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The purpose of this study is to develop a new measure for discriminatory related party transactions (DRPTs). There are currently measures for such discriminatory transactions but the new measure has a strong theoretical basis and is less susceptible to measurement error.

This paper develops and tests a new measure for these discriminatory transactions. Type I and Type II error rates and the power of the new measure are compared with an existing measure using computer-simulated and real data.

The capital market sensitivity of the new measure is also tested and compared with the existing measure. The new measure is found to be superior.

The new measure of DRPTs has the potential to contribute to both further research on the impact of related party transactions and policy-making in relation to DRPTs.

This paper has developed and tested a new measure for DRPTs.

Several studies, especially in Asian economies, have investigated the antecedents, implications and consequences of related-party transactions (RPTs). This paper aims to review this literature to collate, gauge and critically discuss understandings of the relationship between RPTs and risk, with a particular focus on audit risk.

The paper discusses RPTs and how they have been associated with corporate scandals and the expropriation of shareholders’ wealth. RPTs are defined as per accounting standards and the main types of RPTs are described based on the extant literature. Two key research design issues are discussed: measures used to operationalize RPTs and observable variations in sample size across RPT studies. Evidence is presented on the negative effects of RPTs and the role of regulation, corporate governance and auditing in reducing risks.

Prior studies have associated RPTs with the expropriation of shareholders’ wealth, declining firm valuations, lower-quality financial reporting, increased risk of material misstatements and decreases in long-term firm performance. Further, the evidence suggests that regulation, corporate governance and auditing can mitigate the negative effects of RPTs.

This paper provides insights for regulators on the effects of enforcement, corporate governance and external audits on reducing the negative effects of RPTs, and highlights the increased risk of material misstatements in financial statements when RPTs are conducted. Moreover, it reveals how RPTs affect risk assessments for auditors.

This paper represents the first comprehensive review of the empirical RPT literature. It provides a starting point for future investigations of RPTs, not least because it reveals important limitations with the extant body of research in this domain. It also offers salient insights and implications for practitioners and policy makers.

The purpose of this study is to present the results of an experiment that examines the effects of client management’s increased disclosure of related party transactions (RPTs) on auditors’ judgments of financial reports that contain RPTs.

This study used a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment to investigate auditors’ judgments in response to questionable RPTs in a Chinese context.

The results show that the auditor participants assessed a lower likelihood that the client’s financial statements were intentionally misstated and that they were less likely to request additional evidence when the client management chose to disclose more, as opposed to less, detailed RPT information in their disclosure. Moreover, there was a significant interaction between disclosure level and client incentive to manipulate earnings on the likelihood of the auditor requesting additional evidence.

This study should be of interest to regulatory agencies that have expressed concerns over auditing practices related to RPTs.

The findings from this study help to provide a more in-depth understanding of disclosure literature by investigating voluntary RPT disclosure and the moderation role of clients’ incentives to manipulate earnings.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of related party transactions (RPTs) and types of RPTs (complex, simple and loan) on earnings quality in four East Asian countries: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.

RPTs and types of RPTs are measured using two approaches, magnitude and abnormal (magnitude change). Earnings quality is measured using proxies for accrual earnings management and identified as discretionary accruals (DAC) and performance matched discretional accruals (PMDAC).

The results suggest that firms in these countries experience poor earnings quality when they are engaged in RPT. The effect of RPT-simple on earnings quality is more severe than RPT-complex. However, the presence of higher investor protection and stricter enforcement of regulations in countries like Singapore and Hong Kong reduce the negative impact of RPTs on earnings quality.

The results support the argument that the presence of controlling shareholders in East Asia is likely to lead to engagement with RPTs, which will increase the likelihood of firms’ earnings manipulation via DAC. This study has two limitations. It only focuses on Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and the results may not be generalizable to other countries. Second, this study only measures the magnitude and abnormal RPTs based on the disclosures available in annual reports.

This paper contributes to the literature by examining the effect of RPTs and types of RPTs on earnings quality in four selected East Asian countries. 

The main objective of the study is to ascertain the level of independence and the effectiveness of the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) members of Islamic banks in Bangladesh. This is because only SSB members are empowered to oversee and certify the overall business functions of Islamic banks.

This paper implements qualitative case research approach to explore the research objective in the context of Bangladesh. We applied purposeful and snowball sampling tactics for selecting respondents. By using a semi-structured questionnaire and face-to-face interviews, we collect data from SSB members, central bank executives and experts in Islamic banking and Shariah governance.

The study finds that majority Islamic banks' SSB's positions are similar to the Board of Directors (BOD) of the banks. Next, this study finds that in recruiting/selecting SSB members, some banks do not follow the guidelines of the central bank. This study finds mixed evidence regarding the independence of the members of the SSB. Most of the respondents opined that SSBs do not have power; in some cases, members of SSB are not independent and seeming powerless as BOD selects and recruits them. In contrast, they are dependent on management in respect of strategy implementation.

The study significantly contributed to the national and global regulatory bodies by identifying an important governance determinant of Islamic banks that is the independence of SSB members, which is highly important for both Shariah functions, and to enhance the trust level of the stakeholders. This study makes a theoretical contribution by documenting the violation of stakeholder theory and agency theory in recruiting SSB members by BOD's choice. The lack of SSB members' independence has an impact on Shariah legitimacy of the Islamic banks which is contradictory with the notion of legitimacy theory. This study recommends the central bank to ensure the independence of the SSB and central bank should take initiatives to develop an environment for the Islamic banking sector.

This study extends the literature of corporate governance relating to Islamic banking and financial institutions. More specifically, this paper explores the necessity of independence of members of the monitoring body (here SSB), an important constituent of governance, to ensure high-quality governance and transparency in reporting to increase diverse stakeholders' trust/confidence. The absence of independence of SSB in performing their functions contradicts with the agency, stakeholder and legitimacy theory, which is inconsistent with global evidence, that demands further investigations.

The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

The purpose of this paper is to explore discrepancies between transfer provisions in the US model BIT, employed as a working text in the ongoing China‐USA BIT negotiations, and relevant Articles of the Agreement of the IMF, to which both China and the USA are signatories, with a view to advising on China's possible strategies for negotiation.

The approach taken is doctrinal and comparative analysis and treaty interpretation of the US model BIT, the Articles of the Agreement of the IMF, the Chinese model BIT and some earlier versions of these instruments.

A detailed analysis of several major discrepancies between these instruments finds that a differentiated treatment of capital transfers and current transfers is desirable and, in respect of current transfers, a properly formulated “temporary derogation” exception should be adopted.

The paper conducts a unique substantial comparison of two most influential instruments governing transfer of funds in international investments. It reveals the common rationale shared by the transfer provisions under both instruments.