race occurring in the health care sector. We account simultaneously for the diffusion of different technologies not only within the same typology but also with technologies of a different class.

This paper empirically tests whether the nonprofit hospital is influenced by the community benefit standard by analyzing differences in nonprofit and for-profit hospital inpatient Medicaid share, while controlling for the effects of hospital market competition. Hospital specific data for this study are from the 1991 American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals and the 1991 Medicare Minimum Cost Report by the Health Care Financing Administration. The sample includes 192 for-profit, 899 nonprofit and 221 government-owned general acute care hospitals. Key variables in the multivariate analysis include hospital inpatient Medicaid share as the dependent variable and Medicaid demand, market competition and input quality as independent variables. The principal findings are that nonprofit hospitals serve a larger share of Medicaid inpatients than for-profit hospitals although the greater the presence of for-profit hospitals in the market (one measure of market competition) the smaller the nonprofit hospital Medicaid share. It is concluded that nonprofit hospitals reduce their level of community benefit, where community benefit is measured as a hospital's percent Medicaid share, in markets with a greater presence of for-profit hospitals.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

The objective of this chapter is to introduce the reader to Spatial Health Econometrics (SHE). In both micro and macro health economics there are phenomena that are characterised by a strong spatial dimension, from hospitals engaging in local competitions in the delivery of health care services, to the regional concentration of health risk factors and needs. SHE allows health economists to incorporate these spatial effects using simple econometric models that take into account these spillover effects. This improves our understanding of issues such as hospital quality, efficiency and productivity and the sustainability of health expenditure of regional and national health care systems, to mention a few.

This chapter investigates whether signing more hospital contracts with Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), hospital affiliation in a system, having more system hospital members located in the same area, and increased competition from area hospitals, contributes to improvements in the cost efficiency of U.S. Midwestern hospitals. Hospitals may offer HMOs and PPOs discounts on contracts to provide health care services to firm employees enrolled in HMOs and PPOs (discounts would lead to smaller price mark-ups over costs for hospital services). Enacting policies to enhance cost efficiency may help hospitals maintain a specified level of profits.

Hospitals worldwide command the majority of any countries’ health care budget. Reasons for these higher costs include the aging of the population requiring more intensive health care treatments provided in hospitals, the relatively high costs of labor in this labor intensive industry and payment systems that may encourage inefficient behavior on the part of hospital managers and physicians, that have not been fully mitigated via reforms and regulations.

There were 4,919 registered, short-term, community hospitals in the 2004 American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals; 60 percent of those hospitals were non-profit (NP), 23 percent of them were public (non-federal government owned and operated), and 17 percent were for-profit (FP). In general, while the absolute number of hospitals in the United States has decreased in recent years, the share of hospitals that are FP has increased. For example, in 1997, the AHA reported 5,057 registered, short-term, community hospitals, of which 59 percent were NP, 25 percent were public, and 16 percent were FP.