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This chapter introduces dividend policy as both financial and business decisions. First, it presents the history of dividend payment, definition of dividend, and typical types of dividend. Dividends originate from liquidating payments of sailing vessels in the early 16th century and become popular with the development of corporations. In this book, a dividend is defined as a cash payment to shareholders. By payment time, there are three typical types of dividend including final dividend, interim dividend, and special dividend. Second, it presents definition, important dates, measures, and patterns of dividend policy. Dividend policy includes two decisions: the first is to pay or not to pay dividends, and the second is the dividend magnitude. Investors have to follow important dates of dividend payments in order to make their investment decisions. Important dates include declaration date, record date, ex-dividend date, and payment date. Dividend payout ratio and dividend yield are two common measures of dividend policy. Common patterns of dividend policy are no dividend policy, residual dividend policy, stable dividend policy, and irregular dividend policy. Finally, dividend policy is both financial and business-related decisions. Therefore, dividend decisions are affected by various levels of business environment such as internal, micro (industry), and macro-environment. Dividend theories are the behind mechanisms to explain the effect of each factor in the business environment on corporate dividend policy. Dividend policy, in turn, determines shareholders' wealth through its impact on stock price.

This chapter analyzes how the industry environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, common participants in the product market are competitors, suppliers, and customers. These micro-stakeholders create competitive pressures on firms and thus affect their current and future performance. Competitors influence dividend decisions through three mechanisms, namely predation threat, corporate governance, and imitation. Predation threat reduces firms' incentives to pay dividends when facing high rivalry. Competition helps firms improve corporate governance. However, strong corporate governance may increase or decrease dividend payments since dividend policy may be the outcome of strong corporate governance or the substitute for weak corporate governance, respectively. Besides, firms tend to imitate their industry peers in dividend policy. Second, as a financial policy, dividend policy is also affected by participants in the financial market like investors, creditors, and auditors. These financial stakeholders' behaviors are important to stock prices. Due to the agency problem, creditors have high incentives to restrict firm's dividend payments in order to protect their benefits. On the other hand, creditors are effective external monitors who help firms improve their corporate governance. Outside investors affect corporate dividend policy through their valuation. Firms pay more dividends if investors prefer dividends to capital gains. Auditors play the role of a third-party monitor, and thus, they help firms reduce managers' expropriation of shareholders and improve the quality of accounting information. Furthermore, we also investigate dividend policy of regulated industries in both financial sector (banking, insurance, and real estate) and utilities sector (energy, telecommunications, and transportation).

This chapter investigates the relationship between financial measures and dividend payout policy choices of firms. We examine why firms choose to pay dividends continuously, intermittently, or not pay them. Specifically, the findings provide evidence that firms with relatively larger debts tend to pay dividends less frequently than firms with smaller debts.

The results also suggest that good financial performers are more likely to pay dividends more regularly. Additionally, the results of this study indicate that highly leveraged firms tend to make less frequent payouts than lowly leveraged firms.

Overall, this research adds to our understanding of firms’ dividend payout policy choices. First, evidence on the relationship between the various types of financial measures and firms’ choice of dividend payout frequencies should be useful to investors. Second, the findings of this study provide financial statement users with useful information about the firm’s dividend payout patterns. Third, in general, it also adds to the accounting and finance literature on dividends.

This chapter analyzes how firms conduct their dividend policy around the world. In principles, firms are free to pay or not to pay dividends and choose dividend levels. However, in some countries, the government requires firms to pay dividends annually in order to protect minority shareholders. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, and Venezuela are five countries of mandatory dividend payments. In addition, using the Compustat database, we investigate how nonfinancial firms pay dividends over the period 2001–2020. The percentage of payers tends to decrease across four time periods including 2001–2005, 2006–2010, 2011–2015, and 2016–2020. Newly listed firms are less likely to distribute dividends than old firms. “Payers,” “Always payers,” and “Former payers” have positive earnings while “Nonpayers” and “Never payers” experience negative earnings. “Never payers” have the highest level of cash while “Always payers” and “Former payers” have the smallest cash reserves. Moreover, Asia-Pacific has the largest proportion of payers but it tends to decrease. America has the lowest proportion of dividend payers, but it tends to increase. Firms in developing countries are more likely to pay dividends. Both the proportion of payers and the average payout ratio of civil law countries are much higher than those of common law countries. The United States has the lowest percentage of paying firms and dividend payouts. Furthermore, construction and wholesale trade industries have the highest proportions of payers and payout ratios. Mineral and services industries are less likely to pay dividends. Tax rates for dividends and capital gains are diverse across countries.

Historical stock prices have long been used to evaluate a stock’s future returns as well as the risks associated with those returns. Similarly, historical dividends have been used to evaluate the intrinsic value of a stock using, among other methods, a dividend discount model. In this chapter, we propose an alternate use of the dividend discount model to enable an investor to assess the risks associated with a particular stock based on its dividend history. In traditional applications of the dividend discount model for stock valuation, the value of a stock is the net present value of its future cash dividends. We propose an alternative approach in which we calculate the internal rate of return for a stream of future cash dividends assuming the current stock price. We use a bootstrapping approach to generate a stream of future cash dividends, and use a Monte Carlo simulation approach to run multiple trials of the model. The probability distribution of the internal rates of return obtained from the simulation model provides an investor with an expected percentage return and the standard deviation of the return for the stock. This allows an investor to not only compare the expected internal rates of return for a group of stocks but to also evaluate the associated risks. We illustrate this internal rate of return approach using stocks that make up the Dow Jones Industrial Average.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between company reputation and dividend policy.

