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Presents an analysis of the domestic market for field vegetables and comments on the nature of the market changes and the role of market intelligence. Concludes with a discussion of how British producers can use their competitive advantages to exploit current opportunities and to build new markets.

Few articles have been published on counter‐terrorist finance (CTF) policies in the UK and fewer still have attempted to evaluate their effectiveness. This paper seeks to examine both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the UK's CTF policies from open‐source materials and in doing so considers the credibility of many of the claims by those who have attempted to evaluate their effectiveness in light of the data gathered.

The paper presents an analysis of the UK's CTF regime.

There have been just over 100 convictions under terrorism legislation offence in Great Britain alone since 11 September 2001 resulting in at least ten individuals being convicted of a CTF offence. In terms of assets frozen or seized, Robinson appears to have a point when he argued that: “when you look closely at those frozen assets, you discover that most of them have been unfrozen”, given the tens of millions of pounds returned to the Afghan Government.

This paper will be of interest to academics, politicians, practitioners interested in the use of CTF policies.

To summarise a key development that provides clarity for banks on the operation of the money laundering provisions in the UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

The article provides the background leading up to the UK Court of Appeal hearing, the key issues in the appeal, the decision of the court and what this means for banks in the UK.

The Court of Appeal held that (i) where a bank suspects that money in its customer’s account is criminal property, freezes the account and seeks consent to deal with the money, the court should not intervene during the course of the seven-working-day notice period and 31-day Moratorium Period and (ii) in most cases the discretion to grant an interim declaration is unlikely to be exercised.

This decision is important for banks and brings much-needed clarity. Prior to the Court of Appeal decision, it was open to customers to challenge a bank’s decision to freeze an account (pending a response from the NCA to a consent request) on the basis that, on a balance of convenience, payments from a bank account should be permitted to be made.

Practical guidance from an experienced lawyer specialising in complex investigations, litigation dispute resolution and regulatory enforcement proceedings for financial institutions and large corporations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Vietnamese laws and practices concerning the confiscation of proceeds of crime, especially in view of Vietnam’s obligations to meet the international standards on money laundering and terrorist financing, set by the Financial Action Task Force and relevant international conventions that Vietnam ratified. To limit the scope of this paper, the analysis focuses on the confiscation of proceeds of domestic crimes that do not require international legal assistance. This paper concludes with recommendations for improving the legal framework on criminal asset recovery in Vietnam.

This is a doctrinal study that considers the applicable legal framework. This study is supported by brief case studies of major cases involving the confiscation of proceeds of crime.

Vietnam has a functioning asset confiscation regime but gaps in the law, lack of financial investigation expertise and lack of focused investigative attention on asset preservation and confiscation are hampering its effectiveness. The key gaps can easily be closed with appropriate amendments to the law. These reforms should be combined with a dedicated skills development program to produce sufficient number of financial investigation experts and criminal asset management experts to support the regime. The training should extend to judicial officers to ensure an appropriate understanding of the asset confiscation law. Reforms such as these should follow on a comprehensive review of Vietnam’s law and practices relating to the confiscation and forfeiture of criminal assets. This review should extend to assets linked to the financing of terrorism and proliferation to ensure that Vietnam has a comprehensive regime to deal with criminal assets.

This paper draws on publicly available information regarding the confiscation of proceeds of crime in Vietnam. Little data is available on asset confiscation and that prevents an in-depth assessment of the regime.

This paper highlights gaps in the current asset confiscation regime and proposes reforms and approaches that will ensure a more effective asset confiscation regime for Vietnam.

This is a “how‐to” guide for compliance professionals with regard to money laundering issues. It's a must‐read for all broker‐dealer attorneys and compliance analysts who want to know what's required of broker‐dealers by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and what “red flags” to look out for.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issues faced by financial institutions in detecting threats to their stability and integrity, and taking adequate steps to ensure that those who engage in abuse are detected and sanctioned. The focus is on financial institutions in Nigeria. The paper proffers practical recommendations towards greater effectiveness of Nigeria's anti‐money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist‐financing regimes.

