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The world has been gripped by the severest global financial (and economic) crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. How did it come about, what is being done to alleviate its consequences and, vitally, what measures should be undertaken to ensure against its recurrence are therefore questions that must be satisfactorily addressed. Preventing ‘financial crises’ from ever happening again is of course completely out of the question, they being inherent to the economic system as we understand it; rather that of those of the ‘severest’ kind. Fortunately, a vast literature has been accumulating on these issues, so the intention here is not to add to it and reinforce the perception that economists will offer more opinions on a single issue than the total membership of any assembled group thereof for the purpose. Hence, this is confined to a consideration of the most convincing explanations. Owing to space limitations, I shall not examine the recommendations for future action in all the mentioned areas but will do so for what is being offered to cater for the capital adequacy and pro-cyclicality since they are of the essence and involve many players.

In the last decades, many of the most talented and promising young graduates in the developed economies have joined the financial industry. Simultaneously, ill-designed incentives’ schemes have favored the development of a culture in which excessive greed, free-riders’ behavior, unreasonable appetite for risk, and short-term decision making have endangered the economy and, potentially, have laid the foundations for financial, economic, social, and environmental crises.

In this chapter, we review current challenges in the financial industry from the lens of human and social capital. We examine some of the factors that allowed unethical behavior and a short-term financial focus in the financial sector, examining how compensation and an extremely competitive culture became key elements that favored greedy and manipulative behavior and ultimately generated socially harmful human and social capital in the financial sector. Finally, we discuss the emergence of a number of game-changers (namely, Brexit, FinTech, the growing relevance of ethical standards, and the increasing participation of women and millennials in the industry) that might represent potential promotors of change and help restructure and reshape the financial industry.

The aim of this paper is two‐fold: to examine the challenges that organizations that have originated in transition environments face when moving from one layer of the environment (local/national) to another one (international/global) and to enrich the understanding of the legitimacy concept by looking at two types of legitimacy (functional and relational) relevant to the organizations in transition environments trying to access the global marketplace.

Drawing on the legitimacy needs of organizations evolving in transition environments and trying to access a different environmental layer, we developed a signalling theory of legitimacy.

When trying to move from one layer of the environment to another one, organizations will use different types of legitimacy signals in order to address the liabilities they face.

The research examines organizations facing both drastic environmental changes and evolving in a global industry. Future research can separately study the impact of each factor; and also investigate additional types of liabilities.

The study can help organizations from transition and emerging economies identify and employ signals that can enhance their organizational legitimacy, which may affect their performance. Additionally, public policy implications are developed in order to stimulate local businesses.

The multidimensionality of a signalling theory of legitimacy – functional and relational – increases our understanding of organizations facing liabilities, such as firms evolving in transition environments and trying to access the global marketplace.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between regulation, market discipline and banking distress.

To address the empirical question put forward above, a multivariate logit model is applied to an international sample of 586 banks from 21 European countries in the period between 2000 and 2012. To give robustness to the results, different variables have been used to test the role played by market discipline and regulation as well as an alternative methodology known as duration/survival analysis.

It can be found that market discipline is a good indicator in signalling banking distress, that is, market discipline has penalized more banks with a higher likelihood of being in distress. Nonetheless, as broadly acknowledged, market discipline was not sufficient per se to avoid banking distress in Europe. With regard to regulation, this paper evidences that the adoption of other regulatory measures beyond the simple transposition of changes occurred in the EU Directives such as borrower-based measures and limits on pre-emptive exposures’ concentration, have contributed toward reducing the probability of distress of EU banks, showing that the introduction of this kind of measures was necessary and relevant. In addition, in this paper, it can be found that the NPL ratio, size, capital (including the well-known regulatory capital ratio, as well as the novel leverage ratio which discards the risk weights present in the former one) and liquidity are good indicators of banking distress which lead us to conclude that the new regulatory framework known as Basel III is on the right path to mitigate the probability that a new banking crisis similar to the last one takes place again.

The first limitation regards the period of time chosen, that is, from 2000 to 2012, empirically neglecting, to some extent the important regulatory changes occurred after the aforementioned period. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the Data and Methodology section, the period ends in 2012 because it is difficult to flag a reasonable number of banks’ bailouts afterwards, to properly run the type of model used in this paper. The second limitation is the fact that the possible changes in the risk management and risk assessment by institutions and in the behaviour of investors, acknowledge as weak and inappropriate before the on-set of the global financial crisis, albeit very relevant, are not in the scope of this paper.

Despite the welcomed changes performed by regulators so far, some aspects are not complete yet and new areas deserve more empirical work and attention by the regulators and supervisors. Some of them stem directly from the results obtained from this paper such as the enhancement and a close monitoring of the current Pillar 3 framework the increase of the adoption of more targeted tools, in a more preemptive way, to counter the build-up of risks and the implementation of the leverage ratio.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the identification of leading indicators signalling emerging risks to the banking system has become a major priority to central banks and supervisory authorities. As a consequence, several studies have formulated the aim of analysing predictive characteristics of a set of macroeconomic variables, such as GDP Growth, Credit-to-GDP, Inflation, M2-to-GDP, among others. Other studies take a different perspective and complement the analysis with bank-specific risk indicators. Nonetheless the aforementioned studies do not consider the relationship between regulation and market discipline and banking distress. This is the gap the authors wanted to fill, and this assessment is the main contribution of this paper.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the long‐term impact of the current financial and economic crisis on competition in the European Union (EU) banking sector.

The article first discusses the long term role of competition in the banking sector, commenting on policy developments prior to the crisis. Then the impact of the crisis is discussed focusing on two main areas of policy state: aids and bank regulation and supervision. The article culminates with the conclusions.

