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This paper analyses the possibility of Latin America's (LA) major economies adopting dollarization, considering that in the last decade macroeconomic instability has once again challenged the ability of certain economies to properly manage their own currency.

To determine the feasibility of adopting the US dollar as official currency, the author uses the framework of optimum currency area (OCA) theory, since, in fact, dollarization is an incomplete monetary union. The author uses a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model to identify what type of structural shock — country-specific, regional or global — prevails in LA economies. For this purpose, the US output is used to represent the global output and determine how the shocks of the US influence the output trajectory of each LA nation. The higher the influence of the US product, the lower the costs of adopting the US dollar.

The results of the variance decomposition show that the influence of the US shocks in the gross domestic product (GDP) trajectory of LA countries has significantly decreased over the last two decades, even in the currently dollarized economies. The estimates for Venezuela and Argentina show that the importance of US shocks in the trajectory of their GDP is low. Therefore, the cost of adopting the US dollar as the official currency would be high.

In view of hyperinflation and macroeconomic imbalances in certain LA nations, the dollarization debate has resurfaced in recent years. However, the literature that empirically evaluates the feasibility of adopting dollarization as a monetary system under current economic conditions is limited.

Highlights the constraints – natural, technological and political – to continued global economic growth.

Draws upon historical data from various secondary sources. Considers long-term trends.

The world economy has grown explosively over the past two centuries and has hugely increased its use of resources and associated emissions over that period. Global output could easily rise more than three-fold over the next 40 years, almost all of it in the emerging world. This will put substantial pressure on energy resources, and emissions of carbon dioxide and equivalents continue to rise. These developments are likely to generate large, unpredictable and possibly calamitous climate change.

Disturbing – in the absence of a technological, policy and political revolution.

Emphasises the challenge of mitigating climate change, and highlights the twin imperatives of convincing the people of the world that it is possible to combine greater prosperity with recognition of environmental limits and of developing the political institutions that make feasible the decisions that need to be taken.

Offers a comprehensive assessment of the prospects for global economic growth and the increasing demand for non-renewable resources, particularly energy.

The 1980s and 1990s constituted a boom period for foreign direct investment. The opening of dozens of new nations to foreign direct investment and the associated confidence in these countries' long-term growth potential led more multinational firms from more countries to undertake investment of greater magnitude in more countries than in any previous historical period. In his 1983 Harvard Business Review article “The Globalization of Markets,” Theodore Levitt (1983) famously advised companies that if they wished to survive, they should expand quickly to global scale. More recently, Thomas Friedman (2005) reinforced Levitt's conclusion in his book “The World Is Flat: Distance is dead. Markets have now converged.” Governments were helpless in the face of the power of global finance. The question posed to managers of multinational corporations was not where to invest globally but rather how fast. During this period, the United Nations reports that the magnitude of global foreign direct investment surged in real terms from $89 billion to $471 billion (constant 2,000 USD) or from 0.5% to 4.4% of global output. The percentage of those flows destined for developing and transition economies soared from 13.9% to a peak of 41.4%.

This chapter contributes to the growing global VAR (GVAR) literature by showing how global and national shocks can be identified within a GVAR framework. The usefulness of the proposed approach is illustrated in an application to the analysis of the interactions between public debt and real output growth in a multicountry setting, and the results are compared to those obtained from standard single country VAR analysis. We find that on average (across countries) global shocks explain about one-third of the long-horizon forecast error variance of output growth, and about one-fifth of the long-run variance of the rate of change of debt-to-GDP. Evidence on the degree of cross-sectional dependence in these variables and their innovations are exploited to identify the global shocks, and priors are used to identify the national shocks within a Bayesian framework. It is found that posterior median debt elasticity with respect to output is much larger when the rise in output is due to a fiscal policy shock, as compared to when the rise in output is due to a positive technology shock. The cross-country average of the median debt elasticity is 1.45 when the rise in output is due to a fiscal expansion as compared to 0.76 when the rise in output follows from a favorable output shock.

Of late, the issue which has attracted the highest attention in the global scenario is the US–China trade relation, in particular the tariff war. The biggest nations in the world are in war with each other in matters related to trade since 2018. In the first quarter, the United States imposed a tariff which affected many countries like Canada, the EU, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Turkey, and, in developing Asia, India and the People’s Republic of China. This has resulted in a significant dampening of global output growth and growth in emerging nations of Asia. The present chapter seeks to investigate into the historical evidences of trade wars between the United States and China, major reasons responsible for this conflict and tries to figure out the impact of this conflict on fundamental macro variables using secondary time-series data primarily on selected Asian economies including India. The author uses the multiple regression technique to find to what extent changes in the independent variables are responsible in explaining the changes in the dependent variable for both China and the United States. The empirical results clearly show that in the case of China and the United States, an increase in weighted tariff rates (WTR) will lead to a significant decrease in the trade GDP ratio (TGR), whereas in the case of both these countries, Purchasing Power Parity GNI (PPPGNI) is positively and significantly associated in determining TGR. In the case of India, a decrease in WTR is expected to lead to a rise in TGR and it is significant. In case of Vietnam, PPPGNI is significant, but not WTR. In the case of Singapore, neither of the two independent variables is significant.

The global slack hypothesis is central to the discussion of the trade-offs that monetary policy faces in an increasingly more integrated world. The workhorse New Open Economy Macro (NOEM) model of Martínez-García and Wynne (2010), which fleshes out this hypothesis, shows how expected future local inflation and global slack affect current local inflation. In this chapter, I propose the use of the orthogonalization method of Aoki (1981) and Fukuda (1993) on the workhorse NOEM model to further decompose local inflation into a global component and an inflation differential component. I find that the log-linearized rational expectations model of Martínez-García and Wynne (2010) can be solved with two separate subsystems to describe each of these two components of inflation.

I estimate the full NOEM model with Bayesian techniques using data for the United States and an aggregate of its 38 largest trading partners from 1980Q1 until 2011Q4. The Bayesian estimation recognizes the parameter uncertainty surrounding the model and calls on the data (inflation and output) to discipline the parameterization. My findings show that the strength of the international spillovers through trade – even in the absence of common shocks – is reflected in the response of global inflation and is incorporated into local inflation dynamics. Furthermore, I find that key features of the economy can have different impacts on global and local inflation – in particular, I show that the parameters that determine the import share and the price-elasticity of trade matter in explaining the inflation differential component but not the global component of inflation.