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This paper aims to demonstrate how illicit funds are being laundered through underground currency exchange networks.

Sixty interviews with money launderers and compliance officers were conducted to identify methods relevant to current money laundering issues. Further, a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers was administered.

The currency exchange method is highly suitable for money launderers with access to a criminal network. It may be used for placement or pre-placement. Evidently, the vast majority of compliance officers fail to recognize the utilization of this method in their daily business.

Implications are based on the statements of 60 interviewees, comprising both alleged money launderers and compliance officers.

The study identified gaps in anti-money laundering mechanisms. The documentation of said inconsistencies aims to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with useful insights into the minds of money launderers.

Whereas most prior literature focuses on money laundering prevention methods, how money launderers operate is not illustrated. This study comprehensively overviews the issue by interviewing not only compliance officers but also money launderers. Understanding how money launderers operate is essential to effectively prevent money laundering. In particular, compliance officers must be able to view money laundering from the criminal’s perspective to sufficiently combat the issue.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how money launderers circumvent compliance measures by using exchange offices to launder incriminated funds.

The three-step process entailed carrying out unofficial interviews with money launderers, which gave first insight into the issue, followed by expert interviews that were reviewed by means of a qualitative study. The findings of the qualitative study were processed during the subsequent quantitative research.

Although exchange offices are a known threat to anti-money laundering efforts, they continue to be highly applicable. As exchange offices are responsible for their own compliance measures, compliance officers employed by other institutions do not encounter money laundering through exchange offices regularly.

The findings of the study are limited to the experiences of the interviewed experts, which, naturally, are highly subjective. Further, they are geographically limited, as certain areas were not represented in the study.

During the literature review, a research gap was identified. The present study attempts to partially fill the same. The illustrated findings aimed at facilitating an improvement of anti-money laundering measures. The insights into the minds of money launderers provide valuable information for legislators, compliance officers and authorities.

Presently, the majority of the literature focuses on the issue of money laundering from a compliance perspective. However, accurately understanding how money launderers circumvent the existing prevention measures requires an exploration of their approaches. To effectively inhibit money laundering, it is necessary to gain a holistic overview of the issue, which entails the observation of both perspectives.

This paper aims to discuss how feasible it is for intelligent criminals to circumvent existing anti-money laundering mechanisms.

Based upon ten informal interviews with money launderers and their advisers; 18 formal, semi-standardized expert interviews with selected anti-money laundering specialists; and a quantitative survey of 181 compliance officers, 12 effective methods to launder money have been developed.

It has been found that gold, jewellery, raw diamonds, antiquities, art, real estate projects, consulting firms, mergers and acquisitions, banks in Dubai, deposit boxes, private cash deals and currency exchange offices continue to be extraordinarily suitable tools for money laundering.

The identification of gaps in anti-money laundering mechanisms is meant to provide both compliance officers and legislators with valuable insights. While the existing literature focuses on estimating the volume of money laundered in certain geographical areas and on the improvement of anti-money laundering mechanisms, this paper describes how money launderers proceed to avoid getting caught.

Although economists and academics have studied money laundering for several decades, there continues to be gaps in the research due to a lack of reliable data on money laundering activity, and a lack of detailed sources and methods of collection in government-based reporting. The purpose of this study is to apply the Walker-Unger gravity model and examine US-based money launderer preference for the 2000-2020 time frame. This paper then compares those results with previous applications of the model and identifies trends, which may serve as the foundations of a money launderer preference theory. The results of the investigation ranked countries by preference of US-based money launderers and determined that there was consistency in country destination preference even during recessionary periods.

The Walker–Unger gravity model as applied by Roman et al. (2021) is used to conduct the investigation, to maintain consistency in the application of the Walker–Unger model and further the objective of validating the attractiveness simulation. The model tests the predictive capability of the independent variables to establish the degree of attractiveness each country represents for the funds of US-based money launderers. A score is generated by the model, which is then used to analyze and interpret its significance in relation to all sampled countries.

Model results reveal the countries with the highest attractiveness for US-based money launderers during 2000–2020 were Australia, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Canada, Cayman Islands, Norway, Monaco, Puerto Rico, Switzerland and the USA. Model results show that over the two decades the proportion of money flow scores changed but not to a degree that would alter the country preference of US-based money launderers. US-based money launderers tended to use the same countries for their illicit financial activities, regardless of the state of the legitimate economy.

One of the limitations of the model is that it does not show the effect of money laundering on legitimate economic activity.

The model results will give insight into the preferred destination of US-based money launderers and therefore frame one component of money laundering activities in the USA for the examined time period.

A secondary objective of this study is to evaluate if any changes to US-based money launderer preferences occurred during the three most recent periods of economic downturn in the USA.

