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The purpose of this paper is to examine political accountability to the voter in India by studying re-election patterns in 14 major states categorized as leading and lagging during the period 1952–2015.

This study has computed a state-wise re-election index by taking the ratio of the number of constituencies exhibiting re-election in four consecutive terms during 1952–1999 to the total number of constituencies in the state. The time-invariant re-election index as of the year 1999 is used to estimate the impact of the re-election on per capita state income during 2001–2015. This paper has used the correlated random effects estimation procedure that considers the state-specific unobserved factors while using a time-invariant regressor to ascertain the impact of re-election.

This study finds that persistent re-election does not seem to lead to better development outcomes. When this study computes the re-election index by excluding constituencies that are underdeveloped both in the economic and social spheres, this paper finds the asymmetric impact of re-election for the leading and the lagging states. The findings suggest that historical institutions in the laggings states could be driving the empirical results. The empirical findings are corroborated by the relatively poor availability of basic amenities in constituencies exhibiting persistent re-election when compared to the state average.

The findings suggest that the provision of re-election without term limits may need to be revisited in the lagging states for better political accountability.

First, the authors study the pattern of constituency-wise re-election to compute state-wise re-election index to capture persistent re-election. Second, the authors assess the development status of a constituency by mapping it to the development indicators of the district in which the constituency is located. This paper considers both economic as well social indicators of development. Third, the time-invariant nature of the re-election index helps to address reverse causality while studying the impact of re-election on development. Fourth, the authors use a novel econometric methodology to study the impact of the re-election on development given the time-invariant characteristic of the re-election index.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of local government spending on local government financial performance. Furthermore, this study also investigates the moderating role of re-election on the relationship between local government spending and the financial performance for all local government and dynastic local government. The hypotheses are analyzed using multiple regression with fixed effect using two groups of samples: all local governments and dynastic local governments from 2010 to 2015. The result shows that local government spending positively affects local government financial performance, but in dynastic local government, spending has negative effect on financial performance. Moreover, this study proves that re-election strengthens the positive effect of local government spending on local government financial performance in all sample and weaken the negative effect of spending on financial performance in dynastic local government. The finding of this study is very useful for the central government in terms of policy formulation and mechanisms to limit the practice of political dynasty.

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether Mayors in Portugal engage in earnings management close to zero with the motivation of re-election.

The data used in this study were annual financial information from Portuguese municipalities from 2005 to 2016, as well as data on elections and Mayor re-elections involving three political cycles. The methodologies employed were quantitative, including graphical and panel data regressions.

The results indicate that municipalities used discretionary accruals to engage in earnings management to report net earnings close to zero, and re-election seems to be a motivation for earnings management behaviour. Furthermore, the results suggest that municipalities in which the Mayor is re-elected are less likely to report positive net earnings close to zero.

This paper makes a valuable contribution to the literature on earnings management in municipalities. At the theoretical level, it makes it possible to identify whether re-election is a motivation for earnings management and, in this sense, to identify patterns of behaviour by managers. On a practical level, the knowledge of a manager's behaviour patterns will help to anticipate his or her future behaviour and, consequently, may prevent inefficiencies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possible influence of financial health of local governments (LGs) on the re-election of politicians.

The study investigates a sample of 129 Italian LGs with more than 50,000 inhabitants for the period 2008–2014, resulting in 903 observations. A regression model has been implemented, where the dependent variable refers to the probability of re-election, and different dimensions of financial health are the independent variables.

Budgetary and service-level solvency influence positively the probability of re-election of the major, while the ability of the government to generate liquidity to pay its short-term debts is not statistically relevant. Moreover, the sustainability dimension of budgetary solvency is more relevant than the flexibility and vulnerability dimensions.

To be re-elected, local politicians are advised to pay attention to and preserve the social welfare of citizens with the available resources.

This study adds fresh insight to the literature on financial health, emphasising the relevance of public financial management in the re-election of local politicians.