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The economic and financial crisis, especially the sovereign debt crisis, discovered many deficiencies and weaknesses in the banking sector in the European Union (EU). The need for special surveillance and supervision of cross-border banking cooperation and termination of the toxic link between sovereign debt and banking sector have accelerated the process of forming and establishing a Banking Union (BU). An integrated financial framework has been established in which the European Central Bank (ECB) through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has a key role and the responsibility for the overall supervision of the banking sector of the euro zone. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and schemes of the Single Deposit Guarantee Mechanism (SDGM) are under the national supervisory authorities while the European Banking Authority (EBA) is responsible for developing the Single Rules. From the new architecture is expected the preservation of the single market and a common currency, breaking “toxic connections” between sovereign debt and banks, mitigation and removal of financial instability and economic growth. The research shows that the BU together with the ECB in a certain sense, also contributes to the normalization of credit and financial conditions in the single mark. Estimates through SSM, conducted by the ECB and the EBA, during, 2014 and 2015 on 107 banks in 21 countries indicate progress toward solvency and resilience of the banking system of the euro area. Despite some initial success the entire project BU seems to have missed on opportunities, resulted in late reactions, and was too complex to be feasible. The political will of national governments to give up sovereignty over its banking sector and transfer competencies to the supranational institutions is a key factor in the success or failure of a BU. It seems so but past experience indicates that there is no political willingness to solve problems. Mainly most of the government avoids cleaning a hidden “skeleton in closets” due to lack of means for recapitalization while some are trying for loans from the ECB to help their banks. The ECB plays a key oversight role at the EU level and has too much power, which can cause risks caused by conflicting goals. The ECB is losing the role of the final refuge of liquidity, which is the main disadvantage of a BU. The SSM is susceptible to criticism due to difficulty in operation because of slow incorporation of European legislation into national law. Slow implementation carries risks of fragmentation of the market, regardless of the responsibility of the ECB. The financial capacity of the temporary agreement with the SRM is insufficient in solving the crisis of more banks while procedural application is complex and time-consuming. Planned backstop with a centralized resource is a resolution that is insufficient for solving the failure of big systemic banks, which are too big to bail. The heterogeneity of the existing Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the banking systems of the member states of the euro zone caused controversy in terms of setting of common insurance schemes. The procedures for the recovery and resolution of critical banks are problematic.

The connectivity provided by full-service network carriers under the umbrella of airline alliances is increasingly challenged by the services of Middle Eastern airlines via their own hubs, and the rise of new passenger strategies like self-connectivity. While these two developments can potentially benefit consumers with more services and lower fares, the rise of Middle East carriers has been met with opposition by EU and US airlines that call for increased protectionism. In addition, only a few airports in the world actively support self-connections. In this context, this study aims to investigate (1) the markets in which Middle East carriers exert a stronger dominance in terms of the number of passenger connections, (2) whether EU, US, or Asian hubs provide a competitive quality of connectivity in terms of travel time, and (3) whether a significant potential for self-connections is hidden at major airports worldwide. To that end, several datasets of passenger bookings (MIDT), airline schedules, and minimum connecting times between 2012 and 2015 are combined in a connections-building methodology that delivers six market-specific airport connectivity indicators for our benchmarking exercise. Our findings show that although European and some Asian hubs have lost traffic in global markets, they remain competitive from a quality perspective. US hubs have maintained their market share and competitive position. Finally, we identify the airports and airlines with the highest potential to provide self-connecting travel options, which can become an attractive new source of revenue for the parties involved.

The area of law where the principle of transparency is applicable is expanding fast. Also many financial markets have recently become subject to new regulations requiring transparency, such as EU directives MIFID II or Solvency II. Here, what is expanding is not just the applicability of the principle as such, but also the scope of issues which are affected by transparency, that is, remuneration or conflict of interests. In the light of these regulations, it may seem that transparency has simply become a sole legislative measure assuring values such as consumer protection, market stability or – most of all – high-quality governance. Indeed, transparency is thought to contribute to the quality of governance in several different ways, although its implementation must meet certain standards if it is to produce the desired results, especially when it comes to financial institutions. Financial institutions are commonly required to be particularly transparent due to the fact they often act as public trust entities. As the activity of financial institutions is of such importance, the issue of transparency efficiency is worth discussing. Although it is said that the emergence of the principle of transparency in the EU law is a fairly new phenomenon, the existence of transparency obligation is not. Therefore, some doubts may arise as to the question whether the principle of transparency actually adds much to existing rules and principles. In this chapter the author explored and discussed how mandatory transparency affects financial institutions’ activity, and whether it performs its function efficiently.

The world has been gripped by the severest global financial (and economic) crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. How did it come about, what is being done to alleviate its consequences and, vitally, what measures should be undertaken to ensure against its recurrence are therefore questions that must be satisfactorily addressed. Preventing ‘financial crises’ from ever happening again is of course completely out of the question, they being inherent to the economic system as we understand it; rather that of those of the ‘severest’ kind. Fortunately, a vast literature has been accumulating on these issues, so the intention here is not to add to it and reinforce the perception that economists will offer more opinions on a single issue than the total membership of any assembled group thereof for the purpose. Hence, this is confined to a consideration of the most convincing explanations. Owing to space limitations, I shall not examine the recommendations for future action in all the mentioned areas but will do so for what is being offered to cater for the capital adequacy and pro-cyclicality since they are of the essence and involve many players.

The materials and energy density of current electric vehicles (EV) battery technology means that the vehicles are heavier and have a shorter range in comparison to internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV). Battery cost also means EVs are relatively expensive for the consumer, even with government incentives, and dependent on sometimes-rare resources being available. These factors also limit the applicability of battery-electric technologies to heavy-duty vehicles. However, a number of next generation technologies are under laboratory development which could radically change this situation. Using a follow-the-money methodology, the strategic innovations of companies and public institutions are examined. The chapter will review the potential for changes in resource inputs, higher-density batteries and cost reductions, considering options such as lithium-air, metal-air and solid-state technologies. The innovations outlined in these technologies are considered from an economic perspective, identifying their advantages and disadvantages in commercialisation. At the same time, innovations, and investments in infrastructure electrification (Electric Road Service) and battery exchange point with swapping technology will be also considered due their implications and contribution to solving battery-related challenges and shortcomings. It is concluded that only a joint investment in effort on technologies would allow the use of EVs to be extended to a broad public in terms both of users and geography.

Risk governance is being successfully inserted into scientific and political agendas as a way to understand and address complex problems, such as health problems that have both social and ecological dimensions. However, to date, the debate on risk governance has remained rather conceptual. This chapter addresses these lacunae through describing research that was conducted on the Flemish environmental health governance arrangement and draws on this empirical case study to suggest ways that risk governance can be put into practice.

The case study analysis was conducted through a mixed methods study that combined document analysis and data gathered through 22 in-depth interviews with environmental and health scientists as well as policymakers.

This research shows that the Flemish environmental health risk governance arrangement has succeeded in increasing the exchange of information between: (1) governments at a variety of levels; (2) scientists, policymakers and the general public and (3) environmental and public health civil servants. The analysis also provides insights into some shortcomings and makes recommendations for ameliorating this arrangement: (1) the integration of environmental health objectives into all relevant policy domains, (2) the need for additional research into environmental health indicators and (3) the facilitation of the co-production of knowledge and multi-actor governance.

Empirical contributions and analysis about risk governance and policy formation processes are not often conducted. The added value of this Flemish case study is that it presents an example of good practice from which lessons for future risk governance arrangements can be drawn.