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Within the contexts of globalization, rationalization and modularization, this article seeks to explore why Ford Europe performed so badly in the second half of the 1990s, sustaining heavy losses and falling market share. The causes of this are deep‐rooted and are traced to poor model development and a failure to realise that the market for cars was fragmenting with the emergence of new segments such as people carriers, sports utility vehicles and premium brand cars, etc. This was made worse by high costs due to excess capacity and a crucial weakness in diesel engine technology. Moreover, the European scene of operations appeared to be marginalized compared with developments in other parts of the world in Ford 2000. Ford’s response was a reorganization of its European management structure, the development of new models, an attack on its excess capacity and costs through plant closure and redundancies, the forming of strategic alliances to improve its position in diesel engine technology and transmissions and, finally, the development of its Premier Automotive Group.

The efforts of Ford to get their employees actively involved in improving quality is one of America′s recent success stories. Employee involvement was one of the key reasons why Ford, which recalled more cars than it built in 1978, has progressed to recently outearning the much larger General Motors. It took not only upper management support but a total rethinking of relationships between line management and their employees. Out of this process came Ford′s eight basic steps for launching EI. It is a systematic approach that has produced results.

This paper aims to reconsider the significance of Henry Ford’s claim that “History is more or less bunk”. It argues that this seemingly philistine remark can be understood as a specific historiographical position which informed Ford’s wider worldview, management approach and philosophy of industry.

The paper draws on primary philosophical works, secondary criticism and archival evidence. These sources detail the context in which the claim was made, the ideas underpinning its articulation and the conceptual basis on which Ford’s wider perspectives and contributions to historical experience can be interpreted.

This paper interprets Ford’s claim as a gesture of allegiance to a deeper cultural sensibility that was informed by Ralph Waldo Emerson’s transcendental view of history.

In addition to offering a rereading of Ford’s historiographical position, Emerson’s thought is discussed in relation to Ford’s subsequent “living history” project (Greenfield Village), which is considered the materialisation of his historical and industrial worldview.

This interpretation reveals how a specific historiographical position held by one of the twentieth century’s leading industrialists offers new insights into his wider worldview and philosophy of industry. It contributes to recent studies that challenge taken-for-granted narratives in management history and recent work that has highlighted the influence of transcendental principles on Ford’s philosophy of industry.

This paper presents the concepts and principles of quality function deployment (QFD) as they have been implemented by Ford company. The paper illustrates the essential linkages between external and internal customers to suppliers (i.e. “Voice‐Quality‐Satisfaction” Chains).

The paper considers some of the details of changes that are occurring to support the “Breakthrough in Quality”. One of the key elements of the Ford Motor Company engineering quality improvements program (EQIP) within Europe has been the linking of some seven‐quality tool techniques including QFD as the core link. For the purpose of improving QFD, it is both useful and rational to look at ways in which it can be linked to, or integrated with other quality tools. The Ford EQIP training process argues that QFD, within a customer focused engineering (CFE) process is a key tool in linking all other tools, through the QFD process itself.

The paper also looks at discussions on QFD linkages with other quality tools and processes. This sequence of QFD linkages to other single, or dual linked quality tools finishing with some engineering processes is particularly discussed. Among these are Pugh Concept Selection, Taguchi methods, experimentation, failure mode effects analysis (FMEA), value management, quality benchmark deployment (QBD) and benchmarking, process management, statistical process control (SPC), team oriented problem solving – eight disciplines (TOPS 8D), and systems engineering.

Although the manifestation of the Ford customer satisfaction process has been reviewed as the CFE QFD process within Ford of Europe, its adoption and awareness is still limited. As a result of this, it is critical to review the research topic of customer satisfaction with a focus on how Ford Motor Company as a whole approaches this key goal through the use of various marketing, sales and marketing research office (MRO) initiatives.

It discusses the various arguments and proposals that link together the end user customers voice to the internal customer‐supplier chains that act on the customer input and feedback to improve product quality and ultimately deliver higher end user satisfaction.

The paper concludes with a discussion of the use of QFD with other quality tools and processes, the role of QFD within total quality management (TQM) processes, and team working.

Comparisons of western manufacturing management with Japanese methods have highlighted a number of differences between them. But a comparison of earlier western ideas about manufacturing shows remarkable similarities between the two. Henry Ford′s ideas and practices show many features seen in contemporary Japanese approaches. Ford, in the period from 1908 through the late 1920s, relied on a number of progressive and radical methods in manufacturing management; methods that were similar to the current Japanese methods.

Just‐in‐time (JIT) production methods were popularized by the excellent results achieved by Japanese industry. When it became evident during the 1970s that the Japanese were gaining markets previously dominated by Americans, there was considerable interest in learning how Japanese industry operates. Then, during the early 1980s, Toyota’s highly effective JIT production system had a particular appeal to Americans who were trying to understand Japanese production methods. While Taichi Ohno, creator of Toyota’s production system, credits Henry Ford as the originator, it is now known that Ernest Kanzler, one of Ford’s subordinates, played a major role in developing JIT production methods. This article reports Ford’s and Kanzler’s contributions and explores the possible influence that Frederick W. Taylor may have had on the development of this approach at the Ford Motor Company.

Develops an original 12‐step management of technology protocol and applies it to 51 applications which range from Du Pont’s failure in Nylon to the Single Online Trade Exchange for Auto Parts procurement by GM, Ford, Daimler‐Chrysler and Renault‐Nissan. Provides many case studies with regards to the adoption of technology and describes seven chief technology officer characteristics. Discusses common errors when companies invest in technology and considers the probabilities of success. Provides 175 questions and answers to reinforce the concepts introduced. States that this substantial journal is aimed primarily at the present and potential chief technology officer to assist their survival and success in national and international markets.

The Ford Motor Company is undergoing an evolutionary change in its corporate culture and operating procedures, hoping to transform itself into a twenty‐first century organisation capable of competing around the globe with other world‐class producers. Beset with simultaneous strategic, financial and design crises it has become obvious that revitalisation of the company is dependent on recasting the labour‐management relationship, and that cost increases must be offset by productivity. The 1979 negotiations between Ford and the Union of Automobile Workers (UAW) resulted in the creation of the National Joint Committee on Employee Involvement (NJCEI) specifically considering quality circles and team building; while 1982 negotiations outlined specific functions of local steering committees, career counselling and guidance, targeted vocational retraining projects and introduced the Employee Development and Training Programme. Through the use of joint governing boards, local steering committees and the National Joint Committee, Ford and union officials meet frequently to discuss topics of mutual concern. With eleven major product re‐configurations either in progress or recently completed, it appears that the company has made a major gamble on the future. The UAW‐Ford NJCEI has been successful in achieving its aims of improved employee satisfaction, labour‐management co‐operation and improved product quality.

The issues and dilemmas facing companies, their unions and their workers as they attempt to emulate Japanese‐style production practices are discussed. Using the case of Ford UK as an example, the causes and effects of the 1988 strike and the withdrawal from the proposed electronics plant at Dundee are explored. Major obstacles to the successful introduction of practices such as just‐in‐time production are identified; however, once implemented these practices carry significant implications for unions and workers.

The Ford Motor Company is feeling the pressure. Over the last couple of years the world’s second largest car maker has suffered a series of blows ranging from strategy crises to PR disasters which culminated in a massive $5.5 billion loss in 2001. In an effort to get things back on track, sweeping changes have been made – including the departure of CEO Jacques Nasser. But can Ford turn things around in time?