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I reexamine the conflicting results in Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) and Lennox, Lisowsky, and Pittman (2013). Frank et al. (2009) conclude that firms can manage book income upward and taxable income downward in the same period, implying a positive relation between aggressive book and tax reporting. Lennox et al. (2013) conclude the relation is negative and aggressive book reporting informs users that aggressive tax reporting is less likely. I identify four key differences in the research designs across the two studies, including measures of aggressive book reporting, measures of aggressive tax reporting, sample time periods, and empirical models. I systematically examine whether each of these differences is responsible for the conflicting results by altering the key difference while holding other factors as constant as possible. I find the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting is driven by the measure of aggressive book reporting, as the relation is positive for some subsets of firms and negative for others. Firms accused of financial statement fraud have a negative relation while nonfraud firms exhibit a positive relation. Using discretionary accruals, I also look for, but do not find a “pivot point” in the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting. I provide a better understanding of the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting by identifying research design choices that are responsible for prior results. I show that measures of both discretionary accruals and financial statement fraud are necessary to gain a more complete picture of the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting.

Purpose – Previous studies distinguish revenue management based on discretionary accruals; the research of studies is to investigate the factors that affect the finance manager at the discretionary accrual in General financial information statement.

Design/Methodology/Approach – Literature review models used in research aimed at detecting any company that performs the company’s discretion to fulfill the accrual of interests internally. This research study also discusses the relationship between earnings and discretionary manager behavior.

Findings – The researcher wants to re-examine the hypothesis of market efficiency on Indonesia’s capital market. The current company information technology uses greatly influences worldwide investor interest to invest on Indonesian’s capital market. Emerging Indonesia Capital market status becomes very interesting to be studied.

Originality/Value – It also presented the shortcomings of current research and the trends for future study in capital market.

This paper provides evidence on the impact of regulatory environment on financial reporting quality of transitional economies. This study compares the financial reporting quality of Hong Kong firms which are cross-listed in mainland China with those of Hong Kong firms cross-listed in China using specific earnings management metrics (earnings smoothing, timely loss recognition, value relevance and managing towards earnings targets) under pre- and post-IFRS regimes.

The financial reporting quality of Chinese A-share companies and Hong Kong listed companies are examined using earnings management measures. Using 2007 as base year, the study used a cumulative of −5 and +5 years of convergence experience which provide a total of 3,000 firm-year observations. In addition to regression analyses, we used the difference-in-difference analysis to check for the impact of regulatory environments on earnings management.

Through the lens of contingency theory, our results indicate that the adoption of the new substantially IFRS-convergent accounting standards in China results in better financial reporting quality evidenced by less earning management. The empirical results further shows that accounting data are more value relevant for Hong Kong listed firms, and that firms listed in China are more likely to engage in accrual-based earnings management than in real earnings management activities. We established that different earnings management practices that are seemingly tolerable in one country may not be tolerable in another due to level of differences in the regulatory environments.

The findings show that Hong Kong listed companies’ exhibit higher level of financial reporting quality than Chinese listed companies, which implies that the financial reporting quality under IFRS can be significantly different in regions with different institutional, economic and regulatory environments. The results imply that contingent factors such as country’s institutional structures, its extent of regulation and the strength of its investor protection environments impact on financial reporting quality particularly in transitional and emerging economies. As such, these factors need to be given appropriate considerations by financial reporting regulators and policy-makers interested in controlling earnings management practices among their corporations.

This study is a high impact study considering that China plays a significant role in today’s globalised economy. This study is unique as it the first, that we are aware of, to compare real earnings activities against accrual-based earnings management in pre- and post-IFRS adoption periods within the Chinese and Hong Kong financial reporting environments, distinguishing between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms.

We analyze the quality of accounting information reported by public firms in Latin America and United States of America.

To reach our objective, an exploratory and descriptive research was developed. To analyze the dimensions of accounting information quality, the operational model present in literature were applied which assess the persistence in earnings (Dechow & Schrand, 2004), the level of conservatism (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005), accounting earnings management (Pae, 2005) and accruals quality measurement (Dechow & Dichev, 2002), in a sample composed of publicly traded companies in the markets of Latin America and the North America (represented by USA), totaling 2,526 companies, from 2005 to 2011.

Our results evidenced that financial reporting of Latin-American companies are less conservative (except for Brazilian companies) and has similar level of earnings management in comparison to the North-American ones. Concerning to the quality of accruals it was observed that there are significant differences especially related to accruals of Brazilian companies.

Our results suggest differences in the quality of accounting information, originated by the economic environment where the company is inserted. So, investors must be careful when they are comparing firms between these markets, because the results were different for some cases, which may lead the investors to make misallocation of his resources.

We expanded previous literature by the use of various proxies for accounting quality, comparing firms on emerging markets with the major capital market (USA), and the crises period of time.

