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The funding of defined-benefit plans has garnered the attention of academicians, practitioners, and policymakers. Drawing upon agency and organizational control theories, this study investigates the implications of board independence on changes in defined-benefit funding. Using a panel dataset of S&P 500 companies sponsoring defined-benefit plans, the author finds that corporate boards matter. Specifically, CEO duality and outside director representation are associated with year-to-year decreases in defined-benefit funding. Conversely, outside director ownership is related to year-to-year increases in defined-benefit funding. Furthermore, outside director ownership moderated the relationship between outside director representation and defined-benefit funding such that outside director representation is associated with year-to-year increases in defined-benefit plan funding when the percentage of outside director ownership is high.

Using a population study, we provide evidence on the important but understudied issue of company survival under employee ownership, as well as on the performance effects of employee ownership and the issue of whether employee ownership substitutes for other pension benefits.

Company survival and pension benefits are assessed using a unique dataset from Dun & Bradstreet of privately held Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) companies over the 1988–1999 period, matched to non-ESOP companies in the same industry. Performance is assessed using pre/post-comparisons of ESOP adopters in the 1988–1994 period.

Privately held ESOP companies in 1988 were only half as likely as non-ESOP firms to go bankrupt or close over the 1988–1999 period, and only three-fifths as likely to disappear for any reason. The ESOP companies had significantly higher post-adoption annual employment and sales growth, along with higher sales per employee. ESOP companies are four times more likely than their non-ESOP pairs to have defined benefit pension plan and other forms of defined contribution plans.

The greater survival was not explained by higher productivity, or by greater compensation flexibility. The higher survival may instead be tied to complementary policies adopted along with ESOPs to create a more committed and engaged workforce that contributes ideas to enhance survival and is more flexible when economic difficulties arise. The pension results are consistent with other studies on compensation under employee ownership, suggesting that employee ownership is generally used as a form of efficiency wage to provide above-market compensation.

Higher survival among ESOP companies could result in lower job loss and unemployment, potentially providing a public policy rationale for support of employee ownership.

The chapter provides the first examination of company survival in privately held ESOP companies, and one of the few examinations of how ESOPs relate to other pension benefits.

It is well established that Black and Hispanic workers accumulate leszs wealth for retirement than white workers. This study provides evidence on whether racial and ethnic differences in private pension coverage and benefit levels contribute to the wealth differentials. Using data from the Current Population Survey, Survey of Consumer Finances and the Health and Retirement Survey, several consistent findings emerge. First, most of the racial and ethnic differences in pension benefit levels are accounted for by differences in worker charateristics. Second, among workers who are covered by a private pension, racial and ethnic differences in pension asset accumulation are quite small. Finally, exclusion of pension wealth has a small effect on the comparison of average levels of wealth across racial and ethnic groups, but has a substantial effect for comparisons at the bottom of the wealth distribution. Overall, the findings suggest that, holding worker characteristics constant, minority and majority workers accumulate very similar levels of wealth.

Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we examine behavioral responses to a new generation of retirement policies that on average are actuarially neutral. Although many conventional models predict that actuarially neutral policies will not affect retirement behavior, our model allows those with high-time preference rates to find that the promise of an actuarially fair increase in future rewards does not balance the loss from foregone current benefits. Thus together with liquidity constraints facing those with high-time preference, we find that actuarially neutral policies do affect retirement behavior. One such policy follows on the elimination of the Social Security earnings test for those over normal retirement age, and would eliminate the earnings test between early and normal retirement age. Another of these policies would increase the ages of benefit entitlement. Still another such policy emerges from a central focus of the past few years on the adoption of personal accounts. Although Social Security benefits are currently paid in the form of an annuity, benefits from either defined benefit plans or from personal accounts may be made available as an annuity or as a lump sum of equivalent actuarial value. A related policy choice between actuarially equivalent benefits emerges on the pension side. There has been discussion of relaxing the current IRS prohibition against paying a pension benefit when a person remains at work, instead allowing partial pension benefits to be paid to those who partially retire on a job.

Over the past 15 years or so, a very large proportion of the forensic economics literature has been devoted to research concerning better ways of estimating damages in cases involving personal injury and wrongful death (PI/WD). This is probably not surprising since the largest fraction of consulting income for forensic economists (at least those in the National Association of Forensic Economics, NAFE) comes from such cases.

Given the ongoing attention surrounding public sector defined benefit pensions, the participating plan sponsors such as local units of government may be tempted to reduce their future pension liabilities, possibly at the expense of their former employees. Alternatively, public sector employees may act to withdraw their pension contributions if they have concerns related to the sustainability of their employer's pension plan. Nonvested, terminated employees have the option of leaving their contributions on account or taking them as a distribution in the form of a rollover to a qualifying retirement account, or a cash-out. Because a cash distribution carries with it the potential for retirement savings ‘leakage,’ it continues to be of public concern.

This study contributes to the literature by examining determinants of the distribution decisions of terminated employees and is first to specifically explore the association of pension funding levels as a determinant of such decision. Decisions of 46,608 employees who separated employment between 2010 and 2013 were examined. The results suggest that a decrease in the employer's pension funding is associated with increased probability that the terminated employee will take a refund of their contributions. Additionally, the data reveal that 88% of the terminating employees who took a refund requested to receive it in the form of a cash-out, totaling about $38 million of cash distributions. Lastly, about 1,000 of those employees each cashed out more than $8,000, thus suggesting the pension leakage problem warrants further research and perhaps policy changes.

We study the potential effects of pension underfunding on corporate investment, financial constraints and improved employee bonding using 10 Pacific-Basin countries (including the United States, Australia, and eight Asian countries) at heterogeneous economic development stages and different regulatory environments. We document that corporate pensions are significantly underfunded in most countries of our sample in the period of 2001–2017, when interest rates were ultralow in most countries. In addition, firms from countries with stronger employee protection and more generous retirement benefits tend to show higher levels of underfunding in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans. To the extent of pension underfunding imposing constraints on corporate investment, we find that firms in these countries can face more constraints on investment when their pension is underfunded.