Search results

This paper aims to investigate the cooperative governance mechanisms for personal information security, which can help enrich digital governance research and provide a reference for the formulation of protection policies for personal information security.

This paper constructs an evolutionary game model consisting of regulators, digital enterprises and consumers, which is combined with the simulation method to examine the influence of different factors on personal information protection and governance.

The results reveal seven stable equilibrium strategies for personal information security within the cooperative governance game system. The non-compliant processing of personal information by digital enterprises can damage the rights and interests of consumers. However, the combination of regulatory measures implemented by supervisory authorities and the rights protection measures enacted by consumers can effectively promote the self-regulation of digital enterprises. The reputation mechanism exerts a restricting effect on the opportunistic behaviour of the participants.

The authors focus on the regulation of digital enterprises and do not consider the involvement of malicious actors such as hackers, and the authors will continue to focus on the game when assessing the governance of malicious actors in subsequent research.

This study's results enhance digital governance research and offer a reference for developing policies that protect personal information security.

This paper builds an analytical framework for cooperative governance for personal information security, which helps to understand the decision-making behaviour and motivation of different subjects and to better address issues in the governance for personal information security.

Currently, many studies have shown an increasing interest in owner-dynamic capabilities (ODCs). Existing studies mainly focus on the dynamic capability basis and capability development within the owner organization, whereas they rarely analyze the capability mobilization within the network of participants in megaprojects. Therefore, this study aims to explain the interaction and evolution of the mobilization strategies of ODCs and the cooperative strategies of other participants.

This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy of the owner, the reciprocal participants and the general participants. Results are numerically simulated with a validation case. The asymptotic stability of multiple group strategies is discussed under the replicator dynamic system.

This study suggests that resource complementarity significantly reduces the difficulty of mobilization. Moreover, these strategies are only effective with sufficient ODCs. The results indicate that reciprocal participants are more sensitive to the change in resource complementarity.

This study provides strategic guidance for mobilizing ODCs in megaprojects to better embrace uncertainty and stress, contributing to the dynamic capability literature with an evolutionary game approach. And new insight for the study of reciprocity preference in megaprojects is also provided.

This study aims to investigate the most effective approach for governments and enterprises to combat desertification by considering the governance cycle. The focus is on understanding how the government can incentivize enterprises to actively engage in desertification combat efforts.

Both the government and the enterprise are treated as rational entities, making strategic choices for joint participation in combating desertification. Recognizing the dynamic nature of the desertification combat area, differential game models are employed to identify the optimal mode for combating desertification.

The findings underscore the significant influence of the governance cycle duration on the selection of desertification combat modes for government and enterprise. A cooperative mode is best suited to a short governance cycle, while an ecological subsidy mode is optimal for a longer cycle. Enhancing governance technology and shortening the governance cycle are conducive to combating desertification. Reducing taxes alone may not be an effective control strategy; rather, the government can better motivate enterprises by adopting tax rate policies aligned with the chosen governance mode.

This research contributes by elucidating the impact mechanism of the government cycle’s length on the desertification combat process. The results may offer valuable insights for governments in formulating strategies to encourage corporate participation in combating desertification and provide theoretical support for selecting optimal desertification combat modes.

The core of the successful implementation of the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode is to establish a high-quality relationship of cooperation, trust and sharing among participants. This paper proposes recommendations to improve the relationship quality of participants from the owner's perspective. The results provide the theoretical basis and practical guidance for the popularization and application of the IPD mode.

This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship among participants in IPD mode based on supply chain theory and similarity theory. A tripartite game model of the owner, designer and the contractor is constructed to obtain the evolutionary equilibrium strategies under different parameter constraints. Then, numerical simulations under various scenarios are conducted to explore the dynamic evolution and the influencing factors of the relationship quality among the participant in the IPD mode.

The results show that (1) the relationship quality under certain conditions gradually improves as the project progresses until stable and high-quality cooperation is formed and (2) the owner's positive supervision cost, the distribution coefficient of incentive and punishment of participants and the scale of incentive pool are important factors influencing the relationship quality.

This study incorporates the following three innovations. First, analyzing the relationship quality among the participants of IPD mode based on supply chain theory. Second, the evolutionary game theory is applied to the relationship quality analysis. Third, conclusion innovation. The authors conclude that the relationship quality may progress, decrease or cycle with the progress of the project and targeted recommendations are presented based on the results.

