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This study aims to examine whether auditors who specialize in research and development (R&D) activities help reduce managers’ opportunistic adjustment of R&D expenditure for real earnings management (REM).

Using a sample of US firms during the 2001–2017 period, the authors identify auditors’ R&D specialization as their prior experience of auditing R&D expenses spent by each client’s peers. The authors measure R&D-based REM as the negative deviation from the predicted level of R&D expenditure.

The authors find that clients of R&D specialist auditors are less likely to engage in REM through a discretionary reduction of R&D expenditure. This effect is more pronounced when clients face higher competition, have larger investment opportunities and entail higher audit risks.

This study shows that auditors’ specialized knowledge can facilitate stronger monitoring of clients’ real decisions, providing implications for auditors’ knowledge acquisition and transfer in specific types of transactions.

This study contributes to the literature by documenting the governance role played by R&D specialist auditors in clients’ real economic decisions. Moreover, the study identifies R&D as a distinct area of auditor specialization.

This paper aims to examine the effect of audit firm governance on audit quality. Audit firm governance is broken down into two categories, namely, board ownership and engagement partner ownership.

Audit firms from Borsa Istanbul and their clients who are quoted there as well were used to test the hypotheses. The final sample covers 1,291 observations at the client level between 2013 and 2019. Ordinary least square was conducted to test the hypotheses. Heckman selection model and instrument variable regression with two-stage least square (IVREG with 2SLS) were also used to control the self-selection and endogeneity problems, respectively. To enhance the validity of the main results, alternative audit quality measures were used.

The empirical findings show that board ownership and engagement partner ownership have an impact on audit quality. The results indicate that engagement partners with high shares enhance audit quality only in Big4 audit firms. The positive effect of higher board ownership on audit quality is more prominent in non-Big4 firms. The Heckman two-stage procedure and IVREG with 2SLS were conducted, both of which were consistent with the main results. The results regarding alternative audit quality measures are in accordance with the main estimation results.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study examining the impact of audit firm board ownership on audit quality. In addition, this paper further advances the literature by investigating the effects of ownership at engagement partner levels on audit quality in the context of an emerging market, Turkey.

This study explores whether hard regulatory control decreases the level of earnings management in local governments. The implementation of a new regulatory approach by Norwegian authorities provides the opportunity for an empirical study.

The authors adopt a two-stage strategy to investigate the existence of earnings management, using the Jones (1991) and modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) models to construct a random-effects model.

The authors test the hypothesis that, given decentralisation of control, there will be an increase in opportunistic financial reporting. This study's findings suggest that this is not the case, thereby indicating that a soft control regime does not diminish discipline in municipalities.

This study has practical implications for policymaking in the public sector. Its findings suggest that municipalities do not engage in more earnings management under a soft regulatory regime. Hence, other authorities should consider adopting a soft regulatory approach to controlling local governments and their financial reporting systems.

This study contributes to a growing body of literature regarding earnings management by local governments. The authors investigate a hypothesis previously untested in the literature by comparing the degree of earnings management under different regulatory control regimes.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the dynamic interdependence structure and risk spillover effect between the Chinese stock market and the US stock market.

This paper mainly uses the multivariate R-vine copula-complex network analysis and the multivariate R-vine copula-CoVaR model and selects stock price indices and their subsector indices as samples.

The empirical results indicate that the Energy, Materials and Financials sectors have leading roles in the interdependent structure of the Chinese and US stock markets, while the Utilities and Real Estate sectors have the least important positions. The comprehensive influence of the Chinese stock market is similar to that of the US stock market but with smaller differences in the influence of different sectors of the US stock market on the overall interdependent structure system. Over time, the interdependent structure of both stock markets changed; the sector status gradually equalized; the contribution of the same sector in different countries to the interdependent structure converged; and the degree of interaction between the two stock markets was positively correlated with the degree of market volatility.

This paper employs the methods of nonlinear cointegration and the R-vine copula function to explore the interactive relationship and risk spillover effect between the Chinese stock market and the US stock market. This paper proposes the R-vine copula-complex network analysis method to creatively construct the interdependent network structure of the two stock markets. This paper combines the generalized CoVaR method with the R-vine copula function, introduces the stock market decline and rise risk and further discusses the risk spillover effect between the two stock markets.

This study examines the effect of local government debt (LGD) on corporate earnings management using 25,624 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2019.

Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to examine the impact of LGD on earnings management. A difference-in-differences (DID) method is also used to alleviate potential endogeneity.

Results show that LGD motivates firms to increase earnings management, especially income-decreasing earnings management. Findings are robust to DID method and robustness tests. Heterogeneity analyses show that the positive effect of LGD on earnings management is pronounced in firms with political dependence and moderated by external governance mechanisms. Further discussions indicate that tax enforcement is an underlying channel for LGD to affect earnings management. Firms engage in downward real earnings management by increasing their abnormal discretionary expenditures and higher LGD leads to a greater book-tax difference in those firms that manipulate income-decreasing earnings management.

