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This study reviews and discusses the accounting literature that analyzes the role of auditors and enforcers in the context of fraud.

This literature review includes both qualitative and quantitative studies, based on the idea that the findings from different research paradigms can shed light on the complex interactions between different financial reporting controls. The authors use a mixed-methods research synthesis and select 64 accounting journal articles to analyze the main proxies for fraud, the stages of the fraud process under investigation and the roles played by auditors and enforcers.

The study highlights heterogeneity with respect to the terms and concepts used to capture the fraud phenomenon, a fragmentation in terms of the measures used in quantitative studies and a low level of detail in the fraud analysis. The review also shows a limited number of case studies and a lack of focus on the interaction and interplay between enforcers and auditors.

This study outlines directions for future accounting research on fraud.

The analysis underscores the need for the academic community, policymakers and practitioners to work together to prevent the destructive economic and social consequences of fraud in an increasingly complex and interconnected environment.

This study differs from previous literature reviews that focus on a single monitoring mechanism or deal with fraud in a broadly manner by discussing how the accounting literature addresses the roles and the complex interplay between enforcers and auditors in the context of accounting fraud.

The paper provides a detailed historical account of Douglass C. North's early intellectual contributions and analytical developments in pursuing a Grand Theory for why some countries are rich and others poor.

The author approaches the discussion using a theoretical and historical reconstruction based on published and unpublished materials.

The systematic, continuous and profound attempt to answer the Smithian social coordination problem shaped North's journey from being a young serious Marxist to becoming one of the founders of New Institutional Economics. In the process, he was converted in the early 1950s into a rigid neoclassical economist, being one of the leaders in promoting New Economic History. The success of the cliometric revolution exposed the frailties of the movement itself, namely, the limitations of neoclassical economic theory to explain economic growth and social change. Incorporating transaction costs, the institutional framework in which property rights and contracts are measured, defined and enforced assumes a prominent role in explaining economic performance.

In the early 1970s, North adopted a naive theory of institutions and property rights still grounded in neoclassical assumptions. Institutional and organizational analysis is modeled as a social maximizing efficient equilibrium outcome. However, the increasing tension between the neoclassical theoretical apparatus and its failure to account for contrasting political and institutional structures, diverging economic paths and social change propelled the modification of its assumptions and progressive conceptual innovation. In the later 1970s and early 1980s, North abandoned the efficiency view and gradually became more critical of the objective rationality postulate. In this intellectual movement, North's avant-garde research program contributed significantly to the creation of New Institutional Economics.

This research aims to identify the optimal configuration of investment which leads firms to their best competitive positions, considering the degree of concentration in the market.

The methodology was quantitative and based on secondary data with samples of 124, 106 and 90 firms from competitive environment classified as perfect competition, monopolistic competition and oligopoly, respectively. Proposed models' parameters were estimated by means of genetic algorithms.

Adjustments on firm's investment are contingent on the degree of competition they face. Results are in line with existing academic research affirmation that the purpose of investments is to create and exploit opportunities for positive economic rents and that investments allow firms to protect from rivals' competitive actions and reinforce the need for investment decision makers to consider the environment in which the firm is competing, when defining the amount of investment that must be done to achieve and maintain a favorable competitive advantage position.

This research brings two main original contributions. The first one is the identification of the optimal amount of capital and R&D investments which leads firms to their best competitive positions, contingent to the degree of concentration of the competitive environment in which they operate, and the size of the firm. The second one is related to the use of genetic algorithms to estimate optimization models that considers the three competitive environments studied (perfect competition, monopolistic competition and oligopoly) and the investment variables in the linear and quadratic forms.