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Although green logistics has become a new focus of cooperation between government and enterprises under environmental constraints, how local governments formulate subsidy policies to effectively guide the green transformation of regional logistics and how to facilitate the reasonable cost-sharing are rather critical. This paper will deeply explore the dynamic process of the tripartite participation (government, platform, and logistics enterprises) in the selection of regional green logistics strategy, and reveal the evolutionary game relationship of the three parties.

To explore the dynamics involving the government, platform and logistics enterprises for the green logistic transformation, and reveal the evolutionary gaming among the three parties, based on the bounded rationality premise, this study constructs the tripartite asymmetric evolutionary game models, uses the stability theorem of differential equation to explore the evolution and stability strategy of the system in different cases and explicates the paths of influence on the tripartite behaviors via simulations.

Results of this study indicate that there exist stable equilibrium strategies among the three parties regarding the regional green logistics, and they are affected by different factors. The government's subsidy, subsidy intensity and the platform's cost-sharing proportion can generate positive effects, but the latter two can also impact negatively beyond the effective ranges. The findings provide a theoretical basis for local governments, platforms and logistics enterprises to formulate justifiable subsidy intensity and determine reasonable sharing proportion.

Firstly, considering the significant relevance of local government, it is included in the evolution model, and the tripartite game (among government, platform and enterprises) is explored; Secondly, by comparing the equilibrium results under different game conditions, this paper analyzes the evolution of each party's game strategy to achieve the optimal return under bounded rationality and the important factors determining the strategic selection; Finally, the key factor of platform cost sharing is involved, and to what extent the change of platform cost sharing ratio will influence the systematic stability is explored.

This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports and uses the system dynamics model to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, aiming to promote the development of foreign trade of film copyright and innovation and development of the film industry so as to improve the overall social benefits of the film industry and provide policy enlightenment for enhancing the import power of foreign core enterprises to introduce domestic film copyrights.

In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports is constructed, the evolution process of cooperation strategy is derived, the impact of innovation income coefficient, mixed incentive policy and single incentive policy on the evolution results is analyzed, and the system dynamic model is used to simulate to find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

The results show that export-oriented core firms are more sensitive to mixed incentives, while import-oriented core firms respond more quickly to single incentives. The large innovation income coefficient has a negative impact on the willingness of import-oriented core enterprises to cooperate. The study proposes measures to increase the willingness of core companies to participate.

Due to the fact that numerical simulation is based on simulation, there may be a certain gap between it and the actual situation. Therefore, it is necessary to further use actual data to conduct empirical analysis on the theoretical model.

This article mainly focuses on analyzing the impact of strategy choices and related parameters of various entities on the incentive mechanism and studying the foreign trade cooperation strategies of film copyright export enterprises under policy support from a theoretical model perspective. Furthermore, research has proven that in order to effectively enhance the willingness of foreign import core enterprises to participate in the foreign trade of domestic film copyrights, the government needs to coordinate the use of single incentive policies and mixed incentive policies. This study provides a major contribution for policymaker to develop film copyright import and export trade.

Based on the research conclusions, this paper puts forward management countermeasures to further improve the development of the film copyright import and export trade. The first is to enrich government incentive methods and stimulate the vitality of film copyright and foreign trade market entities. The second is to guide the core enterprises of film copyright export to increase investment in innovation and stimulate the endogenous driving force of industrial development. Finally, lengthen the foreign trade industry chain of film copyright and increase the income of film derivatives.

Firstly, this paper applies the research methods of evolutionary game and system dynamics simulation to the field of foreign trade research on film copyright and expands the research perspectives and methods of the film industry. Secondly, by analyzing the “cost-benefit incentive” relationship of the evolutionary game of government export-oriented core enterprises and importing core enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed, the quantitative point of tripartite interest decision-making is solved and the research object of the evolutionary game method is expanded. Finally, the system dynamics model is used to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

The study focuses on drug safety regulation capture, reveals the inner mechanism and evolutionary characteristics of drug safety regulation capture and provides suggestions for effective regulation by pharmacovigilance.

The article introduces prospect theory into the game strategy analysis of drug safety events, constructs a benefit perception matrix based on psychological perception and analyzes the risk selection strategies and constraints on stable outcomes for both drug companies and drug regulatory authorities. Moreover, simulation was used to analyze the choice of results of different parameters on the game strategy.

