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One of the several claims that Seligman makes for Rooke is that he should be accorded priority in the discovery of the correct, that is Ricardian, doctrine of rent:there seems little doubt that the doctrine of rent was developed practically simultaneously by Malthus, West, Torrens and Rooke in 1814, but so far as the priority of actual publication is concerned, the above list should be reversed. And in the interests of historical accuracy, Rooke and Torrens must hereafter be accorded the position which they deserve. (Seligman, 1903, p. 512)¹

Our Dublin correspondent telegraphed last night:

Classical economics recognizes three categories of inputs into production: land, labor, and capital goods. The three factors are also germane to Austrian economics.

This chapter attempts to theorize the role of knowledge in the determination of the value of commodities. This draws from the South Korean controversy on the value and price of information commodities such as computer software and digital music. One group of writers has argued that the value of software copies (=commodities) is contributed by the labor time expended to produce the source code (=knowledge) in a piecemeal fashion. For another group, the source code has nothing to do with the production of the value of copies given that the source code is unnecessary for the (re)production of copies, and thus the value of software copies is approximately zero and its price is a high monopoly price. Both approaches are flawed. In the case of the former, no value can actually be transferred from the source code to copies because no changes are made to the source code before or after the production of copies. In case of the latter, knowledge is viewed as having nothing to do with value production. On the basis of this critique, an alternative view is put forward, in which knowledge plays an important role in value production by determining the productivity and/or complexity of labor. Knowledge “virtually intensifies” labor. It is also argued that intellectual property rights should be theorized in a way to refine and reproduce the role of knowledge – the virtual intensification of labor – at more complex and concrete levels of analysis.

Dublin, Wednesday, 1 a.m., Aug. 9, 1882.

In this introductory chapter, we briefly outline the history of the political economy of raw materials, focusing particularly on the relationship between raw materials and economic development. We then introduce the chapters of this volume, and we conclude by discussing future directions for research in this area.

Recent debates in urban studies and urban anthropology have revolved around the growth of neoliberal economies and their impact on postcolonial cities such as Bengaluru and invoke the phenomenon of the death of the commons. Rather than focusing on a dialectical existence of infrastructures, which suggests a life and death binary, in 2020, I turned my attention to the possibility of a life between and beyond these two binaries through the game of football and its place in Bengaluru. This essay is based on a study of two different types of football fields in Koramangala, Bengaluru, and through this exercise, it intends to examine a potential move towards the viewing of commons as sites of knowledge production for sport, culture, and the city. One of the key ideas around which urban commons are looked at in this essay is through an examination of Bengaluru as a postcolonial city, one which was supposed to uphold a Nehruvian vision, and its transformation into the Information Technology hub of India through a neoliberal turn in urban development. A major concern raised here with neoliberal models of urban development is how people who do not have the monetary capacity to access sports infrastructure end up playing in the postcolonial, neoliberal city.

This paper exposes, analyses, and challenges the revanchism (Smith, 1996) exhibited by ruling elites in austerity Britain. After recapitulating the concept of revanchism in its original form, and discussing some critiques and extensions, it scrutinizes the emergence of revanchist political economy in Britain, with particular reference to the UK housing crisis. In order to explain how revanchism has become so ingrained in British society, the paper analyses the production of ignorance via the activation of class and place stigma, where free market think tanks play a crucial role in deflecting attention away from the causes of housing crisis. It is argued that the production of ignorance carves an economic and political path for gentrification on a scale never before seen in the United Kingdom, where speculation, rentier capitalist extraction, and the global circulation of capital in urban land markets is resulting in staggering fortunes for those expropriating socially created use values.