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In this time of heightened regulatory attention to potential conflicts of interest and the transparency of transaction costs in buying and selling portfolio securities, soft dollar practices have come under intense scrutiny. Regulators are asking whether the use of soft dollars should be eliminated, while some in the investment management industry have begun to restrict their own practices or even voluntarily discontinue them. What should you be doing now? Should you be evaluating your soft dollar arrangements? Do you have effective soft dollar policies and procedures in place to maintain compliance with applicable regulatory requirements? Who are the primary beneficiaries of your soft dollar arrangements? This article outlines the background and regulatory considerations applicable to soft dollar arrangements, and discusses the issues money management firms should consider in reviewing their soft dollar practices.

The Haitian gourde is one of the most curious and exotic currencies of the world. On it is printed the striking statement: “The banknote, in conformity with the Constitution of the . Republic of Haiti, is payable to the bearer in legal money of the United States of America at the rate of five gourdes for one dollar.” Amazingly, the gourde stands exactly where it was set by the Convention of April 12, 1919 at five gourdes per dollar. This fixity in the exchange rate is a remarkable achievement of an otherwise totally squalid economy record, which has been made very much due to the total convertibility of gourdes into dollars and their easy co‐existence and use in Haiti. Such a feat runs counter to early suggestions in the newly developing currency substitution literature that currency competition promotes instability in rates. A very different story emerges due west on the largest English‐speaking island in the Caribbean, Jamaica, where monetary turbulence has been the rule since 1978. The currency there was initially backed 50 percent by pounds sterling when the Bank of Jamaica began operation in May 1961, but switched to a dollar peg in January 1973 at $1,10 US, a rate maintained through 1977. After the economic problems of 1976–77, the Jamaican dollar was devalued 15½ percent in January 1978 and, under the strong advice of the International Monetary Fund, a further 32 percent in May 1978. Following was a “crawling peg” devaluation of 1½ percent per month until October 1978, then 1 percent a month until May 1979, when the current dollar peg of 56.13 cents per Jamaican dollar was established. This dramatic decline in the currency was caused in part by expansionary monetary policies of the Bank of Jamaica monetizing budget deficits, and in part by the decline in tourism, the fall in bauxite and steel output, and the oil shocks Jamaica experienced. (From 1974 to 1979, the government budget deficit went from 168 million Jamaican dollars (J$) to 551 mill J$ with a peak of 625 million in 1978, holdings of government debt by the central bank from 72 to 898 mill J$, and net foreign assets or reserves of the central bank plunged from 141 to minus 778 mill J$ (Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF 1980 Yearbook and IFS January 1981 issue).) The International Monetary Fund set specific performance criteria such as devaluation and ceilings on government budget deficits for successive draws on a substantial loan of 351 million U.S. dollars or 360 percent of Jamaica's quota at the end of 1979.

In the increasingly globalized economy, foreign exchange fluctuations have multiple, conflicting effects on domestic stock prices. The purpose of this paper is to examine return data to determine the relation between the dollar’s value and stock prices as it relates to monetary policy.

The authors examine US stock returns over a 40-year period, which is classified according to monetary policy and dollar trend. To better understand the impact of foreign exchange fluctuations, the authors estimate a model of stock returns using the three Fama-French factors and a momentum factor. Then the authors explore the underlying economic fundamentals that drive the sharp difference in annual returns between periods when the dollar is in an uptrend trend with loose monetary policy and periods when the dollar is in a downtrend with tight monetary policy.

Over the last 40 years, US stock returns were 2.5 times higher when the dollar was trending up vs down. The factor model of returns shows that equity returns are positively associated with periods when the dollar appreciated. Returns were particularly high when the dollar was in an uptrend during accommodative monetary policy. During these periods, stocks in the consumer goods and services industries provided relatively high returns. This occurred with strong economic growth due to consumer spending. Stocks exhibited the lowest returns when the dollar was depreciating and the Federal Reserve was tightening.

The key contribution of the research is that currency trends should be analyzed in the light of monetary policy. During periods of accommodative monetary policy and dollar appreciation, the US stock market provided average returns of 18.7 percent compared to −3.29 percent during a period of restrictive monetary policy and dollar depreciation. This result is driven by stronger economic growth, which is composed of consumer spending that more than offsets the dollar’s impact on net exports.