The results found that the system does not have a stable equilibrium strategy under the role of cognitive psychology. The risk transfer coefficient, penalty cost, risk loss, regulatory benefit, regulatory success probability and risk discount coefficient directly acted in the direction of system evolution toward the system stable strategy. There is a critical effect on the behavioral strategies of drug manufacturers and drug supervisors, which exceeds a certain intensity before the behavioral strategies in repeated games tend to stabilize.

In this article, the authors constructed the perceived benefit matrix through the prospect value function to analyze the behavioral evolution game strategies of drug companies and FDA in the regulatory process, and to evaluate the evolution law of each factor.

To further promote application of BIM technology in construction of prefabricated buildings, influencing factors and evolution laws of willingness to apply BIM technology are explored from the perspective of willingness of participants.

In this paper, a tripartite game model involving the design firm, component manufacturer and construction firm is constructed and a system dynamics method is used to explore the influencing factors and game evolution path of three parties' application of BIM technology, from three perspectives, cost, benefit and risk.

The government should formulate measures for promoting the application of BIM according to different BIM application willingness of the parties. When pursuing deeper BIM application, the design firm should pay attention to reducing the speculative benefits of the component manufacturer and the construction firm. The design firm and the component manufacturer should pay attention to balancing the cost and benefit of the design firm while enhancing collaborative efforts. When the component manufacturer and the construction firm cooperate closely, it is necessary to pay attention to balanced distribution of interests of both parties and lower the risk of BIM application.

This study fills a research gap by comprehensively investigating the influencing factors and game evolution paths of willingness of the three parties to apply BIM technology to prefabricated buildings. The research helps to effectively improve the building quality and construction efficiency, and is expected to contribute to the sustainability of built environment in the context of circular economy in China.

In the context of constructing an integrated national strategic system, collaborative innovation among enterprises is the current social focus. Therefore, in order to find the interest relationship between multiple game subjects, to explore the influencing factors of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises. This paper constructs a collaborative innovation mechanism for military–civilian integration involving four game subjects (military enterprises, private enterprises, local governments, and science and technology intermediaries). It aims to solve and reveal the evolutionary game relationship among the four parties.

To explore the mechanism of military–civilian collaborative innovation involving four players, this study employs game theory and constructs an evolutionary game model for collaborative innovation with the participation of military enterprises, civilian enterprises, local governments, and technology intermediaries. The model reveals the evolutionary game patterns among these four entities, analyzes the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary process of the game system, and numerical simulation is used to show these changes more specifically.

The research findings demonstrate that active government subsidies promote cooperation throughout the system. Moreover, increasing the input-output ratio of research and development (R&D), the rate of technological spillovers, and the R&D investment of civilian enterprises all facilitate the tendency toward cooperation within the system. However, when the government chooses to actively provide subsidies, increasing R&D investment in military enterprises may hinder the tendency toward cooperation. Furthermore, central transfer payments, government punishment from the central government, and an increase in the information conversion rate of technology intermediaries may suppress the rate of cooperation within the system.

Most of the previous studies on the collaborative innovation of military–civilian integration have been tripartite game models between military enterprises, private enterprises, and local governments. In contrast, this study adds science and technology intermediaries on this basis, reveals the evolution mechanism of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises from the perspective of four-party participation, and analyzes the factors influencing the cooperation of the whole system. The conclusion of this study not only enriches the collaborative innovation evolution mechanism of military–civilian integration enterprises from the perspective of multiple agents but also provides practical guidance for the innovation-driven development of military–civilian integration enterprises.

The promotion of autonomous vehicles introduces privacy and security risks, underscoring the pressing need for responsible innovation implementation. To more effectively address the societal risks posed by autonomous vehicles, considering collaborative engagement of key stakeholders is essential. This study aims to provide insights into the governance of potential privacy and security issues in the innovation of autonomous driving technology by analyzing the micro-level decision-making processes of various stakeholders.

For this study, the authors use a nuanced approach, integrating key stakeholder theory, perceived value theory and prospect theory. The study constructs a model based on evolutionary game for the privacy and security governance mechanism of autonomous vehicles, involving enterprises, governments and consumers.

The governance of privacy and security in autonomous driving technology is influenced by key stakeholders’ decision-making behaviors and pivotal factors such as perceived value factors. The study finds that the governmental is influenced to a lesser extent by the decisions of other stakeholders, and factors such as risk preference coefficient, which contribute to perceived value, have a more significant influence than appearance factors like participation costs.

