Search results

Purpose — This chapter investigates how dishonesty may be legitimized in organizations through customary practices of gift giving, patronage, and non-meritocratic employment practices.Design/methodology/approach — A survey of managers was undertaken in four sub-Saharan African countries: Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.Findings — Gift giving was perceived to be widespread in organizations in all four countries and yet the vast majority of managers we surveyed, rejected the proposition that the practice of gift giving causes dishonesty in organizations. There were cross-country variations as to whether the expectations of the society on individuals “glorify and endorse” dishonesty as they may feel pressured to accumulate and (re)distribute wealth among their wider social groups. Non-meritocratic employment practices were unanimously perceived to engender incompetent workforce, lack of accountability and transparency without necessarily improving trust, and loyalty in organizations.Research limitations — This study used quantitative methods to gauge managers’ perceptions of the relationship between customary practices and dishonest behavior in only four African countries. Further qualitative research is required to gain a deeper insight into how customary practices may inform dishonest behavior in organizations.Implications for managers — Managers should be clear about the distinction between customary practices and dishonest behavior in order to facilitate the development of appropriate organizational strategies to minimize their negative impacts.Originality/value — This paper explores the relationship between dishonesty and customary practices of gift giving, patronage and nepotism in African organizations from the managers’ point of view, an approach that had not been undertaken previously.

Purpose — This chapter aims to argue that in some cases, dishonesty in international partnerships may be beneficial from the dishonest firm’s perspective.Design/methodology/approach — The chapter is based on three cases of dishonest Chinese firms that cheated their American or German partners.Findings — We argue that dishonesty does not always lead to negative consequences for the dishonest/opportunistic firm and if it does, benefits may be larger than costs.Practical implications — It is not always easy to avoid partners’ dishonest behavior especially if they hope to benefit considerably from this and if the probability of getting caught and punished is low.Originality/value — The consequences of dishonesty in international partnerships — especially, relationship dissolution and positive impacts of dishonesty for the dishonest firm — have not received considerable research attention yet. We argue that despite relationship dissolution caused by the Chinese partners’ dishonesty, two of the dishonest firms gained.

Purpose — The aim of this chapter is to explain the concepts of honesty and dishonesty in management and provide a general understanding why and how honesty and dishonesty may manifest in different ways.Design/methodology/approach — This conceptual chapter discusses what (dis)honesty is, which factors affect it and which consequences result from it. It is illustrated with several short examples.Findings — (Dis)honesty is a complex concept. It is not always possible to classify a certain act as honest or dishonest: sometimes, it is in the ‘grey area’. Moreover, the understanding what is honest and what is not depends on the cultural context. Thus, the term (dis)honesty may be sometimes more appropriate.Originality/value — The complexity of (dis)honesty in management (encompassing its nature, impact factors and consequences) has received relatively little research attention.

Purpose — The aim of this chapter is to explore the relative bounds between the domains of dishonesty and honesty, focusing on the antecedences and consequences of these phenomena.Design/methodology/approach — This conceptual paper discusses the literature on the nature of (dis)honesty in management based on the chapters published in this book but also other management literature.Findings — (Dis)honesty is a complex concept, especially in international management. The chapter brings out two main features of dishonesty. First, dishonest behavior occurs always in result of moral path dependency, and second, both honest and dishonest behaviors seem to be contagious — belonging to our social surrounding, we inevitably mirror others.Originality/value — The complexity of (dis)honesty in management (encompassing its nature, impact factors and consequences) has received relatively little research attention.

The authors investigate the joint effects of two environmental variables, performance-based pay (PBP) and performance monitoring (PM), on behavioral dishonesty in a setting where the controls subsequently are absent. In a laboratory study using 88 participants in a 2×2 experimental design, simulating a work environment, the authors manipulate the presence of PBP and PM. Once the participants are accustomed to their assigned work environment and have completed contractual tasks unrelated to the dishonesty experiment, the authors allow them to privately roll dice to determine the size of a bonus gift card. Dishonesty levels are inferred from differences between treatment groups in the prizes claimed. The authors find an interaction effect, where inferred dishonesty in the performance-based-pay group is higher than the fixed-pay group when there is no PM, but lower when there is PM. Although theory and existing literature did not lead us to hypothesize these exact results, they offer important insights into a complex relationship. By jointly examining the effects of worker contracts and workplace monitoring on dishonesty, this research extends the understanding of the potential consequences of formal controls. As the workplace grows more complex, employers increasingly rely on information provided by frontline employees and managers. Thus, unintended effects of managerial controls on honesty are an important topic in the business literature.

