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The paper examines the relationship between board effectiveness and audit fees for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Furthermore, given the unique nature of SOEs, the paper assesses country-level influences, such as economic freedom, political democracy and protection of minority shareholders, which can impact board effectiveness and audit fees.

A combination of two-stage and ordinary least squares regression is used to examine the board characteristics-audit fee relationship for SOEs in a multinational setting during the period from 2016 to 2018.

The results indicate that board characteristics that represent a high level of effectiveness are associated with higher audit fees in SOEs. Furthermore, the findings suggest SOE's operating in countries evidencing medium levels of democracy and economic freedom and medium to high levels of protection of minority shareholders may be motivated to reduce agency conflicts by promoting accountability and transparency, thereby demanding increasing levels of corporate governance, monitoring and audit quality, thereby increasing audit fees.

The results provide further support for the OECD (2015) guidelines promoting the use of high-quality external audits in SOEs.

As a result of the scarceness of research in this area, the current study extends the literature by examining the role of corporate governance and audit fees in SOEs, while examining the influence of economic freedom, political democracy and protection of minority shareholders.

The chapter focuses on the personal characteristics of top executives in companies involved in corporate financial crime as well as the introduction of human governance as one of the mechanisms in preventing corporate misbehaviour. This chapter discusses directors’ and top management teams’ personal characteristics – in the context of corporate governance – that may influence the occurrence of corporate financial crime. The study further proposes the human governance factor as a possible mechanism to improve corporate governance in preventing such misbehaviour. This chapter highlights the personal characteristics of top executives, which may become the indicators of corporate financial crime, as well as human governance, which is shown to be one of the most important mechanisms of corporate governance for corporate financial crime prevention.

The purpose of this paper is to explore relationships between corporate governance characteristics and strategic management accounting (SMA). The relationships provide insight into a debatable issue of whether corporate governance characteristics affect applications of SMA in Thailand. SMA is supporting tools for an organization to effectively execute its management strategies aiming for business success.

This study analyzes primary data from survey and corporate governance data from year 2011 to 2013 of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand.

Results show that corporate governance characteristics significantly affect SMA in two aspects, namely, participation and usage. This study finds some results that, on the one hand, separation of CEO’s role and chairmanship, size of independent board, and frequency of audit committee meetings positively affect both participation and usage. On the other hand, an independent chairman and board size negatively affect both participation and usage.

Findings confirm framework of enterprise governance issued by the International Federation of Accountants that not only does corporate governance provides assurance control, but it also provides strategic governance through behavioral applications of SMA tools and supports.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the link between earnings quality, Audit Committees and the Board of companies located in Jordan through the lens of enhancing corporate governance.

The real earnings management (REM) and accruals earnings management models were notably used within the panel data robust regression analysis approach; these were used against certain Audit Committee characteristics (i.e. meeting frequency, amount of Board and Committee participants [both internal and external], size) and Board of Directors.

The former characteristics were found to have a positive relationship with REM, while the latter yielded mixed results: while there was no significant identifiable relationship between Board outsiders and REM, there was a positive relationship identified between Board meetings, Board insiders and Board size and REM. In regard to this study’s limitations, the qualitative data gathered for the Board of Directors through the lens of corporate governance enhancement should have been documented with more detail; furthermore, the study was limited to the study of just one nation.

The data is limited to only a single country. More explanation for Board of Directors need qualitative understandings into corporate governance improvement. The control variables are essentially partial in a developing market context.

The different corporate governance code and guidelines improvements have varied influence on earnings quality. As predictable, boards of directors most effect on earnings quality. Improvements have included most modification to audit committees but through them slight measured effect on earnings quality.

Jordan’s corporate governance improvements expected organised corporate governance practices generally in place amongst its boards, and though invoking considerable modification to audit committees, eventually included slight modification to earnings quality. However, both improved earnings quality.

This particular research appears to be the first to consider both Audit Committee and Board of Directors characteristics in one model; indeed, in this vein, this research is also the first to explore the corporate governance enhancements that initially stemmed from there being zero code or guideline regarding its use, despite it becoming required recently. Hence, the authors can say this study has high originality.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management in US context and provide further insights on the effects of board of directors' characteristics on earnings management.

The paper uses a sample of three groups of US firms; where firms with relatively high negative, firms with relatively high positive, and those with low levels of discretionary accruals in the year 2004 are examined. Descriptive statistics, univariate analysis, multivariate analysis, board of directors' characteristics, and possible relationships between corporate governance variables and earnings management proxy provide the basis for discussion.

Firms with annually elected boards, small size boards, 100 percent independent nominating committees, and 100 percent independent compensation committees have more negative discretionary accruals. However, firms with 75‐90 percent independent board or firms with a board size of between nine and 12 have higher positive discretionary accruals.

