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This study proposes targeted modernization of the Department of Defense (DoD's) Joint Forces Ammunition Logistics information system by implementing the optimized innovative information technology open architecture design and integrating Radio Frequency Identification Device data technologies and real-time optimization and control mechanisms as the critical technology components of the solution. The innovative information technology, which pursues the focused logistics, will be deployed in 36 months at the estimated cost of $568 million in constant dollars. We estimate that the Systems, Applications, Products (SAP)-based enterprise integration solution that the Army currently pursues will cost another $1.5 billion through the year 2014; however, it is unlikely to deliver the intended technical capabilities.

Purpose – The forced rural–urban migration in Colombia is a phenomenon that could be seen as the collateral damage of an armed conflict that takes place mainly in rural areas. Nevertheless, there is a significant percentage of cases in which the main reason to flee is a direct threat by an armed actor. This chapter proposes a possible reason why an illegal armed group displaces population from rural to urban areas.

Design/methodology/approach – A two-stage game theoretical model is considered, in which the central government struggles over the control of a region with the insurgents. In the first stage, rebels have the choice of forcing a proportion of peasants out of the rural areas or not. In the second stage, both players choose the level of military expenditure.

Findings – It is found that, under certain circumstances, the displaced population could be used by the insurgents as a means to deter the central government from fighting. This model predicts that the larger the value rebels attached to the contested region, the higher the proportion of forced migrants. It is also consistent with the idea that if the central government can commit to warfare, then forced migration will be useless for rebels.

Originality/value – This chapter explores a new rationale for forced displacement which consists in lowering government's incentives to fight for a region, by reducing the remaining population which in turn reduces income for the government.

Since the democratic transition in 1986, the Philippines has made considerable progress in re-establishing the legal/constitutional basis of civilian supremacy. Legislative control over the military's budget and appointment as well as the use of paramilitary units were re-instituted. Congress also assigned civilian court jurisdiction over human rights cases involving state security forces. An independent human rights commission was given power to investigate allegations of abuses. Constitutional limits were written into the President's ability to mobilize and deploy the military during emergency situations. Notwithstanding, the present structure of the Philippine security forces remains problematic. Of the three services, the army is primarily focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, with the police and paramilitary providing support. The army relies on large formations for its COIN operations and less on Special Forces, which owing to historical interventionist and coup-plotting proclivities, has been numerically emasculated.

Using a case study method, the chapter probes how local civilian authorities in Leon, Iloilo (a town in central Philippines) are able to monitor, supervise or control security sector activities within their area of jurisdiction. A considerable gap exists between each force's understanding of its functions and what they actually do in relation to other state security forces. The army performs mostly non-combat tasks in line with COIN as well as non-traditional tasks. The police are involved mostly in law enforcement and provide augmentation force to army-led COIN operations, but greatly handicapped in detection and investigation matters. The paramilitary is utilized primarily for COIN as territorial defense forces but not for other emergency tasks as envisioned in the law. A tighter relationship exists on the ground between the army unit and the paramilitary, whereas a gap is evident between the army and the police regarding the geographic scope of response to rebel threat. The local government played no significant role in the peace initiative brokered in the 1990s nor has the town peace and order council been the framework of choice in seeking more constructive engagements between the civilian authorities and security forces.

This Chapter is written in an era in which the United Nations (UN) routinely deploys Missions to environments that satisfy the armed conflict threshold. Such Missions often require personnel to employ significant levels of force, whether to safeguard mission and humanitarian personnel, to protect civilians, to neutralise violent armed groups or, in pure self-defence. But use as well as non-use of force can readily frustrate the very objectives these troops are deployed to uphold, in turn creating gaps between the Promises they make and the Outcomes they actually secure. On the other hand, current Missions such as MINUSMA in Mali have proven to be amongst the deadliest for UN troops in the entire history of UN Peacekeeping. The thin line between use and non-use of force must therefore be trodden with utmost care. This Chapter tries to find answers to this dilemma from a moral perspective and considers how the peculiar nature of the morality of resort to force by the UN influences that of its use of force. It assesses why the latter should be calibrated or adjusted to comply with the former, and how this can consequently channel UN troop conduct towards the objectives pursued through deployment. It is only where these realities are understood and addressed, the Chapter submits, that the aforementioned Gaps between Promises and Outcomes can be redressed and closed.

