Employee stock options: exercise decisions by top executives

Abstract

Reviews previous research on the timing of employee stock option exercise decisions and share price performance before and after insider trading. Analyses the 1992‐1993 exercise behaviour of top executives at 65 large US firms using the Black‐Scholes (1973) value (less anticipated dividends) as a benchmark to compare with the intrinsic value (market price minus exercise price) at the date of exercise. Finds options are exercised when the two values are roughly equal, i.e. that executives’ decisions are not risk‐averse or biased by private information. Also shows a tendency for the subsequent change in share prices to be lower when the intrinsic value is less than the Black‐Scholes value at the time of exercise. Considers consistency with other research and the implications of the findings.

Citation

Anderson, M.C. (1999), "Employee stock options: exercise decisions by top executives", Managerial Finance, Vol. 25 No. 10, pp. 50-60. https://doi.org/10.1108/03074359910766226