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The purpose of this paper is to investigate conceptualizations of Europeanization, the difficulties this creates when assessing the impacts of the European Union (EU) on member states and the influence member states have on the EU policy‐making processes. There are also problems when considering questions regarding the basis of Europeanization in terms of its relationships with globalization, governance, institutionalization, polity, politics and policy.

Different conceptualizations of Europeanization concentrate on distinct methodological positions and whether Europeanization may best be understood as “situation” or “process”. Indeed, difficulties are further exacerbated when identifying the extent that drivers for change at the EU and domestic level involved Europeanization, domestication, globalization and/or European integration. Meso theory identifies “process” and substantive theory “situation” in terms of downloading (En1), up‐loading (En2) and cross‐loading (En3). Each of these conceptualizations allow “situations” where empirical reliability could be made explicit from a particular perspective.

This paper investigates and assesses the Europeanization of UK financial services and provides a conceptualization of Europeanization as both meso (middle range) and substantive theory. By breaking down meso theory into substantive theories (up‐loading, downloading and cross‐loading) the analysis attempts to clarify the interaction between Europeanization, globalization and domestication in relation to impacts on UK financial services regulation. Following an assessment of UK financial services in general, this paper concentrates on the concept of “competent authority” and how the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) displays attributes outlined in the directives. Through an analysis of the Third Life Assurance Directive, Second Banking Directive and FSA this paper identifies a number of issues relating to how the EU responded to sector demands and how Europeanization is actualized through domestic response.

Europeanization indicates a continual interaction or dialectic between the uniformity of the EU and the diversity of the individual member states. The process involves interaction between global, domestic and European variables with the European dimension in relation to domestic interpretation providing a mechanism whereby dominant economic global factors can be diminished or enabled.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the activities of the FCA with respect to the incidence of money laundering and highlight regulatory gaps. The financial services sector provides a crucial infrastructure for the promotion of wealth and innovation in the UK. This attractive infrastructure also appeals to criminals looking to launder the gains of their illicit activities.

The paper analyses the UK money laundering regime, highlighting specific challenging areas. The paper investigates the role of politically exposed persons and the use of corporate structures in promoting money laundering. In this context, it also becomes crucial to investigate the role of financial institutions and the sufficiency of their governance approach in lessening the incidence of money laundering. The paper investigates secondary sources and relies on their findings. It compares these findings to the regulatory outcomes.

The paper recommends steps that can be used to lessen the incidence of money laundering in the UK. From the reports evaluated, it is clear that the Financial Conduct Authority is working towards reducing the incidence of money laundering, but this could be further strengthened with the adoption of additional enforcement tools.

The paper suggests that different approaches should be used based on firm size, the type of business and the risk that a financial services firm presents to the financial sector. A large firm will need to bear more regulatory burden compared to a smaller firm.

The paper investigates the current approach to minimising the incidence of money laundering in the UK. It suggests that the regulator can guide financial services firms to meet the regulatory objectives by relying on an approach that discerns the regulatory risks presented by different firms depending on their size.

This paper aims to summarize and explain the recently enacted UK Financial Services Act 2010 (the FS Act) and the coalition government's proposals for a new regulatory structure.

The paper explains the purpose of the FS Act, the statutory objectives of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and the FS Act's provision of the FSA with: an explicit financial stability objective, extensive powers to require information, extended enforcement powers, the power to prohibit or require disclosure of short selling, the duty to require authorized firms to prepare and maintain recovery and resolution plans, the obligation to make remuneration rules and the requirement to establish a new consumer education body. Explains proposals dropped from the FS Bill to secure its enactment during the “wash‐up” process. Summarizes the recently announced coalition government proposals for reform of the UK financial services regulatory structure.

The FS Act is a legislative response by the predecessor government to the causes of the global financial crisis, delivering significant reforms that seek to enhance financial regulation. The FS Act mainly amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the FSMA) in order to give the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) new objectives and duties and extend its powers variously. The recently elected coalition government has announced proposals for a new regulatory structure likely to take effect in 2012.

The paper provides practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

Product intervention power is introduced under the markets in financial instruments regulation (MiFIR) and packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) Regulation for all EU Member States and gives National Competent Authorities (NCAs), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European Banking Authority (EBA) powers to monitor financial products (and services) under their supervision and to “temporarily” prohibit or restrict the marketing, distribution, or sale of certain financial instruments, or to intervene in relation to certain financial activities or practice. This extends the supervisory measures defined in MiFID II to any PRIIPs (including insurance-based investment products “IBI products”) that would not otherwise fall under the scope of MiFID II. Product intervention power is given to the NCAs, and in order to use power, it requires to take the specifics of the individual case into account and a series of conditions, criteria, and factors to fulfill. Moreover, ESMA and the EBA have a type of control function and ability to override national regulators on product. The aim of product intervention powers is to ensure strengthening of investor protection, but given the potential significant impact of this power, calls into question of possibility to delay innovation and slow down product developments on the capital market.