In recent years, and especially with the war in Iraq, the U.S. military's reliance on private contractors as forces in the theater of war has grown and become increasingly clear. We critically evaluate some of the best literature on the emergence of this phenomenon – especially Ken Silverstein's Private Warriors and P. W. Singer's Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry – and find a neglect of the historical path-dependent character of the rise of the new corporate armed forces. In particular, we concentrate on American experience and two silences that are integral to understanding the path-dependent character of this process: (1) earlier historical reliance on private armed force to suppress the labor movement in America, the template for this new form of irregular armed force and (2) the ghost of Vietnam as a continuing political liability in the mobilization of sufficient troop levels under neo-imperialist aspirations and “the global war on terror,” as the main condition for the rise of the new private military form. Both elements suggest the theoretical importance of state strength/weakness in any explanation of private armed force. We discuss several important political implications of our findings.

To determine what role overconfidence plays in the forced removal of CEOs internationally.

The study makes use of the Fortune Global 500 list.

We find that overconfident CEOs face significantly greater hazards of forced turnovers than their non-overconfident peers. Regardless of important differences in culture, law, and corporate governance across countries, overconfidence has a separate and distinct effect on CEO turnover. Overconfident CEOs appear to be at greater risk of dismissal regardless of where in the world they are located. We also discover that overconfident CEOs are disproportionately succeeded by other overconfident CEOs, regardless of whether they are forcibly removed or voluntarily leave office. Finally, we determine that the dismissal of overconfident CEOs is associated with improved market performance, but only limited enhancement in accounting returns.

This study is unique with its examination of overconfidence among global CEOs rather than being limited to U.S. chief executives. It also provides insight into how overconfidence is related to national cultures, legal systems and corporate governance mechanisms.

The relations between the Latin American states and their armed forces have been a special one at all times. In this region the military played and still plays a major political role. But the political role of the military has changed several times during the last century. These changes were forced by social movements, new patterns of thought, the USA or the Cuban Revolution. During the years, the military had different self-perceptions, which caused in a lot of interventions and military dictatorships. Today, it seems that democracy is well accepted throughout Latin America, but the military still has possibilities of influence.

The evolution of military profession in Latin American countries has not been the subject of research as compared to civil–military relationships because of the political intervention of the latter. Since the 1980s, with the restoration of democracy in countries of the Southern Cone, the design and management of defense is no more a monopoly of the armed forces, and they are now exposed to a wide range of influences. On the basis of the framework proposed by Moskos, Williams, and Segal in their book: The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, where they argue the case of the United States of America as a paradigm of the military profession changes because of the postmodernism in industrialized countries, we pretend to make a comparative analysis of the changes or modernizations experienced by the military profession in Southern Cone's countries, mainly Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

Purpose – The present study addresses: First, which traditions are currently lived in the Swiss Armed Forces? Second, which traditions are viewed in positive or negative terms and why is this so? And finally, which traditions have disappeared and which are wished for?

Methodology/approach – Two separate surveys were conducted by the authors of this study in an attempt to answer these questions. For the first survey, qualitative interviews were conducted with 50 professional and militia military commanders in order to get the internal perspective. For the second survey, a representative sample of 1,200 Swiss voters was interviewed in an attempt to get the external perspective.

Findings – The main findings show that there are few formal traditions in the Swiss Armed Forces. The republican self-concept and the decentralized political system in Switzerland have significantly influenced the meaning of traditions and their practice. Moreover, traditions mainly serve to integrate cadres and soldiers into the military. The majority of traditions is informal or a combination of formal (top-down) and informal (bottom-up) traditions. Lost traditions not only fell victim to structural changes, but their purpose was also questioned by commanders. Two major military reforms as well as societal change are the main reasons for the disappearance of traditions in the Swiss Armed Forces. The results show a high degree of congruence with the qualitative survey. In short, the Swiss population generally views military traditions in favorable terms. In particular, it endorses traditions that serve to foster a sense of community and impart knowledge. However, traditions that stress manhood and bravery are strongly rejected.

Research limitations/implications – The approach could be applied to other cases. Case studies may be generalized in a conceptual sense.

Originality/value of paper – Case study with broader practical and research implications, invites international comparative research.