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The aim of this paper is to investigate the dynamics between executive ownership and excess cash policy in the UK.

The authors identify firms adopting an excess policy using a joint criterion of high cash and cash higher than the target. Logit analysis is used to estimate the impact of executive ownership and other governance characteristics on the probability of adopting an excess cash policy.

The results suggest that, in the UK, the impact of the executive ownership on the probability of adopting an excess cash policy is non-monotonic, in line with the alignment-entrenchment hypothesis. The results are robust to different definitions of excess cash policy, to alternative specifications of the regression model, to different estimation frameworks and to alternative proxies of ownership concentration.

The authors’ approach provides a new measure of the excess target cash for the firm. They show the need to identify an excess target cash policy not only by using an empirical criterion and a theoretical target level of cash, but also by capturing persistence in deviation from the target cash level. The authors’ measure of excess target cash calls into questions findings from previous studies. The authors’ approach can be used to explore whether excess cash holdings of UK firms and the impact of managerial ownership have changed from before the crisis to after the crisis.

The authors’ measure of excess target cash allows identifying in practice levels of cash which are abnormal with respect to an equilibrium level. UK firms should be cautious in using executive ownership as a corporate governance mechanism, as this may generate suboptimal cash holdings and suboptimal firm value. Excess cash policy might be driven not only by a poor corporate governance system, but also by the interplay between agency costs of managerial opportunism and cost of the external finance which further research could explore.

Actually, “how much cash is too much” is a question that has not been addressed by the literature. The authors address this question. Also, this amount of cash allows the authors to study the extent to which executive ownership contributes to explain the out-of-equilibrium persistency in the cash level.

This paper aims to investigate auditors’ pricing of excess cash holdings and the variation in their pricing decisions in light of the precautionary motives of cash holdings and certain firm-specific conditions and during periods of crisis.

The authors conduct the two-stage-least-squares multivariate analysis using a sample of publicly listed non-financial US firms for the period 2003 to 2021 (42,413 firm-year observations).

The findings show a significant positive relationship between excess cash and audit fee. Next, the authors find that audit pricing of excess cash is significantly higher for firms with lower financial constraints. However, the authors do not find evidence to suggest that auditors price excess cash significantly higher for firms with lower hedging needs. In additional analysis, the authors find evidence to suggest that auditors charge significantly less for excess cash in firms that report financial loss and firms operating in industries with high litigation risk. The additional analysis also reveals excess cash is not positively and significantly priced by auditors as a result of the global financial crisis and Covid-19 pandemic.

Most researchers have analyzed excess cash holding from the perspective of managers, i.e. agency conflict or managerial prudence, while somewhat neglecting auditors’ perception of the embedded risk of excess cash holdings. The authors provide new insights on auditors’ perspective of excess cash holding and identify certain factors/situation/conditions that cause variation in the audit fee premium. The findings offer useful insights for managers and shareholders who are interested in assessing the effects of excess cash holdings policies on the audit fee premium.

This study conducts a logistic regression analysis of the ability of excess cash and short-term bank loans to substitute for each other and a multiple regression analysis of the factors influencing excess cash and short-term bank loans holdings. In addition, a questionnaire is used to survey the views of Taiwan’s corporate financial leaders on the factors influencing these two liquidity resources. The empirical results support a certain level of substitution between the two types of holdings. The regression analysis shows that for companies that would accumulate more excess cash when interest rates are low, have strong corporate performance, have low debt ratios, and whose chairman of the board and chief executive officer (CEO) are not the same person. Companies tend to have more short-term bank loans when corporate performance is poor, debt ratios are high, and the chairman of the board and CEO are the same person, as well as when the degree of the deviation of control is small. We find that factors on financial structure, operating performance, cost of capital and corporate governance have significant influence on the holdings of these two liquidity facilities in regression, whereas the influence factors exclude corporate governance in questionnaire.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate debt-like compensation and the value of excess cash holdings.

The sample comprises 876 US firms covered by ExecuComp over the period 2006-2013. The authors apply the valuation regression of Fama and French (1998) to examine the marginal value of excess cash as a function of CEO inside debt holdings.