This paper provided an overview of supervisory measures on product intervention, that is, scope of the product intervention power, criteria, factors, and risks which have to be taken into consideration when using this regulator’s tool.

This paper investigates the impact of moving Central Counterparty Clearing Houses (CCPs) that clear euro-denominated transactions to the Eurozone after the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union. Prior to Brexit, the City of London had a dominant position in euro-clearing, but in the aftermath of Brexit, clearing houses might decide to move to the EU27. This paper aims to investigate the impact of moving euro-clearing to the EU27.

This paper provides an economic, political and legal investigation based on desk research. It studies the relevant materials, as they relate to the functioning of Central Counterparty Clearing in the aftermath of Brexit, with specific attention to the potential shift of locations and oversight.

The development of a EU27 financial hub and the possibility to increase oversight over euro-denominated financial transactions, which were partly at the roots of the financial and Eurozone crisis, could strengthen the market shaping of European financial markets. However, localizing euro-denominated transactions in Europe could potentially give rise to efficiency losses and a higher risk for companies and investors. Furthermore, the European regulatory framework currently faces certain weaknesses, obstructing the regulatory potential of the EU.

As the Brexit negotiations are not yet finished, this paper does not intend to set out a definite outcome of the processes currently taking place.

Shifting locations and oversight of CCPs as a result of Brexit could lead to the establishment of a large financial centre within the EU-27. At the same time, it is to be expected that such a development will have a significant impact on the financial infrastructure of the City of London.

There exists an important trade-off with regard to shifting locations that need to be at the forefront of the discussions and the negotiations when dealing with Brexit. This seems to be neglected in a lot of the current policy debates. This paper takes stock of the ongoing debate and how it relates to the functioning of CCPs.

The purpose of this article is to make a contribution to the existing knowledge by using the unique cross-jurisdiction data drawn from the FCA’s REP-CRIM submissions to explore dynamics behind firms’ perceptions on financial crime. Capturing firm’s sentiment is notoriously challenging, and any relevant regulatory data is usually not available in the public domain. A recent exception is the UK Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA’s) financial crime data return (REP-CRIM) submissions which include the cross-country regulatory data on the UK financial institutions’ perceptions of jurisdiction risk. Despite a broad literature with respect to financial crime, there exists an important gap in the existing knowledge with respect to factors that are associated with the perceptions of firms with respect to jurisdiction risk, which this article aims to close.

Using cross-country regulatory data on the UK financial institutions’ perceptions of jurisdiction risk, this study empirically determines that perceptions of jurisdiction risk is significantly and positively associated with anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework, as well as with tax burden on business and institutional and legal risk in the case of 165 jurisdictions.

The findings lend support to the proposition that unsystematic efforts and too much publicity may ascertain the high-risk image of a jurisdiction, deterring cross-border business. Policy implications that emerge from the study also add to the case for strengthening institutional and legal frameworks, as well as relieving the tax burden on doing business.

Findings of the present study should be interpreted with caution, as the dependent variable used in the present study reflects UK firms’ perceptions of jurisdiction risk, which may depend on various factors such as different risk appetites and the countries in which firms carry out business, and not necessarily the actual level of risks based on financial crime statistics. For example, a jurisdiction which may indeed be considered high risk, would not necessarily be ranking high on the FCA’s list of UK firms’ jurisdiction risk perceptions due to few firms operating in that particular country. As a result, the list could differ from the Financial Action Task Force’s black and grey lists. Findings based on the regulatory data on the UK financial institutions’ perceptions of jurisdiction risk should be considered preliminary in nature, given that they are based on a single year cross sectional data. As global and country-level AML/CFT efforts continue to intensify and as more regulatory data becomes publicly available, it would be imperative to bring further empirical evidence to bear on the question of whether financial crime perceptions are likely to be more pronounced for jurisdictions where AML/CFT efforts are more intensified. Likewise, from a policy standpoint, it would be equally important to explore further the role that institutional and legal risk, as well as tax burden on businesses, play in shaping firms’ perceptions of jurisdiction risk.

Findings lend support to the proposition that unsystematic efforts and too much publicity may ascertain the high-risk image of a jurisdiction, deterring cross-border business. Therefore, rather than waiting for more data to be made available by other financial regulators, which could lead to a more conclusive evidence in the future, on balance, the findings of this study add to the case for carefully designing and systematically implementing AML/CFT measures in a less publicized manner. Findings lend support to the theoretical postulation that disorderly efforts and undue publicity regarding AML/CFT efforts serve to ascertain the high-risk image of a jurisdiction, which could deter cross-border business and could be detrimental to how firms undertake due diligence. They also suggest that disorderly implementation of AML/CFT measures may hinder access to formal financial service and jeopardize authorities’ ability to trace the movement of funds, which may also add to negative perceptions of jurisdiction risk.