The main findings about state aids are that the efforts of the Commission to ensure that aided companies would not use the government support to distort competition seem to be working. However, given that the full impact on competition of these aids may take years to be felt, the Commission should be prepared to take action where necessary to ensure that competition will be protected. The provision of state aids could not have been avoided due to the grave systemic risks associated with bank failures. In respect of regulation and supervision, the article concluded that there is a lot of work to be done in this area to ensure that mistakes that led to the crisis will not be repeated but also that there is need for the Commission to ensure that the reforms to the regulatory and supervisory architecture do not occur at the expense of competition.

The article contains proposals about policy adjustments, thus contributing to the ongoing debate about the role of competition policy in the efforts to address the impact of the crisis.

This study aims to examine diversity in the composition of Shariah supervisory boards (SSBs) of Islamic banks (IBs). It investigates diversity from two perspectives: existing composition of SSBs and the regulatory frameworks and standards of selected Organisation of Islamic Cooperation countries. Diversity characteristics include education, nationality, gender and age.

A list of all full-fledged Islamic commercial banks (FFICBs) globally has been carefully prepared and confirmed. Conventional banks with Islamic windows, non-commercial banks, takaful companies and other Islamic financial institutions are excluded. The available profiles of 428 SSB members have been scrutinised and analysed. These board members occupy 522 SSB positions in 238 FFICBs operating in 52 countries around the globe. From the regulatory perspective, 12 national and international Shariah governance frameworks and standards have been examined.

Findings of this paper indicate various levels of diversity in SSBs of the reviewed IBs. The level of diversity in educational background and in the nationality of SSBs can be described as generally acceptable. However, a lack of diversity in gender and age among SSB members is evidently observed in IBs. While the lack of age diversity in SSBs may be relatively justified as a common trend in the composition of corporate boards, SSBs of IBs are seriously lagging behind in gender diversity. On the regulatory level, this study concluded that provisions on diversity as a requirement in SSBs are almost non-existent in the existing regulatory frameworks and standards.

The major limitation of this study is the lack of available information on the SSB members.

This paper provides insights for IBs and policymakers concerned with the corporate governance of IBs and all Islamic financial institutions. First, it offers an excellent bird’s-eye view of the status of diversity in SSBs of IBs. Second, it motivates policymakers and standard-setting bodies to ensure, through the relevant regulatory frameworks, adequate levels of diversity in the composition of SSBs. Diversity in SSBs of IBs and Islamic financial institutions should be given special emphasis, not only in boards and top management positions but also in the workplace. This is of profound significance to the reputation of Islamic finance industry which has been recently under mounting pressure to translate the rhetoric about the Islamic finance industry being ethical, fair, just, equitable and inclusive into genuine implementations.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first of its kind to examine the diversity of SSB members from the regulatory as well as from the implementation perspective.

This study aims to examine the relationship between board gender diversity and environmental disclosure (ED) in the banking sector.

Data pooled from Bloomberg database on 2,116 banks from the period of 2007 to 2016 ends up with 7,951 observations. Panel regression model that include random effects was used to test study hypothesis.

The findings showed that when female board members were between 21% and 50%, it had a significant positive effect on the ED disclosure. Furthermore, the results showed that bank located in non-OPEC countries have better gender diversity in their board and greater ED than non-OPEC countries. Moreover, the results demonstrated that the board diversity and ED are better in banks that are located in countries that ranked 26–50 in oil production.

Although findings of this research clearly discussed the importance of board diversity in enhancing ED, the results of this study give us a crucial signal as a wake-up call for regulators to start considering women quota on board for higher ED.

The aim of this paper is to study the relationship between banks' ownership structure and their risk-taking behavior as well as the impact of banking regulation on banks' approach to taking risk, after the 2008 financial crisis.

The empirical analysis considers a sample of listed banks from European Union (EU) countries, over the period of 2011–2016 and uses the generalized least squared (GLS) random effect (RE) method, following Baltagi and Wu (1999) and Pathan (2009).

The authors find that the structure of the board of directors can influence bank risk behavior but not the ownership concentration. No significant relation was found between the influence of the regulatory environment and bank risk, i.e., stricter regulation has no effect on risk taking by banks.

The paper contributes to the literature in risk measures and banks' corporate governance. It also considers the impact of regulatory framework on banks' risk-taking behavior. The aim of this empirical analysis was to examine in greater detail these subjects and the dynamics between them after the significant structural changes in the macroeconomic environment and in the financial system, particularly with regards the regulatory and supervisory framework following the 2008 financial crisis, using data from European Union countries.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the financial risks posed by energy and environmental markets and how these risks are addressed by current regulatory regimes and legislation. This assessment should be of interest to academics, practitioners, regulators and policymakers.

The first half of the paper provides a theoretical conceptualisation of the financial risks energy and environmental markets pose by drawing on established academic literatures on financial regulation and energy markets. The second half of the study provides a legislative analysis of the evolving approach to the financial regulation of energy and environmental markets. Drawing on “grey” literatures, this assessment critically appraises the array of current policy initiatives that have the potential to affect the financial regulation and operation of energy and environmental markets.

The theoretical conceptualisation of financial risks identified macroeconomic and energy systemic as the principal risks posed by energy and environmental markets. The legislative analysis contains various conclusions, prominent amongst which are: that the EU will play an increasingly important role in the financial regulation of energy and environmental markets through bodies such as ACER and ESMA; and that it is essential the boundaries of regulatory responsibility between energy and financial regulators are assessed to ensure activities leading to risk do not fall between the remits of responsibility.

There is a dearth of academic work on the financial regulation of energy and environmental markets, while prior policy and regulatory analyses have focussed on specific markets or products. This belies the interrelationships and, in some cases, the integration of these risks and the nature of financial crises. To amend for this omission we provide a holistic assessment of these legislative and policy developments.