This study contributes towards examining the political costs hypothesis, the microeconomic effects of LGD and the determinants of earnings management.

This study examines specific budget execution items (as proxies of vulnerability and sustainability) along with political factors to identify earnings management (EM) practices in Greek municipalities.

The study employs a sample of 1,831 financial and budget execution statements for the period 2011–2019. EM is proxied by unsigned discretionary accruals that are assessed through the performance-matched modified-Jones model and the modified-Jones model.

The findings provide evidence that the municipality’s dependence on subsidies (or its self-sufficiency) affects EM, especially during the pre-election year. Municipalities that maintain their financial autonomy engage less in EM in pre-election years. Lastly, it is proven that electoral cycles, weak opposition and other variables exert an effect on the size of EM. Sensitivity analysis confirms the results.

This paper contributes to the literature on EM by analyzing for the first time budget execution items (as proxies of vulnerability and sustainability) and their impact on the size of unsigned discretionary accruals.

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether Mayors in Portugal engage in earnings management close to zero with the motivation of re-election.

The data used in this study were annual financial information from Portuguese municipalities from 2005 to 2016, as well as data on elections and Mayor re-elections involving three political cycles. The methodologies employed were quantitative, including graphical and panel data regressions.

The results indicate that municipalities used discretionary accruals to engage in earnings management to report net earnings close to zero, and re-election seems to be a motivation for earnings management behaviour. Furthermore, the results suggest that municipalities in which the Mayor is re-elected are less likely to report positive net earnings close to zero.

This paper makes a valuable contribution to the literature on earnings management in municipalities. At the theoretical level, it makes it possible to identify whether re-election is a motivation for earnings management and, in this sense, to identify patterns of behaviour by managers. On a practical level, the knowledge of a manager's behaviour patterns will help to anticipate his or her future behaviour and, consequently, may prevent inefficiencies.

This study aims to examine the effects of agency cost on auditor choice. This paper also deals with the moderating role of the board’s financial expertise (Bfe) and the status of the internal control (Intecon) system on the relationship between agency cost and auditor selection.

This study’s sample consists of 1,040 firm-year observations of Iranian nonfinancial companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2019. The information required for this research is mainly extracted from Comprehensive Database of All Listed Companies (in Iran Stock Exchange). Data from 130 companies were obtained during the research period. This study used logistic regression to test the hypotheses.

The findings indicate that companies with higher agency costs choose the auditor from lower classes. As the proportion of financial expert members on the board increases, the intensity of this relationship will be reduced. Companies with higher agency costs choose the auditor from the lower classes, but the higher the ratio of financial expert board members, the more these companies will choose high-quality auditors. However, findings showed that the status of the Intecon system has no moderating effect on the relationship between agency costs and auditor selection.

The results of this study can expand the existing literature on the relationship between auditor selection and agency costs and the factors affecting this relationship, especially the Bfe and Intecon. This research has significant suggestions for regulators, stakeholders, shareholders and analysts in emerging economies that may encounter similar contextual implications.

The authors examine whether internal corporate governance mechanisms are effective in curbing cash flow manipulation through real activities, misclassification, and timing.

The sample comprises of firms from an emerging market, India with data for years 2004 through 2015. The authors use the methodology given in Roychowdhury (2006).

The authors find that corporate boards in India play an active role in curbing cash flow manipulation through real activities but fail to control cash flow manipulation through misclassification and timing.

The study suggests that corporate boards should pay more attention to the reported cash flow numbers. Regulators can reduce the opportunities available for cash flow misclassification by fixing relevant accounting and governance norms. Auditors can also help by critically focusing on the cash flow classifications presented by management.

This study, to the authors’ knowledge, is the first study that talks about the role of internal governance in a trade-off between different cash flow manipulation techniques.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of job-hopping executives at their former and subsequent firms.

We conduct regression analyses using a sample of firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2010 to 2020 to examine whether CSR performance is similar from one firm to the next as executives switch jobs.

We find a positive relationship between the CSR performance of former and subsequent firms under job-hopping executives. This relationship is the strongest in the year of the job switch; it weakens in the second year and eventually disappears in the third year. In addition, we show that this relationship benefits different CSR stakeholder groups and is contingent on executive and subsequent firm attributes and job-hopping characteristics. Furthermore, we demonstrate that firms that hire a new chief executive officer from a firm with a strong track record in CSR, the new firm experiences a significant surge in CSR performance compared with firms that do not experience such a shock.

This study has implications for executive hiring decisions.

This study extends the understanding of CSR determinants through the lens of inter-organisational ties associated with job-hopping executives.