Prior research suggests both formal and informal norms influence employee behavior. While increased training is a typical recommendation to strengthen formal norms by increasing adherence to organizational codes of conduct, and therefore improve ethical behavior, there is little empirical evidence that code training actually strengthens formal norms or improves ethics-related behavior. Conversely, prior observations of unethical behavior serve as strong indicators of informal norms. These observations may be unknown to management and therefore difficult to moderate using other means, including with training on a code.

We test the impact of prior observations of unethical behavior and training for a code of conduct on intentions to report unethical behavior in the future, as well as possible mediators of these relationships. We find some support that training on the code increases intention to report and strong support for the notion that prior observations of unethical behavior decrease intentions to report. Responsibility to report and norms against whistle-blowing both mediate the prior observation-to-reporting intentions relationship, but not the training-to-reporting intentions relationship. An interesting by-product of training seems to be that, by increasing awareness of unethical behavior, and therefore the salience of prior observation, training may have indirectly influenced intentions in the opposite direction intended.

Purpose — (Dis)honesty as a quality of our actions can be assessed at different levels. Often these levels have not been differentiated. Semantically we cannot talk about a dishonest society or dishonest organizations — dishonesty can only be attributed to individual actions. We can approach a dishonest act through its essence (deontology), consequences (utilitarianism), and also through the person committing the act (virtue ethics), but most often organizational spheres are too complex objects of study to face ethical dilemmas without the influences that their context can bring. Therefore, the purpose of the chapter is to look at dishonesty as an unethical act through the lenses of behavioral ethics, since behavioral ethics is able to grasp the framing effects of ethical situations while combining the main elements of the previously mentioned traditional ethical theories.Design/methodology/approach — In the current chapter it will be differentiated between traditional ethical theories and acknowledged that depending on the level of analysis (individual, organization, or the society level) with their distinctly different ontological backgrounds, we will have different groundings for making any kind of axiological statements about the dishonesty of an action.Findings — In order to give ethical statements about (dis)honesty in organizations, we cannot neglect the influences brought by context. Organizations with endless social interactions both locally and globally usually have no universal basis for making axiological statements.Originality/value — The originality of this chapter is twofold: firstly to cover the importance of making sense of what ethical approaches we take as a grounding when we make ethical judgments in organizational context, and secondly to analyze whether and how the question of dishonesty differs when we switch between the most traditional ethical approaches. The chapter proposes a new framework how ethical decision-making should be assessed depending on the level of social interactions and how dishonesty is associated with gaining social approval.

This study examines the effectiveness of instruction in accounting ethics as measured by the impact of that instruction on the incidence of student plagiarism in a college writing assignment.

This study avoids the potential problems inherent in measuring Machiavellianism via a psychological questionnaire by using a “reverse methodology,” whereby Machiavellianism is assessed directly from behavior.

The results support past research suggesting that traditional collegiate ethical education may not affect students’ ethical choices. The findings also suggest that increasing penalties for ethical failures may be an effective means of deterring students and business professionals from engaging in inappropriate activities.

This study supports the use of a behavioral measure of Machivellianism as a means of evaluating the effectiveness of alternative instructional methods in ethics. This behavioral approach is superior to the traditional questionnaire methodology because Machivellianism is judged based on actual behavior rather than having students respond to hypothetical and often stereotyped ethical cases, whereby the student can provide an artificial response that will be viewed favorably by the evaluator.

The findings suggest that higher education needs to recognize the relevance of factors beyond mere ethical education when preparing students for the ethical challenges they will face in the business world.

This paper employs a unique “reverse methodology” to measure Machiavellianism. This reverse methodology has greater external validity in quasi-experimental ethical studies because the results can be extrapolated to real-world scenarios where there is a cost to behaving ethically.

Traditional agency theory assumes monitoring is good for the principal, but we investigate an unintended effect: diminishment of the agent’s preference for honesty. We hypothesize greater dishonest behavior in a monitored environment than in a non-monitored environment, when the agent has the opportunity to cheat outside the scope of monitoring. Relevant theories to explain such behavior are behavioral agency theory, where trust and reciprocity are thought to alter contractual outcomes, and the fraud-triangle theory, where the ability to rationalize deviant acts affects behavior. We utilize participants who have been acclimated to either a monitored or an unmonitored condition in an immediately preceding experiment and seamlessly continue that treatment. Within each of these conditions, participants perform a simple task with a performance-based monetary reward. Half self-report and can safely cheat, while the other half are verified; the difference between verified and self-reported scores is a proxy for dishonest reporting. As hypothesized, unmonitored individuals reciprocate with honest behavior, while monitored individuals tend toward dishonest behavior when the opportunity arises. Implications for fraud prevention are discussed.