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In a previous monograph a discussion took place on stages one and part of stage two of the three stage process in an unfair dismissal action, namely the employee having to show that he has been dismissed (stage one), and some of the reasons for dismissal which fall within the statutory categories, namely the employee's capability and qualifications; misconduct and redundancy (part of stage two). In this monograph an analysis is proposed on the two remaining reasons, these being the contravention of a duty imposed by an enactment and some other substantial reason. There will then follow a discussion on the test of fairness as constituting the third of the three stage process and on the remedies available when the tribunal finds that the employee has been unfairly dismissed.

March 28, 1974 Industrial Relations — Unfair dismissal — Reasonableness of dismissal — Employee convicted of fraud — Reinstatement in previous job — Threats of industrial action by fellow employees — Dismissal — Tribunal's finding dismissal unfair — No award of compensation because dismissal contributed to by own misconduct — Whether convictions relevant consideration — Industrial Relations Act, 1971 (c.72),ss. 33(1), 116(1),(3).

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

The objective of this research study is to investigate the impact of auditor dismissals and resignations on commercial lending decisions. The study also examines whether a reason given for a dismissal or resignation affects commercial lending decisions. Eighty-five commercial loan officers were given a scenario involving a hypothetical company loan applicant and were first asked to assess the level of risk associated with granting a line of credit. Next, they were asked to assess the probability that they would grant the line of credit. Five different questionnaire versions were created by varying information about an auditor change and the reason for the change. The study finds that risk assessments of and the probability of granting credit to the applicant company do not significantly differ due to knowledge about auditor changes. In addition, participants did not view auditor resignations differently than auditor dismissals. Finally, disclosure of a disagreement as a reason for an auditor change did not have an impact on lending decisions.

Accounting firms claim that the risk of costly litigation leads to resignations from high-risk clients, and that these resignations represent an economic inefficiency. This study examines the association between resignations, dismissals and litigation in the computer industry from 1988–1995. Resignations and dismissals appear to be similar, suggesting some dismissals are implicit resignations. Results support a relationship between risk and resignations. Since some characteristics of auditor litigation risk are also characteristic of unprofitable audit engagements, the analysis incorporates the actual litigation experience of sample companies to provide insights into claims of inefficiencies surrounding the switches.

In a previous article the author discussed the curious way in which The Redundancy Payments Act is working. This month she examines some of the many facets of the operation of the new unfair dismissal procedure under the Industrial Relations Act, including some which become evident when both statutes are being invoked by an applicant. What is unavoidable is the conclusion that even if the details may be changed in some ways the unfair dismissal procedure is here to stay.

February 5, 1974 Master and Servant — Redundancy — Reason for dismissal — Employers dismissing engineer alleging redundancy — Employee claiming compensation for unfair dismissal — Employers resisting claim on alternative ground that dismissal was fair — Whether employer entitled to change ground for dismissal from redundancy to lack of capability — Industrial Relations Act, 1971 (c.72), s.24(l)(a) (b), (2) (a), (6), (7).

In the previous monograph, a discussion took place on what constitutes dismissal and when the termination of the contract of employment takes effect. These two aspects treat the first of the statutory qualifications necessary to enable the employee to exercise his right not to be unfairly dismissed, namely that he must first be dismissed.

Employment protection legislation defines social criteria according to which firms can dismiss workers. If firms evade the law, then negotiation about compensation begins. To reduce the legal and financial uncertainty often associated with ex post bargaining, the German government stipulate severance payments in the case of mutual agreements in law in 2004. This paper aims to examine whether social criteria affect the dismissal probability of workers.

The probability of receiving compensation and the factors determining the amount of severance payment are estimated when it comes to private negotiations about the termination of an employment contract. In addition, the effect of the reform of the employment protection legislation on the probability of receiving compensation and the amount of redundancy pay is analysed. A stepwise estimation strategy is developed to account for sample selection bias when examining which workers receive severance payments and the determinants of severance pay variation. Empirical evidence is provided using German panel data for the period 2000‐2006.

The paper shows that workers protected by law have the lowest probability of being dismissed. The expected severance payment and firm size increase the probability of receiving compensation while the amount of severance payment depends significantly on the way the employment relationship is dissolved. Contrary to the intention of the legislator, the reform increases the level of compensation.

The paper fills a gap in the literature by taking into account selectivity bias when estimating the probability of receiving redundancy pay and the size of compensation. The evidence also provides insights which may be useful for the ongoing discussion to reform employment protection legislation in Germany.