Research on strategic alliances is concerned with two issues: continuation and reconfiguration. Building on prior research that examines the two issues separately, the paper studies them simultaneously. This paper aims to investigate how strategic alliances may exert the synergetic effect between dynamics and stability as well as to discuss the dynamic evolution process and influence factors of strategic alliances.

This paper describes the construction of a two-party evolutionary game model of alliance and partners. The model is used to analyze the evolution process of synergetic mechanism to determine when to terminate and when to continue with a partnership. Further, numerical simulation is used to quantify the results and to gain insight into the effects of various factors on the dynamic evolution of the synergetic mechanism.

This paper reveals several synergetic states of dynamics and stability in the alliances. The results show that synergy states are positively affected by the collaborative innovation benefits, alliance management capability, the intensity of intellectual property protection, liquidated damages and reputation losses, and negatively affected by the absorptive capacity of partners.

The study helps the alliance to achieve long-term development as well as to balance the paradoxical relationship. The results suggest that managers of strategic alliances should focus on building strong and long-term relationships in order to achieve high performance innovations. Managers should also pay close attention to their partners’ behaviors in previous alliances.

This paper provides new insights into the paradoxical relationship in alliance by revealing the evolution of synergetic mechanism between dynamics and stability. The results remind alliances to understand the relationship between dynamics and stability and to notice the influence factors of synergistic effects when they are making decisions.

Channel coordination has become an essential part of researching hotel supply chain management practices. This paper develops an improved channel coordination approach to coordinate the profit distribution between hotels and online travel agencies (OTAs) achieved through an introduction of advertising fees. This direction further improves the decentralization of cooperation and achieves Pareto improvement to achieve mutual profitability.

The methodology used in this study involves Stackelberg game theory employed for the decision-making and analysis of both the hotel and OTA. The OTA, acting as the leader, offers a hotel a contract specifying the commission rate that the hotel will pay to the respective OTA. The hotel, acting as a follower, sets a self-interested room rate as a given response. A deterministic, price-sensitive linear demand function is utilized to derive possible analytical solutions once centralized, noncooperative decentralization and cooperative decentralized channel occurs.

Results show that a new channel coordination approach is possible, namely via advertising fees. Prior to channel coordination, the OTA tends to set a higher commission rate, and the hotel sets a higher room rate in response under noncooperative decentralization. As such, this results in a lower channel-wide profit for all. One way to reduce channel-wide profit loss is to use a method of cooperative decentralization, which can, and will result in optimal profit as centralization takes place. However, the lack of incentives makes cooperative decentralization unfeasible. Further improvement is possible by using advertising fees based on a cooperative decentralization agreement, which can reach Pareto improvement.

This paper helps the OTA industry and hotel owners cooperate by way of smoother coordination. This study provides practitioners with two important practical implications. The first one is that the coordination between the hotel industry and OTA through cooperative decentralization allows for the achievement of higher profitability than that of noncooperative decentralization. The second one is that this paper solves the outstanding problem of insufficient incentives characteristic of cooperative decentralization by means of an advertising fee as a new supply chain coordination approach.

This paper offers both the problem and solution regarding the lack of incentives that hamper cooperative decentralization without the use of advertising fees. This paper is unique in that it derives analytical solutions regarding commissions levied in a typical hotel supply chain under noncooperative decentralization.

Working conditions, pay rates and the rights of workers to collectively negotiate have become important points of discussions in recent years, with support for unions and union applications rising to levels long unseen in America. In many instances, though, companies have responded aggressively. This is not the first time such a dynamic has played out in American business. This study aims to take a fresh look at one of America’s most prominent historical disputes between labor and ownership – the Homestead Massacre of 1892 – to glean lessons from that conflict that remain relevant to today’s business environment.

This study adopts game theory and the principles of repeated interaction to assess how differing discount factors led to differences in time orientations between the workers and the Carnegie company. These differing time orientations affected both the strategy each side deployed in the negotiations and the payoffs received by the parties. Letters, contemporary news reports and histories of the events leading up to and immediately following the 1892 Homestead Massacre are qualitatively analyzed with a genealogical pragmatic approach.

Differences in temporal orientation between management and workers exacerbated the conflict, with the workers adopting a more cooperative stance and distal time orientation, while the Carnegie company negotiated with a proximal time orientation and played to “win” a game that, in fact, could not be fully won or lost given its infinitely repeating nature. The result was a short-term victory for the Carnegie company but with long-term negative consequences that highlight the suboptimal outcome the company achieved by playing a proximal strategy in an infinite game.