Many argue that the design of compensation contracts for public company chief executive officers (CEOs) is often not guided by a goal of value maximization. Yet, there is limited direct empirical evidence on the negative consequences of the proposed inefficient contracting between shareholders and CEOs. Using data on CEO bonus contracts of the S&P 500 firms, we investigate potential firm performance implications of the use of qualitative criteria such as leadership and mentoring in those contracts. We maintain that unlike quantitative criteria, qualitative criteria are difficult to define and measure on an objective basis, possibly resulting in an inefficient and biased incentive structure. Twenty-five percent of the sample observations have CEO bonus contracts that include a qualitative criterion for bonus payment determination. Our results show that employee productivity, asset productivity, capital expenditures, and future abnormal stock returns are lower for firms that use a qualitative criterion in CEO bonus contracts than those that do not. Further, contrary to the argument in prior literature that earnings management decreases with the use of subjective performance indicators in incentive contracts, we find that income-increasing accruals are actually higher when the CEO bonus contract includes a qualitative criterion. We recommend that compensation committees set concrete, measurable performance goals for CEOs, providing CEOs with better guidance and helping improve their corporate decision making.

We examine the earnings management implications of using nonfinancial performance measures (NFPM) in executive compensation contracts. We argue and test that when a manager's compensation is based on financial and NFPM, he/she has less incentive to manipulate earnings to maximize compensation. Using panel data covering the period 1992–2005, we compare earnings management behavior for a sample of firms that used both financial and nonfinancial measures to a matched sample of firms that based their performance measurement solely on financial measures. The results are mainly consistent with a reduction in earnings management behavior for those firms that rely on NFPM in their compensation contracts.

This study focuses on a survey of chief financial officers (CFOs) in public firms in Japan concerning the following six points: the importance of the definition earnings quality; higher quality earnings; the determinants of earnings quality; prevalence, magnitude, and motivation of earnings management; accounting that influences earnings quality; and misrepresenting of earnings. The results are following: first, Japanese CFOs define earnings quality as earnings accurately reflecting economic reality, earnings accurately reflecting the results of operations, and earnings backed by cash flows, earnings sustainability, recurring, and consistent, and earnings reflecting long-term trend importance. Second, Japanese firms consider earnings that reflect consistent reporting choices over time as higher quality. They do not consider that earnings having accruals that are eventually realized as cash flow as higher earnings quality. Third, Japanese CFOs indicate that 30% of earnings quality is impacted by firm characteristics such as firm’s business model, industry, and macroeconomic conditions. Surprisingly, the influence of the board of directors is greater than the impact of their internal controls. Fourth, as for the determinants of earnings quality, CFOs consider that more than 70% of Japanese CFOs do not allow the discretion and that accounting standards limit their ability to report higher earning quality. Fifth, Japanese CFOs consider that higher earnings are influenced by accounting principles such as policies that match expenses with revenues and policies that rely on fair value accounting as much as possible. Sixth, CFOs themselves predict that 50% of Japanese firms use discretions and that they use 20% of earnings per share (EPS). Since there is inside and outside pressure to hit earnings benchmarks, Japanese firms possess the motivation to use earnings to misrepresent economic performance, Japanese managers see a red flag when generally accepted accounting principle’s earnings do not correlate with cash flow from operations.

In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.

Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.

Amid increasing interest in how government regulation and market competition affect the cost and financial sustainability in health care sector, it remains unclear whether health care providers behave similarly to their counterparts in other industries. The goal of this chapter is to study the degree to which health care providers manipulate accruals in periods of financial difficulties caused, in part, by the rising costs of labor.

We collected the financial information of health care providers in 43 countries from 1984 to 2013 and conducted a pooled cross-sectional study with country and year fixed-effects.

The empirical evidence shows that health care providers with higher wage costs are more likely to smooth their earnings in order to maintain financial sustainability.

The finding of this study not only informs regulators that earnings management is pervasive in health care organizations around the world, but also contributes to the studies of financial book-tax reporting alignment, given the existing empirical evidence linking earnings management to corporate tax avoidance in this very sector.

This study investigates the role of opportunistic behavior in earnings management. Using listed firms in the Indonesia Stock Exchange as the object of study, our examination shows that profitability's opportunistic behavior affects earnings management significantly. The higher the profitability, the higher the earnings management will be. Financial distress also affects the tendency of earnings management. The more severe financial distress, the higher the earnings management is. Another important finding is that bigger firms tend to perform more earnings management activities. This study contributes to earnings management and agency problems research in the context of go public firms in emerging markets since opportunistic earnings management will prevent investments, which will hamper the country's economic growth. This study also contributes to entrepreneurial studies. The manager is considered an entrepreneur CEO, so all the management strategies affect company value, including how the manager communicates the earnings information to accounting information users.