Certain board characteristics may be the important factors associated with constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management.

Results are limited by the accuracy of the models applied to isolate discretionary accruals. Additionally, the direction diverse of discretionary accruals may differ with selecting a time series of three or more years as a base for the analysis.

In contrast to prior literature, where board composition is defined as an insiders‐ or outsiders‐controlled board, this paper classifies board composition into seven discrete categories, using the same seven categories employed by Institutional Shareholder Services in evaluating and assigning corporate governance quotient scores to firms. The paper's major contributions to the existing literature are its findings that income‐increasing and income‐decreasing discretionary accruals have a different relationship with corporate governance practices and its expansion of the scope of corporate governance from board independence and audit committee independence to other corporate governance characteristics. This paper provides evidence that supports US regulators' initiatives that stronger corporate governance mechanisms provide greater monitoring of the financial accounting process and may be the important factors in improving the integrity of financial reporting.

The first purpose of this paper is to investigate whether corporate governance mechanisms, in particular the characteristics of the board, audit committee and risk management committee, are associated with the level of disclosure in integrated reports of South African listed firms. The second purpose of this paper is to analyze how integrated reporting (IR) affects the sustainable development goals (SDGs).

This paper uses a mixed methods approach. First, a multiple regression analysis is used to estimate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on IR practices of a sample of South African listed firms during the period between 2019 and 2021. Using the content analysis method to measure the level of IR, disclosures were measured using a disclosure index consisting of 60 information items developed from the IIRC framework and previous studies. Second, based on a database containing 33 articles in the Meditari Accountancy Research journal with a publication date from 2013 to 2021, a systematic review of the academic literature focusing on IR is conducted to analyze how IR influences SDGs.

The results indicate that board size, board independence and risk management committee independence have a positive effect on IR practices. However, board expertise, board activity, audit committee independence, audit committee size, audit committee expertise, audit committee meetings, risk management committee expertise, risk management committee meetings, risk management committee size and the auditor type are negatively related to IR practices. The results also indicate that IR has an important role in achieving SDGs by relying on integrated thinking that integrates sustainability into the enterprise’s strategy and helps the integration of capitals. In addition, sustainable business models create long-term values.

This study was limited to a sample size of 75 firms, which is country-specific; however, it sets the tone for future empirical research on the subject matter. This study provides an avenue for future research in the area of corporate governance and IR practices in other emerging countries, especially other African countries.

This study provides useful insights for managers and policymakers to better understand which corporate governance mechanisms can best encourage a company to improve IR practices.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is, perhaps, the first to examine the effect of risk management committee characteristics on IR practices. This study provides new insight into the contribution of accounting research toward the achievement of SDGs.

This study aims to examine the link between boards and audit committees and firm performance in Kuwaiti listed firms in the context of recent and extensive corporate governance regulatory reform.

Panel data regression analysis with fixed effects and clustered standard errors of firm performance for 61–97 listed industrial and services firms in Kuwait over a seven-year period. The dependent variables are the returns on assets and equity, the debt-to-equity ratio and leverage and Tobin’s Q and the independent variables comprise board of directors and audit committee characteristics, including size, the number of meetings and the numbers of independent and outside board and expert committee members. Firm size, subsidiary status and cash flow serve as control variables.

Mixed results with respect to the characteristics of the board of directors. Board size and independent and outsider board members positively relate only to Tobin’s Q and insiders only to debt to equity. For audit committee characteristics, committee size, independence and expertise positively relate to the return on equity and committee size and expertise only to Tobin’s Q. Of the five performance measures considered, board and audit committee characteristics together best determine Tobin’s Q.

Data from a single country limits generalisability and control variables necessarily limited in a developing market context. Need for qualitative insights into corporate governance reform as a complement to conventional quantitative analysis. In combining accounting and market information, Tobin’s Q appears best able to recognise the performance benefits of good corporate governance in terms of internal organisational change.

The recent corporate governance code and guidelines reforms exert a mixed impact on firm performance, with audit committees, not boards, of most influence. But recent reforms implied most change to boards of directors. One suggestion is that non-market reform may have been unneeded given existing market pressure on listed firms and firms anticipating regulatory change.

Kuwait’s corporate governance reforms codified corporate governance practices already in place among many of its firms in pursuit of organisational legitimacy, and while invoking substantial change to audit committees, involved minor change to firm performance, at least in the short term. Some firms may also have delisted in expectation of stronger corporate governance requirements. Regardless, these direct and indirect processes both improved the overall quality of listed firm corporate governance and performance in Kuwait.

