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Warren Nutter and James M. Buchanan did not revise “Universal Education” to turn against providing tuition grants to segregated schools in 1965. Their revised text contains no call to expel segregation academies from the tuition grant program and does not even express disapproval of the goals or the work of segregation academies. Recent claims to that effect by Fleury (2023) and Levy and Peart (2023) cannot be sustained by either textual or contextual evidence.

University governance is constantly challenged by changing expectations and contexts. New, prestigious and well-endowed funding schemes are one possible source of pressure for change of university governance. This article analyses the impact of one such scheme, the grants of the European Research Council (ERC), on the governance of European universities. After outlining a model of how this impact on universities can be expected to occur, we present the results of an exploratory study at a very early stage of the ERC’s existence (2010–2011). The empirical analysis is based on an investigation of 11 universities in eight countries, which shows that different kinds of universities are affected in varied and often unexpected ways, with particular differences arising at different levels within the universities.

This paper looks at the research to date on the future of broadly granted stock options (options granted to at least half the full-time employees of a company). In the U.S., granting options broadly became popular in the late 1990s, but has lost some of its appeal in the wake of stock market declines, accounting changes, and increased shareholder concerns about dilution. The data indicate a significant minority of companies will change their plans, but a substantial majority will keep them. The data also indicate changes in accounting rules will not affect stock prices and that broadly granted options are better for corporate performance than narrowly granted options.

During the 1930s Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal created a wide range of spending and loan programs. Brief descriptions are provided for the programs created by the New Deal and loan and spending programs that were in place before the New Deal. I worked with others to create a panel data set with estimates of the spending and lending by the programs each year from 1930 through 1940. The data aggregated to broad categories are reported here and the methods and sources used to construct the estimates of the spending and lending for the categories are discussed.

A study of the price discounts granted by Morton Salt Company and other producers of table salt in the U.S. on their sales of table salt to grocery wholesalers and retailers. The discounts were found to be illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act by the Federal Trade Commission and the Supreme Court. The Commission and the Court believed that the discounts were unjustified price concessions granted to “large” buyers, consistent with the concerns of the Robinson-Patman Act. However, the evidence indicates that the most common discount – the “carload discount” – was received by virtually all buyers, regardless of the buyer’s size; the other discounts – “annual volume” discounts – though received primarily by “large” buyers, were likely cost based. The history of the discounts and likely reasons why they were granted are explored in detail.

The change in CEO pay after their firms make large corporate investments is examined. Whether the change in CEO pay is a beneficial practice or harmful practice to firms is investigated.

A sample of firms that make large corporate investments is identified. For this sample, we identify the change in CEO pay before and after the investment, and we also measure the pay-for-size sensitivity of these investing firms.

For firms that make large corporate investments, CEOs get significantly more option grants when their firms’ stock returns are negative after the investments and these investing CEOs get more option grants than noninvesting CEOs.

The present study suggests that firms may have to increase CEO pay after large corporate investments to encourage investment. However, the results may also be consistent with an agency cost explanation. Future research should try to distinguish between the two explanations.

The study reveals a potential way to prevent CEOs from underinvesting.

The study provides important insights to shareholders on how to encourage CEOs to get their firms to invest, and on how to view CEO pay increases after their firms invest.

This study examines whether Revenue Procedure 2003-61 is an improvement over Revenue Procedure 2000-15, in the areas of taxpayers’ expectations for IRS equitable relief decisions and gender-related in-group bias. The survey instrument includes a vignette adapted from a judicial decision. The results show that Rev. Proc. 2003-61 does improve upon Rev. Proc. 2000-15. Furthermore, taxpayers perceive different expectations of what the IRS should do and what the IRS would do in equitable relief decision making. Also, gender-related in-group biases are found to be present for both genders. Tax policy implications regarding equitable relief are discussed.

This chapter opens with a brief historical account of the vision and development of the land grant college and university system. This account begins to frame the land grant model as an important American social innovation. Next, the legacy of the land grant system as a social innovation is extended through a review of the role the Cooperative Extension System in enacting the New Deal during the Great Depression era. The topic culminates in the chapter with a critical exploration of the revenue-driven university technology transfer system that is currently in place and presents an alternative model that is anchored in the principles and practices of social entrepreneurship. Land grant colleges and universities are positioned as key agents in advancing such an alternative model, which is consistent with the historical role these institutions have played in advancing the economic and social interests of the nation.