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In the aftermath of the 2021 Financial Action Task Force Mutual Evaluation Report, legislators, supervisory bodies, law enforcement and the like are focusing on preventing South Africa from being greylisted. This paper performs an analysis of the 2021 South African Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation, specifically Recommendation 8 and Immediate Outcome 10. The purpose of this paper is to address the concerns raised and assist those tasked with implementing remediation measures.

Secondary sources such as legislation, case law, textbooks and peer-reviewed publications are used in addressing the concerns. A major focus is placed on the evaluation itself, with an analysis of Recommendation 8 and Immediate Outcome 10.

Despite the non-compliance rating and a low level of effectiveness received regarding non-profit organisations, authorities might not place a large focus on remediating this, as more pertinent issues arise in the report. The lack of focus in this area adds to the likelihood of grey listing by FATF. However, with co-operation from the relevant stakeholders, these low ratings can be improved.

Since the Mutual Evaluation’s release in October 2021 there have not been any papers addressing the highlighted issues in the non-profit sector in South Africa, to the best of the authors’ knowledge. This paper will be the first of its kind and will be of use to authorities as regards mitigating the concerns raised by FATF.

The purpose of this study is to examine the South African banks’ customer due diligence (CDD) practices in the fintech era to mitigate money laundering (ML) risks and ensure financial stability. Financial technologies have brought substantial transformations to the financial services sector. However, such technologies have exposed the sector to emerging risks that threaten the integrity and stability of the financial system globally. Before any bank–customer relationship is established, proper customer background checks must be conducted. These background checks enable financial institutions to validate information provided and ensure customers are properly risk profiled. Failure to risk profile customers could result in financial institutions being used as conduits for ML. Undoubtedly, CDD procedures are pivotal to overall anti-money laundering efforts and curbing financing terrorism in a regulatory framework.

A qualitative research approach was adopted to address the research questions of the study. Given the confidentiality associated with the financial services sector, data triangulation was used in blending mainly secondary and primary data sources. Secondary data sources used in the study were published reports available in the public domain that were corroborated with subject matter experts’ interviews.

Based on the findings of this study, it is concluded that in South Africa, technological solutions have been incorporated into CDD functions, which is now risk-based (enhanced due diligence). Also, legally, South Africa has incorporated the biometrics, integration with Department of Home Affairs and Companies and Intellectual Property Commission databases, customer consent to third-party sources with the Financial Intelligence Centre Act and the Protection of Personal Information Act.

The shift towards digital banking in South Africa results in increased data and dynamic risk profiling. This study advocates a policy shift requiring a risk-based approach to mitigating emerging ML risks (in particular digital laundering), especially in the wake of South Africa’s recent greylisting by the Financial Action Task Force.

Banditry and terrorism constitute serious security risks in Nigeria. This follows the fact that Nigeria is rated as one of the leading states in the world that is plagued by terrorism. Terrorists and bandits usually embark on predicate crimes such as kidnapping, smuggling, narcotics trade, and similar trades to finance their terrorist enterprises in Nigeria. The funds realized by criminals from nefarious sources such as sales of narcotics and ransom from kidnapping are usually laundered to make their criminal enterprises self-sustaining. Thus, all “dirty” money is laundered so as not to attract the attention of law enforcement agents. The funds realized through receipt of ransom from kidnapping, smuggling or funds from sponsors are laundered through channels such as bureau de change, which are difficult to monitor by the Nigerian authorities due, in part, to flaws and loopholes in the current anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist laws. This paper aims to adopt a doctrinal and qualitative desktop research methodology. In this regard, the current anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist laws are discussed to explore possible measures that could be adopted to remedy the flaws and loopholes in such laws and combat money laundering and financing of terrorism in Nigeria.

The article analyses the regulation and combating of money laundering and terrorist financing activities in Nigeria. In this regard, a doctrinal and qualitative research method is used to explore the flaws in the Nigerian anti-money laundering laws so as to recommend possible remedies in respect thereof.

It is hoped that policymakers and other relevant persons will use the recommendations provided in this article to enhance the curbing of money laundering and terrorist financing activities in Nigeria.

The article is not based on empirical research.

This study is important and vital to all policymakers, lawyers, law students and regulatory bodies in Nigeria and other countries globally.

The study seeks to curb money laundering and terrorist financing activities in Nigeria.

The study is based on original research which is focused on the regulation and combating of money laundering and terrorist financing activities in Nigeria.

This paper aims to focus on the use of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) in South Africa as a civil method to act upon lifestyle audit results that have indicated wealth from unknown, possibly unlawful, sources.

This paper applied a comparative methodology. Legislation and the application of UWOs in Ireland, the UK and Australia were compared with the situation in South Africa.

It is proposed that South Africa includes UWO legislation within its Prevention of Organised Crime Act or be established as a separate piece of legislation. Also, South Africa should follow both the civil and criminal route to target the proceeds of crime.

Corruption in South Africa is rampant and, without the necessary legislation, impossible to fight. For these purposes, this paper proposes measures to be used from a civil forfeiture perspective.