This paper aims to examine the impact of United States (US) financial sanctions on the international dominance of the US dollar.

The survival analysis technique, which incorporates survival and hazard probabilities to determine the probability of central banks' reserve recalibration, is adopted for analysis.

The result shows that the probability of central banks recalibrating the dollar share of their official reserve currencies would increase by 60% for every ten additional financial sanctions by the United States. This could imply that more sanctions might have unintended consequences on the international reserve currency dominance of the US dollar.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study may be a novel attempt to use survival analysis to examine the impact of financial sanctions on the US dollar’s international reserve currency dominance.

Since the 1970s, many global political economists have been seeing the US as a declining hegemon. After four decades into this hegemonic decline, performance of economies having been regarded as candidates for new hegemons such as Germany/Europe and Japan fell far short of these expectations, while US share of the global economy and its military supremacy remained stable. This staying power of the US stems from the “dollar standard,” under which the US dollar is the dominant foreign reserve currency and international transaction medium in the world economy. The dollar standard originated in the Cold War era when all major capitalist powers relied on the US for military protection. It persisted after the end of Cold War, thanks to the continuous mutual reinforcement of the dollar standard and the global domination of the US military. The recent rise of China, which is the first major capitalist power outside the orbit of US military protection, poses a serious dilemma to the US. On the one hand, China’s export-oriented development drives China to purchase US Treasuries on a massive scale, hence lending support to the short-term viability of the dollar. On the other hand, US’s skyrocketing current account deficit, much attributable to China, precipitates a crisis of confidence over the dollar’s long-term prospects. China is likewise caught in a dilemma between sustaining its export-driven growth and shifting to a domestic-consumption-driven economy. The development of the US–China currency conflict, together with the transformation of the Chinese developmental model, will be the most important determinant shaping the future of the dollar standard and US global power in the years to come.

Culture is a central concept broadly studied in social anthropology and sociology. It has been gaining increasing attention in economics, appearing in research on labor market discrimination, identity, gender, and social preferences. Most experimental economics research on culture studies cross-national or cross-ethnic differences in economic behavior. In contrast, we explain laboratory behavior using two cultural dimensions adopted from a prominent general cultural framework in contemporary social anthropology: group commitment and grid control. Groupness measures the extent to which individual identity is incorporated into group or collective identity; gridness measures the extent to which social and political prescriptions intrinsically influence individual behavior. Grid-group characteristics are measured for each individual using selected items from the World Values Survey. We hypothesize that these attributes allow us to systematically predict behavior in a way that discriminates among multiple forms of social preferences using a simple, parsimonious deductive model. The theoretical predictions are further tested in the economics laboratory by applying them to the dictator, ultimatum, and trust games. We find that these predictions are confirmed overall for most experimental games, although the strength of empirical support varies across games. We conclude that grid-group cultural theory is a viable predictor of people’s economic behavior, then discuss potential limitations of the current approach and ways to improve it.

We study up to 27 years of weekly data on nine currencies to examine the importance of the Japanese yen in exchange rate determination in North and Southeast Asia. We combine a time-varying methodology alongside a focus on long-run equilibrium. Our findings suggest that the Japanese yen had virtually no influence on Asian exchange rates in the 10-year period prior to the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. Since the crisis, the yen and the German mark in particular have exerted a significant influence over the region's exchange rates except for the Chinese yuan, the Hong Kong dollar and the Malaysian ringgit, which continue to be closely related to the US dollar.

Previous studies showed mixed results as to the cause of myopic loss aversion (MLA). This paper reexamines the main driver of MLA, considering two factors from previous studies and an additional factor.

Experimentally investigate whether flexibility of investment, frequency of information feedback, or timing of decision cause MLA.

Timing of decision and flexibility of investment explain most differences in subject behavior. Frequency of information feedback makes only a marginal contribution.

The differences in subject behavior can be interpreted by a shift in their reference points depending on the difference in flexibility of investment, frequency of information feedback, or timing of decision.