This study lacks an investigation into the risk sensitivity of various stakeholders in different scenarios.

The study delineates the roles and behaviors of key stakeholders and contributes valuable insights toward addressing pertinent risk concerns within the governance of autonomous vehicles. Through the study, the practical application of Responsible Innovation theory has been enriched, addressing the shortcomings in the analysis of micro-level processes within the framework of evolutionary game.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the support for multi-party collaboration in project construction provided by building information modeling (BIM). Based on the perspective of value co-creation, the research results can provide support for the collaborative application and contract design of BIM platform.

In this paper, an evolutionary game model involving the owner, designer and constructor is constructed by using prospect theory and evolutionary game theory. Through simulation analysis, the evolution law of the strategy choice of each party in the collaborative application of BIM platform is discussed and the key factors affecting the strategy choice of all parties are analyzed.

The results show that there is an ideal local equilibrium point with progressive stability in the evolutionary game between the three parties: “the construction party shares information, the designer receives the information and optimizes the project and the owner does not provide incentives”; in addition, the opportunistic behaviors of the design and construction parties, as well as the probability of such behaviors being detected and the subsequent punishment have a significant impact on the evolutionary outcome.

This method can provide support for the collaborative application and contract design of BIM platform.

This paper investigates the ways managing directors (MDs) in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) involve employees in strategic conversations. The paper examines how managers interact with employees in strategic conversations, and why the managers do so (or do not), to generate empirically grounded knowledge about the nature of internal openness in SMEs.

This study employs a general inductive approach and is based on in-depth interviews with 60 Swedish MDs with development and growth ambitions.

The paper develops a model of employee involvement in strategic conversations based on the nature and intensity of the MD–employee interaction. A key finding is that SMEs exhibit wide variation in terms of employee involvement, from virtually no employee involvement to, in some cases, far-reaching company democracy. The reasons for this variation are complex, but personal preferences and company size are shown to have an impact, as does, to some degree, ownership structure. In contrast to existing research, the limitations and drawbacks of involving employees in strategic conversations are outlined.

The study provides important insight into MDs' views and practices of internal openness in strategic conversations in SMEs. A model of employee involvement in strategic processes is outlined, and potential limitations of internal openness are highlighted.

The purpose of this paper is to find a simpler model for the reactance components in the high-frequency range on the premise of ensuring the accuracy.

In this paper, based on the fractional calculus theory and the traditional integer-order model, a reactance model suitable for high frequency is constructed, and the mutation cross differential evolution algorithm is used to identify the parameters in the model.

By comparing the integer-order model, high-frequency fractional-order model and the actual impedance characteristic curve of inductance and capacitance, it is verified that the proposed model can more accurately reflect the high-frequency characteristics of inductance and capacitance. The simulation and experimental results show that the oscillator constructed based on the proposed model can analyze the frequency and output waveform of the oscillator more accurately.

The model proposed in this paper has a simple structure and contains only two parameters to be identified. At the same time, the model has high precision. The fitting errors of impedance curve and phase-frequency characteristic curve are less than 5%. Therefore, the proposed model is helpful to improve the simplicity and accuracy of circuit system analysis and design.

In regarding to operational efficiency and safety improvements, multiple tower crane service scheduling problem is one of the main problems related to tower crane operation but receives limited attention. The current work presents an optimization model for scheduling multiple tower cranes' service with overlapping areas while achieving collision-free between cranes.

The cooperative coevolutionary genetic algorithm (CCGA) was proposed to solve this model. Considering the possible types of cross-tasks, through effectively allocating overlapping area tasks to each crane and then prioritizing the assigned tasks for each crane, the makespan of tower cranes was minimized and the crane collision avoidance was achieved by only allowing one crane entering the overlapping area at one time. A case study of the mega project Daxing International Airport has been investigated to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm.

The computational results showed that the CCGA algorithm outperforms two compared algorithms in terms of the optimal makespan and the CPU time. Also, the convergence of CCGA was discussed and compared, which was better than that of traditional genetic algorithm (TGA) for small-sized set (50 tasks) and was almost the same as TGA for large-sized sets.

This paper can provide new perspectives on multiple tower crane service sequencing problem. The proposed model and algorithm can be applied directly to enhance the operational efficiency of tower cranes on construction site.