The model results will give insight into the preferred destination of US-based money launderers and therefore frame one component of money laundering activities in the USA for the examined time period. A secondary objective of this study is to evaluate if any changes to US-based money launderer preferences occurred during the three most recent periods of economic downturn in the USA. The periods chosen are the 2001 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2007/08 global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how illegally obtained funds from Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland are laundered through the banking system in Dubai.

The study is conducted using a qualitative content analysis of 60 semi-structured expert interviews with both criminals and money laundering prevention experts, and a quantitative survey of 200 financial sector compliance officers.

Some banks in Dubai are highly suitable for all stages of the money laundering process. However, although certain banks have weak compliance mechanisms, others act in an exemplary manner.

The qualitative findings are based on semi-structured interviews and are limited to the 60 interviewees’ perspectives.

Identification of gaps in anti-money laundering mechanisms provides compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how money laundering criminals operate.

The existing literature focuses mainly on organizations and the methods they use to combat money laundering. This paper outlines how money launderers operate to avoid detection. Authentic experiences are illustrated. The reader is provided with valuable insights into the minds of money launderers. Both lawful and criminal perspectives are taken into account.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how illicit funds are laundered by using the gold method in German-speaking European countries.

To identify approaches to money laundering via gold, 60 semi-standardized interviews with money launderers and compliance officers were conducted. Further, a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers was administered.

The gold trade in European German-speaking countries remains extraordinarily suitable for money laundering. In particular, it may be used for placement and layering.

The implications are based on the statements of 60 interviewees, including both money launderers and compliance officers. Thus, the derived results are limited to the perspectives of these 60 persons.

Based on this study’s findings, gaps in the existing anti-money laundering measures are identified. Documenting these inconsistencies should provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into the minds of money launderers.

As this study explores the perspectives of both compliance officers and money launderers, it provides a broad overview of the issues. Most existing literature fails to observe money laundering from the launderers’ perspective, focusing instead on methods to prevent money laundering. Effective prevention requires profound knowledge of how criminals operate. Only by adopting criminals’ perspective can compliance officers effectively spot money-laundering methods.

The purpose of this paper is to exemplify how money launderers in European German-speaking countries use deposit boxes to place incriminated funds.

During a qualitative content analysis of 60 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers, concrete money laundering techniques using deposit boxes were identified.

Deposit boxes may be used to place incriminated funds or prepare for their subsequent placement. Thus, the method is highly suitable to the demands of small-scale money laundering.

The study’s qualitative findings are limited to the perspectives of the 60 interview partners. The interviews were conducted in a semi-standardized fashion.

The present paper aims at identifying gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with worthwhile insights into the minds of criminals.

The present paper illustrates how money launderers operate to avoid detection, capturing the perspective of the launderer. Thus, the reader is granted access to highly valuable information that is supposed to facilitate the introduction of new anti-money laundering measures. Moreover, it shows how compliance officers view the issue and what they consider to be important to the successful implementation of compliance mechanisms. Moreover, the officers’ statements will exhibit which methods they do and do not engage with on a daily basis.

This paper aims to illustrate how illegally obtained funds are laundered through raw diamonds in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

To identify specific money laundering techniques involving raw diamonds, this study used a qualitative content analysis of data collected from 60 semi-standardized interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers.

Raw diamonds are extraordinarily suitable for money laundering in European German-speaking countries. In particular, they may be used in all three stages of the laundering process, namely, placement, layering and integration.

Because the qualitative findings are based on semi-standardized interviews, their insights are limited to the perspectives of the 60 interviewees.

Identifying gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms should provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate.

While prior studies focus on the methods used by organizations to combat money laundering and how to improve anti-money laundering measures, this paper investigates how money launderers operate to avoid detection, thereby illustrating authentic experiences. Its findings provide valuable insights into the minds of money launderers and combines criminal perspective with that of prevention experts.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how illegally obtained funds are laundered by employment of consulting companies in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

A qualitative content analysis of 28 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts, and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers led to the identification of concrete money-laundering techniques involving the employment of consulting companies.

Consulting companies continue to be used for money laundering in European German-speaking countries, especially in the layering and integration stages of the money laundering process, during which the origins of funds are concealed, and the money is integrated into the legal economy.

Qualitative findings from the analysis of semi-standardized interviews are limited to the 28 interviewees’ perspectives.

Identification of gaps in existing anti-money-laundering mechanisms provides compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate.

The existing literature focuses on organizations that combat money laundering and the improvement of anti-money-laundering measures. This paper outlines how money launderers avoid detection. Both preventative and criminal perspectives are considered.