This paper proposes one hypothesis. The results constitute evidence that the value of excess cash to shareholders declines as CEO inside debt increases. More interestingly, excess cash holdings contribute less to firm value when shareholders expect their value to be destroyed due to managers’ conservative behavior.

The sample comprises only US firms, owing to a lack of firms data from other countries. It would be interesting to conduct future research on an international sample.

This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of investor valuation of excess cash in the presence of CEO inside debt. The findings complement previous studies on US firms by confirming the existence of a relationship between the agency costs of debt and firm policy decisions.

This work is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the first to examine the relationship between debt-like compensation and excess cash valuation, and it supports the view that the conflict between shareholders and debtholders largely affects firm cash policy, and hence, cash valuation.

Sees the objective of teaching financial management to be to help managers and potential managers to make sensible investment and financing decisions. Acknowledges that financial theory teaches that investment and financing decisions should be based on cash flow and risk. Provides information on payback period; return on capital employed, earnings per share effect, working capital, profit planning, standard costing, financial statement planning and ratio analysis. Seeks to combine the practical rules of thumb of the traditionalists with the ideas of the financial theorists to form a balanced approach to practical financial management for MBA students, financial managers and undergraduates.

This paper aims to examine the impact of gender diversity on boards and on top management positions on excess cash holdings.

The authors adopt the quantile regression approach to test the relation between gender diversity and excess cash holding. The sample consists of 1,235 firm-year observations for the period 2005–2017.

The authors find that board gender diversity negatively influences the level of excess cash. This result suggests that women appointed in the boardroom are effective in monitoring managerial actions, including financing policies. The results also show that by forcing companies to have a quota of women on their boards, the presence of women no longer has a negative impact on excess cash holdings. However, when women stand at the chief executive officer or chief financial officer position, they tend to accumulate cash for precautionary motives. These results suggest that women behave differently regarding excess cash holding as monitors compared to their role as decision-makers.

The results may be of interest to legislators who may decide to break the glass ceiling, preventing women from gaining greater access to senior management positions. This is in line with the recommendations of the AFEP-MEDEF Governance Code of 2020, which strongly recommends the recruitment of women to senior management positions. The results are also important to investors, who might be likely to trust companies in which women hold positions on boards of directors which may increase firm value. The results may also have a social impact. Indeed, the role of women in society may be enhanced if such initiatives are taken to increase their representation on leadership positions and in society in general.

The results may also have a social impact. Indeed, the role of women in society may be enhanced if such initiatives are taken to increase their representation on leadership positions and in society in general.

This study investigates the role of women both as controllers and decision-makers in holding excessive amounts of cash. It also highlights new evidence on the impact the approach of appointing women on boards (enabling/coercive and market-based) can have on the relation between gender diversity and excess cash holdings.

This article analyzes the moderating role of investment opportunities, business risk and agency costs in shaping the nexus between excess cash and corporate performance.

This research uses dynamic regression models (two-step system generalized method of moments) to analyze the data related to 200 Turkish companies listed on Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the years between 2009 and 2020.

The findings indicate that when excess cash increases, the financial performance deteriorates only for firms with lower investments compared to firms with more investments. In addition, investment contributes to better financial performance for firms that hold cash surplus, whereas the influence of investment is insignificant for firms that have insufficient cash. Agency costs of equity exacerbate the adverse impact of excess cash on financial performance while agency costs of debt mitigate this effect. Excess cash reduces the financial performance of highly leveraged firms. However, this impact becomes insignificant when debt ratio decreases. The findings also show that investment has more significant role than business risk in building the precautionary motive to hold cash.

The findings of this article are limited to the Turkish market. Future research is still needed in other emerging markets to compare the results and reveal more about the effect of excess cash on firm performance, and how other factors can change this effect.

The findings verify the increased significance of excess cash in the presence of investment opportunities and difficulties in accessing external funds. Nevertheless, the role of the equity related agency problem in reducing the benefits of cash surplus confirms the necessity of policies that support corporate governance, especially in emerging markets.

This article, according to the knowledge of author, is the first to examine the role of agency costs associated with debt and equity, and the compound effect of investment opportunities and business risk on the nexus between excess internal funds and corporate financial performance in emerging markets.

