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This study aims to obtain empirical evidence and analyzes factors that are affecting earnings response coefficient (ERC). Manufacturing companies are used in this research, which are listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2018. This study used panel data consisting of 114 firm years data. This research is using multiple regression method to examine the effect of independent variable to the dependent variable ERC. The result of this study shows that income smoothing (IS) and systematic risk (SR) have an effect on ERC; while IS, SR, and Firm Growth have an effect on Earnings Announcement; meanwhile, earnings persistence, audit quality, firm size, and leverage have no effect on Earnings Announcement. Implication of the research indicates that investors assess earnings quality of the company for their investment decision. These findings contribute to market reaction on earnings announcement and market-based accounting researches.

This study examines associations between accrual earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM), and earnings quality between countries considered under insider economics and outsider economics clusters. Countries included in the outsider economics cluster are Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong. Meanwhile, countries included in the insider economics cluster are Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea. Earnings management practices have changed from AEM to REM since the publication of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and DFA 954 implementation of the Claws back provision policy in the United States.

Research data were obtained from the Bloomberg database, 2010–2016. Regression analysis and t-test were utilized. This study compared AEM and REM to determine which is stronger based on country clusters, as well as the association between AEM or REM and earnings quality.

The results of this study indicate that AEM and REM are associated with the quality of earnings in the insider economics cluster. However, AEM and REM are not associated with earnings quality in the outsider economics cluster. Furthermore, associations between AEM and earnings quality are stronger than associations between REM and earnings quality in insider economics cluster.

This chapter provides evidence that legislation affecting litigation risk has an influence on the financial reporting behavior of corporate management, we address the following research questions: (1) Do firms react to changes in litigation risk that result from the passage of new legislation at the federal level by adjusting their level of conservatism with regard to reporting earnings? (2) How do firms’ levels of conservatism react to changes in litigation risk over time? We analyze the level and trend in conditional conservatism to evaluate the efficacy of legislation in altering managerial reporting choice. Our examination takes place in the context of two distinct pieces of legislation intended to alter the legal environment faced by corporate managers: (1) the PSLRA (1995), and (2) Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Our findings indicate that the passage of legislation that increases litigation risk is associated with increased timeliness (conservatism) in financial reporting by managers. The increased timeliness, however, begins to subside shortly after the initial effect. While the initial effect of a reduction in litigation risk is negligible, subsequent periods exhibit declining timeliness (conservatism) in financial reporting. Our results indicate that legislative actions can be successful in altering management reporting choice through changes in legal regime. However, our results also demonstrate that the desired influence of these legislative policies may be transient.

In this study, I investigate analysts’ ability to process public information for investors by examining price reactions to a sample of analysts’ recommendation revisions issued shortly after quarterly earnings announcements. I find that these recommendation revisions are used by investors to reassess the valuation implications of announced earnings. Confirmatory (contradictory) recommendation revisions that have the same (opposite) sign as prior earnings surprises can cause investors to revise their beliefs about the valuation implications of announced earnings upward (downward) and thus cause price reactions that are positively (negatively) associated with prior earnings surprises. In addition, I find that as the information complexity of earnings announcements gets higher, these recommendation revisions play a more important role in helping investors understand the valuation implications of announced earnings. Finally, I find that analysts’ ability to interpret the valuation implications of announced earnings for investors has remained at a similar level since the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure. Overall, this study provides additional evidence on how analysts help improve corporate information environment.

This chapter examines the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to market-adjusted returns and changes in earnings for high-tech (HT) firms vis-à-vis firms (NHT) in other industries. Consistent with the hypotheses, this chapter uncovers the following evidence: First, the sensitivity of executive bonus compensation to market-adjusted returns is weaker and more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms (a control group), which implies that the problem of ex post settling up, documented in Leone et al. (2006), may be far less serious in HT firms than in NHT firms. Second, the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to earnings changes is generally more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms, which is consistent with the view that HT firms engage in more conservative financial reporting than NHT firms. Third, the sensitivity of executive equity-based compensation to market-adjusted returns is significantly negative for HT firms compared to NHT firms when bad earnings news is announced. The results imply that HT firms, with a strong motive to attract and retain their highly talented executives, judiciously use both short-term and long-term incentive compensation schemes by compensating for a reduction of short-term incentive pay with an increase in long-term incentive pay. The issue of executive compensation has been a longstanding one in the United States and Canada, and the issue of executive compensation-performance sensitivity for HT firms is also relevant in this era of the information technology (IT) revolution, especially when prior research has shown that HT firms differ from NHT firms in their market-valuation process.

Although prior research documents that analysts sometimes herd their forecasts, very few studies investigate how investors’ judgments are influenced by their perceptions of the likelihood of analyst herding. I conduct an experimental study to investigate the conditions under which investors’ assessments of uncertainty about future earnings are influenced by their perceptions of the likelihood of analyst herding. As expected, and consistent with motivated reasoning, the results show that the temporal order of analyst forecasts influences investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding and investors’ uncertainty judgments when analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent but not when analyst forecasts are preference-consistent. This study provides a potential explanation for the mixed findings of prior research in regard to investors’ reactions to the likelihood of analyst herding. In addition, this study extends research on investors’ credulity by providing evidence that motivated reasoning and skepticism may serve as a mechanism that contributes to that credulity.

