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An agency relationship exists whenever one party (the principal) delegates authority to another (the agent). Because agents are assumed to be self-interested and to possess goals that diverge from the principal's goals, the principal must expend resources (called agency costs) to insure that agents act in her interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In chains, the firm can choose as outlet managers either employees who are paid a salary (and perhaps a bonus) or franchisees who are granted the right to their outlet's profits after royalties and other expenses. In both cases, an agency problem is created because the firm delegates local decision-making to outlet managers whose interests are not perfectly aligned with that of the franchisor's (Rubin, 1978).

This chapter is a descriptive and exploratory study of the challenges and opportunities faced by franchisors in adapting their franchise systems to accommodate cultural diversity among franchisees. It uses literature on migrant entrepreneurs and cultural diversity in small business settings in the United Kingdom, Europe, and the Americas as a basis for application to a franchising context. Triggered by events in the Australian franchising sector over the past two years, in which franchise systems have been embroiled in controversial and illegal activities undertaken by franchisees – many of whom were business migrants – the research begins to unravel the complexities of utilizing migrant franchisees as vehicles of system growth. Two sources of data provide indicative evidence about the issues associated with migrant franchisees. Firstly, two surveys of franchisors were conducted in 2014 and 2016 to obtain descriptive data about the incidence of migrants as franchisees. Secondly, a series of focus groups provided insights into the challenges and opportunities faced by franchisors in recruiting and managing migrant franchisees. Tentative findings of best practice in accommodating migrant franchisees are revealed. This research begins to fill an important gap in the literature about cultural diversity in franchising.

This exploratory paper discusses the undemocratic agenda setting of elites in Britain and how it has changed politics within a form of capitalism where much is left undisclosed in terms of mechanism and methods. It argues for a more radical exploratory strategy using C. Wright Mills’ understanding that what is left undisclosed is crucially important to elite existence and power, while recognising the limits on democratic accountability when debate, decision and action in complex capitalist societies can be frustrated or hijacked by small groups. Have British business elites, through their relation with political elites, used their power to constrain democratic citizenship? Our hypothesis is that the power of business elites is most likely conjuncturally specific and geographically bounded with distinct national differences. In the United Kingdom, the outcomes are often contingent and unstable as business elites try to manage democracy; moreover, the composition and organisation of business elites have changed through successive conjunctures.

Internet + and Electronic Business in China is a comprehensive resource that provides insight and analysis into E-commerce in China and how it has revolutionized and continues to revolutionize business and society. Split into four distinct sections, the book first lays out the theoretical foundations and fundamental concepts of E-Business before moving on to look at internet+ innovation models and their applications in different industries such as agriculture, finance and commerce. The book then provides a comprehensive analysis of E-business platforms and their applications in China before finishing with four comprehensive case studies of major E-business projects, providing readers with successful examples of implementing E-Business entrepreneurship projects.

Internet + and Electronic Business in China is a comprehensive resource that provides insights and analysis into how E-commerce has revolutionized and continues to revolutionize business and society in China.

Purpose – This paper focuses on a unique historical case study of industry evolution in order to develop a road map where historical and strategic research could develop a common ground for trans-disciplinary inquiry.

Design/methodology/approach – The industry I explore is the Universal Credit Card Industry since its inception with the Diners Club in 1949 until its maturity in late 1990s. My empirical objective here is to develop a historically detailed and theoretically rich case study in which evolutionary processes are discovered as a result of the historical narrative.

Findings – The historical account of the industry demonstrates how the evolution of alternative business models as organizing forms has led to the establishment of interorganizational platforms with unique ecosystems. These alternative business models, through various experimentations, have ultimately produced two critical interorganizational organizations, one based on an open-loop system represented by Visa and MasterCard, and the other based on a closed-loop system represented by Diners Club and the American Express. The historical account also shows that in a given industry competition is not only among specific firms in the industry but also among the business models and the platforms created by these models.

Originality/value – I conclude that historical analyses reveal the nature of competition not only among firms but also among alternative business models where traditional strategy research rarely covers.

Franchising manifests a bundle of risks created by the delegation of functions as both franchisor and franchisee exploit their respective comparative advantage. The galvanization of this advantage is governed by the franchise agreement and optimized by the effectiveness of the governance structure. This chapter considers the concept of risk and discusses its implications in valuing franchisee-operated businesses. It examines how risks arise, where they congregate and synthesizes the specific franchising issues relating to risk-adjusted cashflows, risk analysis, risk mitigation, and risk pricing. The authors propose that risks in franchising are multi-layered and hierarchical. Consequently, this relationship is represented in a Franchise Risk Ecology (FRE) comprising risks inherent in the market, the franchisor, the system, the industry, and within the franchisee-operated business.