Seminal analysis of corporate governance reforms in Kuwait, which have rapidly progressed from no corporate governance code and guidelines to an initially voluntary and then compulsory regime. Only known analysis to incorporate both board of directors and audit committee characteristics. Reveals studies of the corporate governance–firm performance relationship may face difficulty in model specification, and empirical significance, given the complexity of corporate governance codes and guidelines, leads in changing firm behaviour and self-selection of firms into and out of regulated markets.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the specifics of the relationship between audit committee characteristics and earnings management in Russian listed companies. This research is driven by the possibility of placing this relationship within the context of a specific institutional environment for company performance.

The authors apply a panel study of 184 Russian listed companies for the period 2014–2018. In addition to the standard fixed effects model, the authors test the results for potential endogeneity with two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis.

The results show that audit committee representation on the board of directors results in some mitigation of earnings management. Results reveal that a higher level of audit committee independence and the presence of financial expertise on the committee are associated with lower earnings management. However, companies with relatively busy directors on audit committees are more inclined to practice earnings management. The study’s findings hold after testing for endogeneity of audit committee independence. The authors also reveal that some audit committee characteristics (for example, audit committee independence; its level of expertise) alleviate earnings management in listed state-owned companies (SOEs) more strongly than in listed non-SOEs.

The results add to the ongoing debate on the role of corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating earnings management in emerging markets by taking into account the type of ownership (state-owned vs private) as a moderating variable. This study reveals, in particular, that the effect of certain audit committee characteristics on earnings management is more prominent in listed SOEs than in listed non-SOEs.

The aim of this study is to explore and understand corporate governance patterns in family firms across Latin America. This is in response to several calls in the academic literature urging for more empirical studies in corporate governance in developing regions.

Following a configurative perspective, a hierarchical cluster analysis is applied to a sample of the 155 largest Latin American family firms.

The authors identify three main corporate governance configurations across Latin American countries. First, the exported governance model resembles many characteristics of Anglo-American and Continental Europe governance patterns of public listed control, having independence from the board of directors, and mainly hiring non-family management. Second, the super-familial governance model describes private ownership where one or multiple families control both the board of directors and the top-management team. Finally, the hybrid governance model is the largest cluster identified in the sample and combines governance characteristics of both of the foregoing configurations. This configuration exhibits ownership structured through public offerings of shares combined with leadership of the board of directors by a family member as well as moderate family influence on the board and management.

This is the first study to investigate corporate governance in the largest listed and privately-owned family firms in Latin America. The article extends the conversation on family firm heterogeneity and contributes to the configurative approach in the family business field by offering a cross-country perspective and identifying meaningful taxonomies that are applicable beyond national boundaries.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between corporate governance attributes in the form of board and ownership characteristics and the remediation of internal control material weaknesses (ICMW) reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002.

The paper employs multivariate logistic regression models for a sample of 528 firms having ICMW as per their auditors' attestation reports during the fiscal periods of 2004, 2005 and 2006 to investigate the empirical relationships between board and ownership characteristics, and remediation of control weaknesses in subsequent fiscal years.

The board diligence, CEO‐independent board, and managerial, institutional and dominant shareholdings are all positively and significantly associated with the ICMW remediation of the sample firms in the presence of other firm‐specific variables in the analysis. The results also suggest that, in general, the ownership characteristics play a greater role in the firms' remediation action than the board‐related factors except board diligence. The separate sub‐sample tests demonstrate that board diligence and several stock ownership characteristics are positively and significantly associated with a firm's action to remediate both the systematic and non‐systematic internal control weaknesses though the results are more robust for non‐systematic control weaknesses.

A useful extension is to conduct a detailed analysis of the effect of audit committee characteristics in conjunction with board and ownership characteristics on firms' remediation action in a setting where ICMW firms take such action at a differential pace that may continue over two or more fiscal periods. Further, the present study examines the empirical associations between variables of interest, and does not, by virtue of its results, establish any cause‐and‐effect relationship between governance attributes and timeliness in ICMW remediation. Finally, this research can be extended to a detailed analysis of the types of systematic and non‐systematic control weaknesses, their probable effect on firms' financial reporting process and the role of corporate governance in timeliness of management's remediation action for different types of internal control problems.

The paper adds to the existing literature on corporate governance and financial reporting quality by documenting the association between a firm's board and ownership characteristics and management's immediate action to remediate internal control problems that ultimately impacts the quality of reported accounting information. The study complements prior studies on ICMW remediation and accrual quality by demonstrating that the effective monitoring by board and large, sophisticated shareholders as well as greater alignment of manager‐shareholder interests ensures more timeliness in remediation of internal control weaknesses and improves financial reporting quality.