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Purpose – Institutional investors are facing increased pressure and threats of legislation from the European Union to abandon passive ownership strategies. This chapter investigates the legal prerequisites for active ownership among institutional investors in two Scandinavian countries to highlight differences in the legal framework that potentially account for apparent dissimilarities in the practice of shareholder activism.

Design/methodology/approach – Data on shareholder proposals from Danish and Swedish annual general meetings from 2006 throughout 2010 suggest that institutional investors are approximately a thousand times more active in Sweden than in Denmark.

Findings – The comparative study of the legal framework for shareholder activism shows diminutive legal distance in general, however, we find that the shareholder-based nomination committee employed in Sweden constitutes an exception. This is relevant, as such a setup transfers power from the board of directors to the owners. Presumably, this reduces the impact of free-rider and collective action problems, and increases the shareholders’ inclination to make proposals, which is also what we find. Moreover, we find other differences in the legal framework that support the transfer of power to the owners.

Research implications – We contribute to literature by investigating the importance of local governance mechanisms created by the legal framework – an area where research is scarce. The chapter discusses how two classical theoretical dilemmas – free-rider problems and collective action problems among shareholders – can be reduced by the implementation of local corporate governance elements.

Originality/value – The chapter outlines the actual practice of shareholder activism, in terms of proposals, in Denmark and Sweden, and highlights divergent legal elements which theoretically transfer power to the shareholders. Thus, regulators should be aware of the impact by local governance mechanisms, and how shareholders react under different legal prerequisites.

During the last decade, school districts throughout the United States have implemented inclusion programs utilizing a variety of models. A growing number of school districts are including all students with disabilities, even those with severe disabilities, into general education classrooms (Thousand & Villa, 1990). Although the term inclusion has no legal definition, and has been interpreted by educational professionals in a variety of ways, the concept has been in existence under the least restrictive environment (LRE) provision of PL 94-142, The Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975, PL 101-476, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) of 1990 and most recently within PL 105-17, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments (IDEA) of 1997. According to IDEA (1997), public education agencies are required to ensure that: to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are nondisabled; and that special classes, separate schooling or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only if the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily [Authority 20 U.S.C. 1412 (a) (5)].The concept of inclusion has been defined in various ways within the literature. Catlett and Osher (1994) reviewed policy statements of professional organizations and found at least seven different definitions for inclusion. Currently, in education, inclusion is the term used when students with disabilities are placed in general education classrooms for a portion of the school day (Falvey et al., 1995b). The term inclusion is differentiated from mainstreaming. Mainstreaming refers to the placement of students with disabilities in general education classrooms with appropriate instructional support (Meyen, 1990). When students are mainstreamed, they are usually prepared prior to placement into general education and are expected to “keep up” with the general classroom expectations (Rogers, 1993). Students with disabilities who are mainstreamed receive the same or nearly the same curriculum as general education students and are expected to “fit” into the general curriculum and classroom. On the other hand, within inclusive programs, the general education teacher is expected to make adaptations to provide a suitable environment for students with disabilities. Within the literature on inclusion, there are a variety of interpretations of the definition of inclusion (e.g. Gartner & Lipsky, 1987; Rogers, 1993; Stainback & Stainback, 1984). For the purposes of this chapter, inclusion is defined as programs in which students with disabilities (with the exception of gifted) are eligible for special education, have an individualized education program (IEP), and receive their education in general education classrooms using different, modified, and/or additional curricula from students without disabilities. This definition of inclusion is similar to “selective inclusion” as described by Zionts (1997). Selective inclusion refers to partial general education class placement of students with disabilities (Zionts). The assumption that this definition is based on is that general education is not always appropriate for every student; some students may benefit by receiving individualized services in addition to general education.

The purpose of this chapter is to share the experience and discuss issues that support and hinder inclusive practices in Taiwan. In this chapter, inclusion-related culture and policies are described in the context of Taiwan, followed by the challenges and lessons learned from promoting inclusive education for students with disabilities from the perspectives of general and special education teachers. Some promising strategies applied by teachers are also discussed in this chapter based on the findings of the research literature in Taiwan. Implications for practice and research about inclusion are addressed at the end of this chapter.

The use of corporate aircraft has increased as businesses place more value on ease of mobility. The bonus depreciation incentives of 2002 and 2003 provided growth opportunities for the general aviation market by allowing accelerated depreciation deductions for the purchase of new corporate aircraft. These incentives allowed more than twice the traditional MACRS allowance for depreciation for the first year of operation of an asset, but the present value of the tax savings after the full depreciable life of the corporate aircraft only generated a 3.25 percent reduction in the after-tax-cost. This study documents that the bonus depreciation incentives did not generate significant growth in the general aviation aircraft market via increased production of aircraft. These incentives may have simply slowed the recession that might have taken place in this industry otherwise. However, the incentives in this study did play a significant role in determining which type of aircraft to purchase, piston or turbine.

The lens used by the courts and much of the antitrust literature on predatory selling and/or buying is based on partial equilibrium methodology. We demonstrate that such methodology is unreliable for assessments of predatory monopoly or monopsony conduct. In contrast to the typical two-stage dynamic analysis involving a predation period followed by a recoupment period, we advance a general equilibrium analysis that demonstrates the critical role of related industries and markets. Substitutability versus complementarity of both inputs and outputs is critical. With either monopolistic or monopsonistic market power (but not both), neither predatory overselling nor predatory overbuying is profitably sustainable. Two-stage predation/recoupment is profitable only with irreversibility in production and cost functions, unlike typical estimated forms from the production economic literature. However, when the market structure admits both monopolistic and monopsonistic behavior, predatory overbuying can be profitably sustainable while overselling cannot. Useful distinctions are drawn between contract versus non-contract markets for input markets.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.