This paper investigates the effect of economic policy uncertainty on value of cash before and after the global financial crisis.

We investigate the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and value of excess cash based on the valuation model of Fama and French (1998). Baker et al. (2016) news-based index (BBD index) is employed to calculate measures of economic policy uncertainty. Our research sample includes 103,474 observations from 11,000 firms across 19 countries over the period 2004–2016.

We find that economic policy uncertainty is negatively “positively” related to value of cash in the pre-crisis “post-crisis” period. Moreover, we also document that the positive effect of economic policy uncertainty in the post-crisis period is stronger in financially constrained firms.

While prior studies find a relationship between economic policy uncertainty and cash levels or the effect of firm-level uncertainty on value of cash, this paper shows how economic policy uncertainty as an institutional environment factor affects value of cash. Moreover, it documents that economic policy uncertainty has opposite effects on value of cash before and after the global financial crisis.

本研究旨在探討經濟政策不確定性在全球金融危機之前及之後對現金價值的影響。

我們基於法馬及佛倫奇(1998) (Fama and French (1998)) 的估值模型，來探討經濟政策不確定性與過剩現金價值的關係。我們採用了貝克等人(2016) (Baker et al. (2016)) 以新聞訊息為基礎的指數 (BBD指數) 、來計算經濟政策不確定性的程度。我們的研究樣本包括橫跨19個國家、涵蓋期為2004年至2016年、取自11,000間公司之103,474個觀察。

我們發現經濟政策不確定性與現金價值在危機前時期成負相關,在危機後時期則成正相關。而且,我們也記錄了在危機後時期經濟政策不確定性的正面影響於財務受限的公司會較大的情況。

過去的研究發現了經濟政策不確定性與現金水平之間存有關係、及企業層面的不確定性對現金價值的影響。唯本研究顯示了經濟政策不確定性作為一機構環境因素,如何影響現金價值；同時，亦記錄了經濟政策不確定性在全球金融危機之前及之後對現金價值會有相反影響的情況。

The purpose of this study is to understand how the business environment of a country has an impact on cash management policies of the firms and also to investigate if there is any asymmetry in cash adjustment dynamics when a firm deviates from its long-term target of cash holdings.

Using a sample of seven emerging Asian countries in the period 2001–2019, the authors investigate the role of country specific variables in the corporate cash holdings and their cash adjustment mechanism. They use the panel data regression method to estimate the results.

The authors find that the overall financial development of a country has a significant impact on corporate cash holdings and cash adjustment dynamics. When a firm has excess cash, the speed of adjustment towards the target is faster as compared to when it has deficit cash holdings. Further, when a firm holds excess cash, it adjusts towards the target using cash from investments; in case of deficit cash holdings, the adjustment happens via cash from financing activities.

The results of the study are helpful to corporate managers as these are important references to them to understand and design cash management policies by considering factors that are measured at the country level. It also provides them a clearer understanding about the role of corporate board and information asymmetry in cash holdings.

This is the first study which examines the role of country-specific variables on corporate cash holdings and their adjustment mechanism of firms in emerging Asia. Further, the study extends the literature by providing new evidence that there is asymmetry in cash adjustment dynamics of firms after controlling for the overall financial development of a country.

This paper aims to discover the underlying mechanisms by which corporate financial policies, cash holdings, capital structure and dividend payouts, transmit their effects on firm value in the “Middle East and North Africa” (MENA) emerging markets.

The authors employ a novel integration of path modelling with parallel multiple mediation analysis to empirically test the hypothesised indirect effects through the mechanisms represented by the value of financial flexibility (VOFF) and agency costs.

The authors do not find any evidence of the association between cash holdings, dividend payouts, and firm value when the mechanisms through the VOFF and agency costs are considered. While these two forces, i.e. the VOFF and agency costs, have balanced mediation effects on the relationship between cash holdings and firm value, they represent equivalent and complementary mechanisms by which dividend payouts transmit their positive impact on firm value. Moreover, we document a significant negative partial mediation effect of agency costs on the relationship between leverage and firm value; however, we do not find any evidence supporting the mediation effect of the VOFF on such a relationship.

This paper sheds new light on the forces that govern the nature of the relationships between corporate financial policies and firm value.