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The purpose of this paper is to explore the contentious issue whether lawyers become launderers when they accept dirty money as legal fees. Lawyers represent criminal defendants who may wish to pay for their legal fees with proceeds of their criminal activities. The paper analyses the legal position of Namibia and Zimbabwe on such tainted fees and proceeds to compare with the different position taken by the United States.

The paper adopts a desk research methodology with reliance on various sources such as statutory laws, case laws, books, journal articles and the internet. Its scope is limited to issue and content analysis relating to the use of dirty money as legal fees.

The paper shows that lawyers become launderers when they accept dirty money as legal fees with knowledge or suspicion of its origins. It concludes that the prohibition of dirty money as legal fees is important in the fight against economic crime in Namibia and Zimbabwe. Even though it is decriminalised in the USA, the continuous prosecution of lawyers for tainted fees shows that state authorities are aware of the dangers of tainted legal fees.

This paper adds to the few available literature on dirty money and legal fees. It provides sound reasons why prohibition of tainted attorneys’ fees adds muscle to the fight against economic crime. No prior literature is available on tainted legal fees in Namibia and Zimbabwe specifically.

This paper aims to examine the concept of corruption and dirty money. Corruption is amorphous and lacks a congruent definition. It is mainly divided into public and private corruption. This divide, is unnecessary, given the fact that both cause incalculable damage to the markets and lager society. Globalisation has necessitated liberalisation and resulted in amalgamating both public and private ventures. This, as a result, has made it more difficult to stick to this. Pronouncements from International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Law Commission’s attitude not to segregate between private and public bribery prior to the legislation of United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010, has added greater impetus to the debate. Attempts to quantify the amount of corruption and money laundering, has equally, hit a dead end. The figures being bandied about are all estimates or “guesstimates” that cannot stand the empirical test. As a result, the conjectures have strong potentials to continue for a longer time. The purpose of this paper is to bring to the fore the need to jettison the long-held perception that public and private corruption should be seen in different lights.

This paper relies substantially on both primary and secondary sources in the analysis.

Indicatively, the facts tilt towards the conclusion that it is impossible to actually ascertain the quantifiable amount of money that is involved in corruption and the money laundering process. It is an illusion.

The paper provides the platform that the time is ripe for both public and private corruption to be seen as the same thing, as they both unleash catastrophic consequences on society. The issues of globalisation and liberalisation make this inevitable.

The objective of this paper is to challenge some of the rhetoric pertaining to the “harm” caused by “dirty” money infiltrating into the “legitimate economy.” The arguments regarding the impact of dirty money have been used to justify enhancements to law enforcement powers, and increasingly invasive investigative strategies and intelligence gathering regimes.

The paper reviews the literature pertaining to the intersection between “dirty money” and “legitimate business” and looks at how some of the most notorious criminal operations have been handled by the press and the courts. The paper examines corporate complicity in situations involving premeditated, ongoing criminal conduct and discusses two specific ways in which societies acknowledge and accommodate criminality within the operation of these corporations.

The paper argues that one must never minimize the amount of legitimate business that involves dirty money or uses dirty opportunities or was once dirty and is now legitimate or was legitimate and is now dirty.

The pretense of a clear separation between criminality and corporate operations is “useful” and is occasionally correct – but not as the norm and ought not to be the operating law enforcement expectation.

The paper encourages the reader to question the easily repeated claims about the financial threats from stereotypical forms of “organized crime,” while either dismissing or re‐defining the equally serious, or more serious, activities of professions (lawyers, accountants, bankers, politicians, government officials, corporate CEOs, etc.) operating supposedly legitimately.

The acquisition of and control over wealth is the motivation for most serious crimes involving premeditation. This is all the more so when the criminal activity resembles an enterprise which inevitably requires capital to operate and lubricate its aspirations. Money, or rather wealth, in its disposable form, is therefore not only the goal of criminal enterprises but the life blood of the enterprise. Therefore until the profits of crime are taken away from subversive and criminal factions, there is little chance of effectively discouraging criminal and abusive conduct which produces great wealth or, through its profits, allows power and prestige to be acquired. As soon as the state devises methods for the tracing and seizure of such funds, there is an obvious and compelling incentive for the criminal to hide the source of his ill‐gotten gains — in other words to engage in money laundering.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse how terrorism financing can be assimilated with money launderning when the amounts ofmoney involved differ so markedly. Not only is the cost of financing terrorist attacks minimal compared to the huge sums often at stake in financial crimes, but also the psychological profile of terrorists, who are reclusive by nature, contrasts starkly with that of financial criminals, who are usually fully integrated members of society. When terrorism financing is equated with money laundering this represents a utilitarian approach in that it facilitates the creation of a security strategy and stifles criticism of criminogenic capitalismthat turns a blind eye to tax evasion.

The analysis is conceptual, focussing on the assimilation of terrorism financing with money laundering. There is an interview with a French magistrate, specialized in the fight against corruption and white-collar crime, and data have been collected from international organizations and scholarly articles.

The fight against money laundering and money dirtying has clearly sparked numerous controversies around evaluation, scope, criminal perpetrators and a lack of vital cooperation between administrative and judicial services.