Although the incident at Homestead is a well-studied labor dispute, many of the themes that preceded the incident have resurfaced in the modern work context. This work, by adopting game theory as an analytical framework, provides new insights into management mistakes that led to the labor conflict and lessons for what present-day managers can do to avoid exacerbating labor strife.

The paper proposes a two-level closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) dynamic competitive model based on different competitive cooperation situations, and explores the impact of competitive cooperation methods on the pricing strategies, recycling and remanufacturing strategies and competitive model selection strategies of supply chain firms.

This paper establishes a CLSC game consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers. Firstly, five CLSC models are established in both horizontal and vertical dimensions, each of which competes with one another. Secondly, the recycling and remanufacturing pricing strategies are analyzed under different competition or cooperation models. Finally, the results are verified through numerical analysis.

The overall profitability of the CLSC is highest when the manufacturer–retailer partnership alliance is in place. The relationship between retailers and manufacturers is also found to be the best way to achieve overall optimization of the CLSC.

The paper investigates the relationship between the competitive partnership and the total profit of the CLSC, taking into account how to optimize the overall benefit, and focusing on how to optimize the individual interests of each participating enterprise. The results can provide basis and guidance for managers' pricing decision and competition cooperation.

This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports and uses the system dynamics model to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, aiming to promote the development of foreign trade of film copyright and innovation and development of the film industry so as to improve the overall social benefits of the film industry and provide policy enlightenment for enhancing the import power of foreign core enterprises to introduce domestic film copyrights.

In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports is constructed, the evolution process of cooperation strategy is derived, the impact of innovation income coefficient, mixed incentive policy and single incentive policy on the evolution results is analyzed, and the system dynamic model is used to simulate to find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

The results show that export-oriented core firms are more sensitive to mixed incentives, while import-oriented core firms respond more quickly to single incentives. The large innovation income coefficient has a negative impact on the willingness of import-oriented core enterprises to cooperate. The study proposes measures to increase the willingness of core companies to participate.

Due to the fact that numerical simulation is based on simulation, there may be a certain gap between it and the actual situation. Therefore, it is necessary to further use actual data to conduct empirical analysis on the theoretical model.

This article mainly focuses on analyzing the impact of strategy choices and related parameters of various entities on the incentive mechanism and studying the foreign trade cooperation strategies of film copyright export enterprises under policy support from a theoretical model perspective. Furthermore, research has proven that in order to effectively enhance the willingness of foreign import core enterprises to participate in the foreign trade of domestic film copyrights, the government needs to coordinate the use of single incentive policies and mixed incentive policies. This study provides a major contribution for policymaker to develop film copyright import and export trade.

Based on the research conclusions, this paper puts forward management countermeasures to further improve the development of the film copyright import and export trade. The first is to enrich government incentive methods and stimulate the vitality of film copyright and foreign trade market entities. The second is to guide the core enterprises of film copyright export to increase investment in innovation and stimulate the endogenous driving force of industrial development. Finally, lengthen the foreign trade industry chain of film copyright and increase the income of film derivatives.

Firstly, this paper applies the research methods of evolutionary game and system dynamics simulation to the field of foreign trade research on film copyright and expands the research perspectives and methods of the film industry. Secondly, by analyzing the “cost-benefit incentive” relationship of the evolutionary game of government export-oriented core enterprises and importing core enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed, the quantitative point of tripartite interest decision-making is solved and the research object of the evolutionary game method is expanded. Finally, the system dynamics model is used to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

This paper aims to propose an integrated use of balanced scorecard (BSC), data envelopment analysis (DEA) and game theory approach as an enhanced performance measurement technique to determine and rank the importance of manufacturing indicators of a steel company as a real case study.

An efficiency change ratio is defined to examine the characteristic function of each coalition which is super-additive. Then, the Shapley value index is used as the solution of the cooperative game to determine the importance of the BSC indicators of the company and rank order them.

The results reveal that “profitability rate” is the most important BSC indicator, whereas “customer satisfaction” is the least significant one. The ranking order of the importance of all BSC indicators makes it possible for the senior managers of the organization to realize the importance of each index separately and to improve the profitability and the number of customers by presenting programs according to the budget and time constraints.

The main contribution of this paper lies in the adoption of a game theory approach to performance measurement in the industrial sector that determines and ranks the importance of manufacturing indicators.