The paper explores Nigerian legislation on money laundering, terrorism, and related crimes. Data are also drawn from analysis of reports of relevant law‐enforcement agencies, regulatory agencies, as well as English and Nigerian case law.

The paper highlights the deficiencies in current money laundering and counter‐terrorist financing (CTF) legislation in Nigeria. It reveals that financial institutions may still be liable to their customers in the course of complying with applicable legislation. The paper suggests that the power of law‐enforcement agencies to “freeze” assets be expanded, while legislation should be enacted with explicit guidance on treatment of politically exposed persons, and terrorism.

The paper calls for a progressively risk‐based approach to reporting of suspicious transactions by Nigeria's financial institutions, as well as greater attention to the provision of training to compliance personnel.

This paper highlights issues requiring urgent legislative intervention; it also draws attention to areas where law‐enforcement agencies and financial institutions could collaborate better in managing cost of compliance and securing the overall effectiveness of the AML and CTF regimes.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the Lebanese anti-money laundering (AML) paradigm in light of banking secrecy law. The phenomenon of money laundering that was first associated with the crime of drug trafficking developed a lot since the early 1900s to become a major threat to the world’s economy today. The fight against this ever-growing crime, with multiple sources and origins, has been the centre of attention of the biggest countries in the world. Thus, the need for international AML standards was required, by which countries must abide, to ensure an effective fight against this crime. The issue of banking secrecy regulations was important to study along with the AML framework as the principles of the first totally contradict those of the latter.

The scope of this study first entails a qualitative technique. It will start with analysing existing legal provisions on money laundering and studying the AML framework internationally and in accordance with the Lebanese banking system. For that, websites such as GoogleScholar and HeinOnline were used to collect many scholars articles. Additionally, Laws, Regulations and Directives have been examined for the purpose of establishing the legal basis for the fight against money laundering. Moreover, an interview was conducted in 2018 with the Lebanese Financial Prosecutor, which served as data related to the operations of the Special Investigation Commission (SIC) in Lebanon, which is the Lebanese Financial Intelligence Unit. Second, quantitative research has been done. Reports of the Association of Banks in Lebanon, Financial Action Task Force Report and Annual Reports of the SIC of Lebanon have been used to gather information related to the AML/combating the financing of terrorism framework, such as customer due to diligence provisions and know-your-customer requirements and to collect statistics of suspicious reports.

The question of “How to balance the confidentiality of the Lebanese banking sector with the interest of the international community in the fight against money laundering?” was interesting to study, as it turned out that the existence of such professional secrecy does not affect the effective implementation of the AML guidelines by banks and other financial institutions. This can only happen when there is a special judicial organ to which banking secrecy is not opposable at any time, and which is the sole organ entrusted with lifting off this professional secrecy and allowing the disclosure of information to the competent authorities. Thus, the Lebanese banking system can ensure total compliance with the AML framework while still adopting banking secrecy regulations.

The choice of Lebanon was compelling because of the special level of protection its banking secrecy law offers.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the potential impact of measures taken in accordance with powers introduced by Schedule 7 of the Counter‐Terrorism Act 2008 on banks and their customers.

The paper analyses the legal provisions setting out these powers and comments on their scope; discusses the guidance issued with respect to these provisions by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, as well as other commentary on these provisions; examines the remedies available to those affected by the measures taken in exercise of the Schedule 7 powers; and comments on the use made of these powers to date and the relevant outcomes.

The paper concludes that while the Schedule 7 powers are useful in permitting a targeted response to money laundering and terrorism financing, they can be needlessly damaging to business unless used in a proportionate and risk‐sensitive manner.

The paper analyses critically the first judicial review decision made in respect of the exercise of Schedule 7 powers.