Prior research finds evidence that audit quality is positively associated with the joint purchase of tax nonaudit services (NAS) and concludes that jointly provided tax services result in audit-related knowledge spillovers that lead to improved audit quality. We extend this line of research. We examine the relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements and determine whether this relation differs when the auditor is a small or large accounting firm. We also examine whether the Securities Exchange Commission’s restrictions on certain tax consulting practices (SEC, 2006) altered this relation. Specifically, we measure whether the probability of financial statement restatements varies with (1) variation in accounting firm size (measured as PCAOB annually inspected firms versus PCAOB triennially inspected firms), and (2) the joint provision of audit and tax services. We find a negative relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements which is consistent with prior research. We also find that this relation is significantly more negative when the auditor is a small accounting firm. Finally, we find that the lower probability of a restatement associated with the joint provision of audit and tax services persists regardless of auditor size after the SEC-imposed restrictions on certain tax consulting services in 2006. Our study provides evidence that accounting firms, and particularly small accounting firms, benefit from knowledge spillovers when jointly providing audit and tax services and these benefits lead to improved audit quality. Prior research concludes that large auditors provide higher audit quality and that the provision of tax services improves audit quality. Our results provide evidence that audit quality improvements are greater for small auditors and their clients. This improvement narrows that audit quality gap between large and small auditors. We do not find evidence that the SEC’s restrictions on certain tax consulting services altered the relation between audit quality and tax services.

This chapter aims to examine the impact of whistleblowing policy (WH) on earnings management (EM) in an emerging market, Egypt. Our sample period from 2014 to 2019: the pre-whistleblowing policy period is 2014–2016 and the post-whistleblowing policy period is 2017–2019 with a total of 780 observations and the data are analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. Data are collected from annual reports, corporate governance reports, and companies’ website. The empirical analysis shows that whistleblowing policy coefficient is negative and significantly impacts EM in Egyptian firms. The result shows that when the firm adopts a whistleblowing policy, it led to decrease in EM. In addition, we provide strong and robust evidence by the difference-in-difference (DID) method to show that whistleblowing is significantly negatively associated with the extent of EM, which indicates that firms have an effective whistleblowing policy and can have several benefits. Firstly, it can help to identify and prevent illegal or unethical behavior within an organization, which can ultimately save the company from potential legal and reputational damage. Secondly, a whistleblowing policy can empower employees to speak up about any concerns they have, without fear of retaliation, which can help to create a more transparent and ethical work environment. Overall, an effective whistleblowing policy can contribute to the long-term success of a company and the broader economy. The findings of this chapter are relevant to policymakers, governments, management, employees, and shareholders to constraining EM in Egyptian firms.

Purpose – The relationship between the board characteristics (i.e. board independence, CEO duality, board size, board meeting and board tenure) and the ownership structure (i.e. managerial ownership, family ownership and institutional ownership) and earnings quality is examined.

Design/methodology/approach – Data from 280 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia's Main Board for the year 2004 is used.

Findings – Significant association was found between board tenure and earnings quality. In addition, a positive significant association was found between outside board ownership and family ownership and earnings quality. However no significant relationship was found between board of directors’ independence and earnings quality.

Research limitations/implications – The association between audit committees’ characteristics and earnings quality was not examined. An examination of the impact of ownership structure on boards of directors and audit committees is warranted. An investigation of the impact of the ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia using separate test on family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms is suggested.

Practical implications – The appropriateness of policy directives requiring majority independent directors may be considered by policy makers.

Originality/value – The conflict of interest between outside shareholders and managers in a diffused ownership support the agency theory. However, utility of agency theory to explain the conflicts between the controlling owners and the minority shareholders where ownership concentration is prevalent is limited. Whilst demonstrating the dominant impact of ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia the study calls for alternative explanations of corporate governance practices in different institutional settings.

Purpose – Audit quality is traditionally defined as the joint probability that an existing problem is discovered and reported by the auditor. This study examines whether and how audit quality is associated with related-party transactions and CEO duality. The first part (i.e., the ability to discover) is related to professional judgment, and the second part (i.e., report truthfully) is related to independence.

Methodology/Approach – Regression methods was used on archival data.

Findings – Our results reveal that for publicly held companies in environments with stronger capital market discipline, which causes greater reputation concerns and litigation risks, a CEO who is also the board chair does not hinder auditor independence. For privately held companies, however, such a CEO hinders auditor independence due to a lack of capital market discipline. The findings on related-party financing, on the other hand, are reversed. That is, in terms of information for an auditor, since the conflicts of interests are more severe in publicly held companies than in privately held companies, the relevance of related-party financing to a decision whether to issue a going-concern opinion is greater in publicly held companies.

Social implications – The empirical results of publicly held companies are useful for countries with better corporate governance, while those of privately held companies are helpful for countries with relatively weak corporate governance.

Originality/Value of paper – Because auditors performing audit services face different litigation risks and reputation concerns, the differences in our results between the two types of clients can have implications about the suitability of these types of companies in emerging markets.