This paper raises questions about the reasons behind the linking of money laundering and money dirtying by states and players in public international law and why the fight against money laundering is very much overshadowed by their focus on terrorist financing in dealing with the growing threat of Islamic State, otherwise known as ISIS or ISIL, in the Middle East and West Africa.

The paper enables the reader to raise the question of similarities between the fight against money laundering and the fight against terrorism financing.

Purpose: This chapter aims to evaluate the impact of money laundering and terrorism financing on the Indian economy and to study the effectiveness of prevention of money laundering acts and terrorist financing as per the guidance of the financial protection task force.

Need for the study: Developing countries like India have been more vulnerable to terrorism and financial scams over the last four decades. Despite the establishment of regulating bodies and anti-money laundering acts, this problem continued to be a national threat. Therefore, examining the impact of money laundering and terrorism finance on the Indian economy is necessary.

Methodology: This study is based on secondary data gathered from the web portals of government agencies and international organisations dealing with money laundering and terror funding. Newspapers, journals, and annual reports are reviewed to identify the modus operandi of money laundering operators and their impact on the economy.

Findings: Money laundering and terrorism financing significantly threaten the Indian economy and national security. Despite different anti-money laundering laws and multiple regulating authorities, the system has pitfalls that allow economic fraud and money transactions for terrorist activities. There is a need for cyber security, and integrated enforcement agencies to combat money laundering at national and international levels.

Practical implications: This study would be helpful for academicians and policymakers to understand the nexus of money laundering and terrorism financing and its impacts on the Indian economy.

In recent years the divide between areas of law, which have hitherto been perceived, in most systems of jurisprudence, as relatively and mutually distinct, has narrowed and in some instances all but disappeared. This tendency is perhaps no more dramatically illustrated than in, which for a better description, might be termed the area of financial regulation. When the present author started teaching a course in the University of Cambridge on financial services regulation in 1979, the perception among those of his colleagues who regarded such things, was that this formed part of the corpus of corporate law. Of course, this analysis is only partly justified, and beyond the area of corporate finance law is misconceived. On the other hand, the commercial lawyers, who — at least in Cambridge, have been regarded or perhaps more accurately tolerated, as being a little more academically respectable than pure corporate lawyers, were distinctly unsympathetic to the notion that financial services law is in part akin to banking law and therefore a subject more suited to mercantile law. Given the author's predilection to weigh more heavily those aspects of the law that are protective of society, rather than facilitative of enterprise, it is not surprising that he ventured more and more into the realm of prohibitions, sanctions and even the criminal law. Take for example, the abuse of price sensitive information obtained by those in a confidential position, by virtue of that privileged relationship, to trade on the basis of that information in corporate securities — in other words, insider dealing. Is this properly regarded as a matter for the traditional law relating to directors and officers, and thus, company law, or given the fact that most countries today seek to curb such activity on the basis that it harms confidence in the integrity of public markets, a matter of public, and in particular criminal law? While such a debate may appear somewhat academic, even if it does result in the demarcation of courses and the like, it can and occasionally does have a very real practical significance. For example, in some jurisdictions, such as the USA, the Federal Legislature is competent to legislate on matters pertaining to international trade and finance, and thus the protection of the markets, but not matters of traditional company law. On the other hand, it has been contended in jurisdictions such as Canada that given the uncertainty attaching to the Federal Legislature's competence in regard to the financial markets, it is better to consider insider abuse as a matter of company law. Similar issues arise in the context of the competence of specific organs of the European Union and, of course, are not uncommon in the demarcation of competence between domestic agencies, whether of law reform or enforcement.

To examine if recent changes to the law and practice of certain offshore financial centres (OFCs) means that some OFCs now have more stringent anti‐money laundering measures in place compared to their “onshore” counterparts. To further explore the allegation by some that there is a dual standard in terms of the pressure applied to OFCs on the one hand and “onshore” jurisdictions on the other.

The analysis will focus on the Crown Dependencies and the British Overseas Territories of Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. The “onshore” jurisdictions include the UK, the USA and Australia. Comparison of the implementation of the FATF 40 Recommendations (using the most recent IMF Assessments), trust and company services legislation, and the “Know Your Customer” requirements.

The results show that the Crown Dependencies and the selected Overseas Territories are not only keeping up with the USA, the UK and Australia but in many cases “outdoing” the AML/CFT regimes of these onshore jurisdictions.

Comparison limited to only certain OFCs and “onshore” jurisdictions. There is a two year difference between the IMF assessments for the OFCs and for the onshore jurisdictions. Future research would include the results of the second phase of the OFC Assessment Program and IMF assessments due in the next few years.

This paper examines a very topical area of financial crime based on the most recent data available.

Crime is becoming ever more international. This is a world where it is quicker to cross the Atlantic from Paris to New York than to traverse the city of Paris by road. This world is faced with a criminality that profits by the advantages of the so‐called free world, where there are practically no frontiers any more. Whether it is drug trafficking, financial fraud or cyber‐pornography, crime has gone global on a massive scale as borders fade and cash rockets from Grand Cayman to Hong Kong, Luxembourg or Vanuatu in the flash of a second. Criminals know no geographical boundaries; nor does their dirty money recognise any such barriers.