Findings are in line with the theoretical expectations that perceptions of jurisdiction risk would be expected to be higher in countries with inadequate disclosure rules, lax regulation and opacity jurisdiction. Likewise, results are aligned with the expectations that tax burden on business would be expected to be in a positive relationship with jurisdiction risk, as it would increase the likelihood of tax evasion, which incentivizes financial crime. Therefore, policy implications that emerge from the study also add to the case for strengthening institutional and legal frameworks and relieving the tax burden on doing business as part of efforts to improve the international image of jurisdictions with respect to financial crime risks.

Using the cross-country regulatory data on the UK financial institutions’ perceptions of jurisdiction risk, this study has empirically determined that perceptions of jurisdiction risk is significantly and positively associated with AML/CFT framework, as well as with tax burden on business and institutional and legal risk. These findings have implications from a policy standpoint.

The world has been gripped by the severest global financial (and economic) crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. How did it come about, what is being done to alleviate its consequences and, vitally, what measures should be undertaken to ensure against its recurrence are therefore questions that must be satisfactorily addressed. Preventing ‘financial crises’ from ever happening again is of course completely out of the question, they being inherent to the economic system as we understand it; rather that of those of the ‘severest’ kind. Fortunately, a vast literature has been accumulating on these issues, so the intention here is not to add to it and reinforce the perception that economists will offer more opinions on a single issue than the total membership of any assembled group thereof for the purpose. Hence, this is confined to a consideration of the most convincing explanations. Owing to space limitations, I shall not examine the recommendations for future action in all the mentioned areas but will do so for what is being offered to cater for the capital adequacy and pro-cyclicality since they are of the essence and involve many players.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of UK investment firms’ implementation of the requirements in Commission Delegated Regulation 2017/589 (more commonly known as “Regulatory Technical Standard 6” or “RTS 6”) that govern the conduct of algorithmic trading activities.

A qualitative examination of 19 semi-structured interviews with practitioners working for, or with, UK investment firms engaged in algorithmic trading activities.

The paper finds that practitioners generally have a good understanding of the requirements in RTS 6. Some lack knowledge of algorithms, coding and algorithmic strategies but have used best efforts to implement RTS 6. However, regulatory fatigue, complacency, cost pressures, governance in international groups, overreliance on external knowledge and generous risk parameter calibration threaten to undermine these efforts.

The study’s findings are limited to the participants’ insights. Some areas of the RTS 6 regime attracted little comment from participants.

The paper proposes the introduction of mandatory algorithmic trading qualification requirements for key staff; the lessening of the requirements in RTS 6 for automated executors; and the introduction of a recognised software vendor regime to reduce duplication and improve coordination between market participants that deploy algorithmic trading systems.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, the study represents the first qualitative examination of firms’ implementation of the algorithmic trading regime in the second Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2014/65/EU.

This paper sets out to evaluate the financial security consequences of the terrorists attack on the USA of 11 September 2001 with specific regard to money laundering.

The study itemises in minute detail the litany of actual and potential financial legislation in the wake of 9/11 in both the USA and the UK.

Basically, the study finds the depriving criminals of the proceeds of their crimes is illusory and ineffectual, since they never have sufficient funds available for confiscation in the first place.

The paper arguably represents the most comprehensive evaluation to date of the financial issues, both real and hypothetical, thrown up on both sides of the Atlantic by the events of 9/11.

This paper aims to discuss key concerns surrounding the recent implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID II). It focuses on the UK regime. The insights derived are envisaged to be helpful guides for participants and regulators in financial markets.

This paper used the legal-economics perspective. It relied on primary data from statutes and regulations and secondary data from the public domain to analyze the phenomenon. The analytical framework comprised the following sections: Introduction, MiFID I review, MiFID II scope, MiFID II key concerns and concluding remarks.

Only half of the EU Member States including the UK managed to transpose MiFID II within the 3rd January 2018 effective date. At this early stage of implementation, various teething problems were encountered. These pertained to costs and charges reporting, firm governance, product governance, transaction reporting, best execution and research. Owing to the sheer scale and complexity of MIFID II, most entities barely coped with their reporting obligations. Noting the situation, the Financial Conduct Authority assured firms taking all sufficient steps that they would be treated fairly.

The paper was not sufficiently empirical. However, the study benefited reasonably from triangulation of data and perspectives to provide good insights on the implementation effects of the complex and voluminous EU rules for governing financial markets with global implications.

Investors could gain from the enhanced transparency and best execution rules. Investment banks could gain from the emerging resilient, integrated and efficient financial markets. Regulators with better access to more and higher quality reporting could intervene more effectively when required.

This paper assembled and critically analyzed currently available research insights in these areas so as to provide useful guidance to those needing to work and comply with MiFID II rules and academics teaching financial services law.