In this study, sample of 98,809 firm-year observations from 22 countries covering 2005–2016 were used.

Firm reputation concerns are associated with higher propensities to pay dividends and payout ratios. Further, this positive effect is more pronounced for firms with high free cash flows, high information asymmetry and low institutional monitoring. The results are robust to an instrumental variable approach, propensity score matching and the Heckman two-stage correction approach while addressing endogeneity concerns.

These findings have significant implications for various stakeholders, such as existing and potential investors, managers, policymakers and regulators, by providing insights into the relationship between corporate reputation and firm dividend payout decisions. Corporate reputation is highlighted as crucial for accessing finance, emphasizing the role of national regulators and policymakers in facilitating firms' efforts to improve their reputation. The study highlights the dynamics of corporate reputation and dividend payout, calling for proactive engagement from regulators and policymakers. Crafting policies conducive to reputation-building can enhance firms' financial prospects, indicating the need for strategic interventions at managerial, regulatory and policy levels. Understanding the influence of economic context is crucial for firms to tailor reputation management strategies and optimize funding opportunities in different economic environments.

Overall, results suggest that reputation serves as a disciplining mechanism, where firms will pay dividends to maintain their reputations.

The study aims to examine the dividend omissions and dividend cuts behaviour of manufacturing and non-financial services firms to identify the determinants of dividend omissions and dividend cuts.

The study analyses the financial data of 3,546 firms from 2011 to 2020 (35,460 firm-year observations) using a dynamic random-effect probit panel regression model.

The results suggest that profitability, growth opportunity, leverage, liquidity, risk, extraordinary income, shareholding pattern and buyback are major determinants of dividend omissions. Similarly, dividend cut in the previous year, profitability, operating cash flow, risk and extraordinary income are major factors leading to dividend cuts.

Firms which omit the dividend are less likely to start paying dividend in subsequent years, whereas firms which cut the dividend may increase dividend in later years. Also, profitability decreases for a significant number of firms post dividend omission and cut. This indicates that dividend omission is a more prominent signal than a dividend cut for the financial health of a firm.

The determinants identified in the study enable analysts and portfolio managers to decide the propensity of dividend omission and cut even before actual announcements and can alleviate the significant loss in the portfolio. Also, managers and the board of directors would be able to monitor the firm’s financial performance to avoid the situation leading to dividend omissions and cuts.

The study strongly recommends that firms should voluntarily pay dividends to shareholders to encourage the healthy participation of retail shareholders in the equity market and create a long-term win–win situation for all stakeholders in society. If a large number of firms continue not to pay the dividend, the study appeals to the regulators to intervene to protect shareholders' interests for the greater good of society.

To the best of author’s knowledge, this is the first study to empirically identify the determinants of dividend omission and cut in the unique setting like India where dividend taxation had undergone a significant change.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the relative power of operating cash flow and earnings in the prediction of dividends.

A linear mixed effects model is used in terms of selected model fit criteria.

Based on the selected model fit criteria, cash flow per share is shown to produce a better fit than earnings per share, but it cannot be said how much better.

Quarterly CRSP and Compustat data from 2000 to 2006 for 1,902 dividend‐paying firms are analyzed. Future work would need a different methodology to determine how much better cash flow is as a predictor of dividends.

Both earnings per share and cash flow per share are found to be reasonable dividend predictors.

Additional insight is provided on modeling factors that contribute to a firm's decision to engage or disengage in a dividend payment policy.

The study described in this paper continues work on predicting dividends per share. Results show cash flow per share is a better predictor than earnings per share. Investors and analysts predict dividends as part of their stock valuation work. This study suggests focusing attention on using cash flow per share as the predictor of dividends.

This paper aims to briefly review principal theories of dividend policy and to summarize empirical evidences on these theories.

Major theoretical and empirical papers on dividend policy are identified and reviewed.

It is found that the famous dividend puzzle is still unsolved. Empirical evidence is equivocal and the search for new explanation for dividends continues. Also a number of stylized empirical facts about dividends discovered by researchers are noted.

As with any review paper, the major limitation is that necessarily some papers will be left out. Also as newer research is published the review paper will become more dated.

This paper will give the reader a comprehensive understanding of the dividend puzzle and the major paradigms of dividend policy. The paper will also give the reader the major stylized facts about dividend policy.

We test for the validity of the smoothing and signalling hypotheses of dividend determination.

Using a VAR framework we examine the dynamic behaviour of share prices, dividends and earnings for 137 UK manufacturing and service companies, observed over the period 1970‐2003.

There is strong evidence of a contemporaneous relationship between prices, dividends and earnings, and little evidence of independence between these variables. Some evidence in favour of both the smoothing and the signalling hypothesis is obtained from causality tests, with perhaps more support for the latter hypothesis. However, there is considerable diversity in the causal relationships between prices, dividends and earnings.

No single hypothesis regarding the determination of dividends, and the predictive power of dividends for earnings and prices appears to dominate.

The results presented here are of interest to markets agents in that while they suggest there is no single transition mechanism linking prices, dividends and earnings, nevertheless these three variables are strongly correlated and exhibit varying degrees of causality.