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The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditures and excess cash holdings.

With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single class companies with concentrated control, the chapter analyzes the relationship between the valuation discount of dual class companies and measures of excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditure and excess cash holdings.

Executives in dual class firms earn greater compensation relative to their counterparts in single class firms. This excess compensation is more pronounced when the executive is a family member. The value of dual class shares is discounted most when cash holdings and executive compensation of dual class are excessive. Excess compensation is highest for executives who are family members of dual class companies. The dual class discount is not related to excess capital expenditures.

The research shows that the discount in the value of dual class shares in relation to the value of closely controlled single class company shares is directly related to the channels through which controlling shareholder-managers can extract private benefits.

Conceptual paper purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to examine a new conceptual model of addiction and interpret the results from delay discounting studies in light of this new perspective.

Methodology/approach – To accomplish this we (1) introduce this new conceptual model, (2) briefly review executive function, including evidence for executive dysfunction among the addicted, (3) describe the unique relationship of temporal discounting to the new model and executive dysfunction, and (4) reinterpret the discounting literature in light of this new conceptual model.

Findings – Addicted individuals discount the future more than controls. This is consistent with greater relative activation of the impulsive system and decreased relative activation of the executive system. It also supports the new conceptual model of addiction.

Research implications – The new model provides a model for understanding the observations from the broader area of research in temporal discounting.

Originality/value of chapter – Given the view of executive function as important for the cross-temporal organization of behavior, we think that temporal discounting, the valuing of future commodities, qualifies this process to be included as an executive function.

Government agencies have endeavored, with limited success, to improve the methodological consistency of regulatory benefit–cost analysis (BCA). This paper recommends that an independent cohort of economists, policy analysts and legal scholars take on that task. Independently established “best practices” would have four positive effects: (1) they would render BCAs more regular in form and format and, thus, more readily assessable and replicable by social scientists; (2) improved consistency might marginally reduce political opposition to BCA as a policy tool; (3) politically-motivated, inter-agency methodological disputes might be avoided; and (4) an independent set of “best practices” would provide a sound, independent basis for judicial review of agency BCAs.

A study of the price discounts granted by Morton Salt Company and other producers of table salt in the U.S. on their sales of table salt to grocery wholesalers and retailers. The discounts were found to be illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act by the Federal Trade Commission and the Supreme Court. The Commission and the Court believed that the discounts were unjustified price concessions granted to “large” buyers, consistent with the concerns of the Robinson-Patman Act. However, the evidence indicates that the most common discount – the “carload discount” – was received by virtually all buyers, regardless of the buyer’s size; the other discounts – “annual volume” discounts – though received primarily by “large” buyers, were likely cost based. The history of the discounts and likely reasons why they were granted are explored in detail.

One of the fundamental tasks in optimal insurance design is mitigating the moral hazard effects inherent in insurance mechanisms. Empirically, relatively little is known about how individual-level time preferences affect selection of insurance options. We use several waves of the Health and Retirement Survey to explore the relationship between revealed time preferences at the individual level and the selection of insurance options for both the under-age-65 population and the Medicare-eligible population. Our results suggest that time preferences are not likely to be fixed across the life cycle, and that they appear to be important predictors of health insurance decisions.

Positive-framed and negative-framed messages were delivered to examine the effect of framing on intertemporal decisions through lab experiments while holding the level of financial literacy constant. The three big questions adopted by Lusardi and Mitchell were utilized to assess the financial literacy of our subjects before they were asked to complete 20 incentivized intertemporal decisions. A small, delayed reward and a slightly bigger one were incorporated into the intertemporal decisions with a delay of 30 days. The ordinary least square (OLS) shows that the negative relationship between financial literacy and discount rates was held when the delayed reward was small. Interestingly, when the delayed reward became slightly bigger, their discount rates were reduced significantly with the negatively framed message. These findings suggest that the negatively framed message can motivate individuals to save for a greater return in the real world. Lastly, subjects with the highest level of financial literacy were not responsive to the magnitude effect, proving that a financial literacy program is essential to strengthen the individual's financial plan and reduce their discount rates in the developing country context.

The theory of discounting is based on the assumption that people's observed behavior in markets for savings and investment reveals their subjective preferences regarding trade-offs between present and future economic benefits. A person who borrows money at the annual interest rate r, for example, shows a willingness to pay (1+r)t dollars t years in the future to obtain one dollar in the present. On the other side of this transaction, the lender demands (1+r)t future dollars in exchange for each dollar loaned out today. In the logic of this situation, both borrowers and lenders behave as if one dollar of future currency has a “present value” of just