Search results

This article aims to provide insight into the future of financial markets and regulation in order to define what would be the best strategy for Europe.

First the authors define the potential changes in financial markets and then the tools available for the regulator to tame them. Finally, they build five scenarios according to the main evolutions observed on the financial markets and on the tools used by the regulator to modify these trends.

Among the five scenarios defined, two present highly unstable features since the regulator refuses to choose between financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance in order to preserve financial stability. Three of them achieve financial stability. However, they are more or less efficient or feasible. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the multi-polar scenario is the worst, because it necessitates coordination at the global level which implies moving further away from respective national preferences. However, the more realistic option seems to be the regionalisation scenario: this level of coordination seems much more realistic than the global one; the market should be of sufficient size to enjoy substantial benefits of integration. Nevertheless, the “European government” might gradually increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of cooperation with the rest of the world.

Foresight studies on financial markets and regulation are quite rare. This may be explained by the difficulty to forecast what will be their evolution in the coming decades, not least because finance is fundamentally unstable. This paper provides a framework to consider what could be the best strategy of regulators in such an unstable environment.

Focuses on what can be referred to as the “fundamental philosophical issues of corporate governance”. Outlines the interdependence of various kinds of governance. Demonstrates that corporate governance is part of a bundle of governances and that, in this respect, it occupies a leading place to the degree that its principles are becoming consolidated. Then discusses in a more detailed manner what is meant by the term “dominant functionalism”. Then deals with the question of the equilibrium between sovereignty and legitimacy from the point of view of corporate governance. In effect, rules of governance (considered as the designation of a sovereign power) are searching for a legitimizing instance originating outside the framework of those rules. Finally, covers the proprietarialist origins of stakeholder theory, origins which correspond to a moderate liberal tradition.

This study aims to investigate the coordinated impact of regulations on the predicted probability of a banking crisis in Africa.

The study used the dynamic panel instrumental variable probit regression model of 52 African economies over the period 2006 to 2018.

The authors observe that banking crisis is persistent for few years but dissipates in the long run. The results show that board mechanism and ownership control are important in reducing the likelihood of banking crisis. The authors found a negative impact of regulatory capital and monetary policy on the predicted probability of a banking crisis while regulatory quality was not strong in reducing the likelihood of banking crisis. There was also evidence to support that regulatory capital and monetary policy augment the negative impact of board mechanism and ownership control on the predicted probability of a banking crisis.

The limitation of the study is that it did not explore all measures of regulatory framework and how they impact banking crisis. However, it has an advantage of using alternative measures of regulations in a banking crisis probability model. Therefore, future studies should include other macro-prudential regulations, regulatory environments and supervision and observe how they are coordinated to reduce possible crisis in a robust methodological framework.

The research has policy implications for monetary authorities and policymakers to set coordinated regulations through internal banking mechanisms that are relevant in sustaining banking system stability goals. Countries in Africa should strengthen their quality of regulation in such a way that it can play a strong and complementary role to a robust internal control mechanisms, so as to maintain stability in the banking system. In general, regulators and policymakers should design greater coordination of external and internal regulations through a single regulatory framework and a common resolution mechanism that make the banking system more robust in curbing possible crisis.

The policy implication of the study is to build banking confidence in the society.

This study analyses the interactions of different components of internal and external regulatory framework in helping to reduce the probability of a banking crisis in Africa.