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The objective of this paper is to document the impact of several types of ESOP announcements on shareholder wealth. The market welcomes the news of initiation ESOPs, nonleveraged ESOPs and ESOPs implemented by firms with B‐BAA Moody's bond rating. However, the market indifferently responds to announcements of expansion ESOPs, leveraged ESOPs and ESOPs adopted by firms with A‐AAA Moody's bond rating. Announcements of nonleveraged ESOPs, expansion ESOPs and B‐BAA rating ESOPs are found to be associated with some resolution of asymmetric information.

Close to half of all privately held companies in the USA are owned by baby boomers, meaning 2.7m American businesses are owned by someone age 55 or older. In the coming decades, all of these businesses will either change owners or disappear. The median state has 34,000 businesses approaching an ownership transition. The effects of this generational shift will be felt in cities, small towns and rural areas. At the same time, state governments are struggling with the challenge of preserving jobs and stimulating local economies buffeted by larger economic trends. States currently spend an estimated $45bn to $70bn a year on efforts to attract and retain jobs. If even a fraction of these exiting owners pursued an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) as their business exit strategy, the potential positive impact on workers, communities and state economies would be substantial. Yet, many business owners are not even aware of ESOPs as an option. In light of this knowledge gap, many of these businesses will instead shut down or sell to outside investors who may not be interested in preserving and growing local jobs. This paper aims to discuss these issues.

Review of state information and statistics on employee ownership.

Currently, there are around 6,660 ESOPs in the USA holding total assets of nearly $1.4 trillion. These plans cover 14.2m participants. The Midwest is home to the greatest number of ESOPs, followed by the South. There is a least one ESOP headquartered in 4,131 distinct zip codes.

In order to increase the effectiveness and penetration of local outreach and education, states can: create an office of employee ownership with a dedicated staff person. The office could exist within a state agency or as a nonprofit receiving state funding; provide grants to one or more nonprofits to run an outreach program; hold seminars statewide in conjunction with professional, business, and trade publications and organizations; publish and disseminate brochures and other material; and work with the media to encourage stories on local ESOP companies. In order to promote ESOPs as an attractive alternative to private equity, outside competitors, and other potential purchasers of the business, ESOP outreach should: focus on business owners who are approaching retirement or a liquidity event, as opposed to start-ups or businesses who are interested in progressive management. Focus on the human side and emotional impact of employee ownership. Videos and other personal testimonials contrasting the storylines of a company that becomes employee-owned vs one that becomes owned by an outside investor can be powerful. Take advantage of the ESOP community by facilitating peer-to-peer connections, where company leaders talk with their peers who have sold to an ESOP. These connections are usually fostered based on location or industry. Take care to ensure that the center is seen as providing objective information as opposed to being perceived as trying to “sell” owners on the idea.

This is the first published review of ESOPs in the states.

This paper offers a new perspective on the potential motivation for the adoption of employee ownership based on market power. Employee ownership may be linked to market power, either through contributing to firm growth that leads to market power or through industry leaders adopting employee ownership as part of rent sharing or a broader consolidation of market position. Both employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) coverage and product market concentration (PMC) have been increasing in the past two decades, providing a good opportunity to see if and how these are related.

The authors predict ESOP adoption and termination using multilevel regressions based on 2002–2012 firm- and industry-level data from the Census Bureau, Compustat and Form 5500 pension datasets.

The authors find that the top four firms in concentrated industries are more likely to adopt Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), while having an ESOP does not predict entering the top four, apart from firm-level predictors. Tests indicate the first result does not reflect simple rent sharing with employees but instead appears to reflect an effort by firms to consolidate market power through the attraction and retention (or “locking in”) of industry talent. Other positive predictors of ESOPs include company size, being in a high-wage industry and having a defined benefit (DB) pension.

To better distinguish among hypotheses, it would be helpful to have firm-level data on managerial attitudes, strategies, networks and monopsony measures. Therefore, future research using such data would be highly useful and encouraged.

The paper includes implications for the potential usefulness of ESOPs in attracting and retaining talent and for the design of nuanced policy to encourage more broadly based sharing of economic rewards.

While prior research focuses on firm-level predictors of employee ownership, this study uses market concentration and other industry-level variables to predict the use of ESOPs. This study makes a unique contribution, broadening the current thinking on firm motives and environmental conditions predictive of firm ESOP adoption.

This viewpoint will present some statistical information about employee ownership in the US and interpret and analyze this information in order to address the barriers question using material from qualitative interviews that the authors have conducted over the last ten years with practitioners in the field. There have been few actual empirical studies that sort out the different barriers to employee ownership. The authors have chosen to focus on employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) in the US because this is the principal example from which people could learn from, and the high prevalence of ESOPs plays an important role in the US. This overview will present interpretations of these interviews with conceptual arguments that cannot always be supported with either overwhelming empirical studies or arguments that conclusively eliminate one or other explanation. This is an initial attempt to bring some comprehensive treatment and data to this incipient discussion. This is based on an interpretive analysis of qualitative interviews without quantification or social survey methods used for measurement. The advantage of this approach is that it lays out a completely different level of analysis of the barriers to employee ownership in the US that is “closer to the ground” and more based in the views of front-line practitioners who are actually implementing it.

Analysis and interpretation of qualitative interviews.

The list of barriers that has been identified is not exhaustive. The preliminary conclusions are that (not necessarily in this order) limitations of investment banking models, poor supportive infrastructure, complexity and cost and regulatory issues, the lack of support by political parties and social movements, the sale of companies due to financial considerations and legal complexities and lack of clarity and resistance by Federal agencies are major barriers in the US. Various sectors of Wall Street has been amenable to employee ownership with the proper government and private sector support. What is needed now is a series of quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews of retiring business owners in closely held companies and of CEOs and CFOs in stock market companies in order to gauge the barriers that they believe are blocking their own action in the employee share ownership area. The Rutgers Institute for the Study of Employee Ownership and Profit Sharing is working on such a research agenda at this time. In addition, with the future size of the US employee ownership sector at stake, a more intensive one-year interview project would make sense in order to present these different explanations to key actors and practitioners and ask them to provide evidence to prove or disprove the relevance of the different barriers.

Empirical research which can resolve which barriers are more important than others is presented, when possible; however, studies that provide metrics to compare different barriers are not available and need to be carried out.

Other countries considering employee ownership policies can learn from the US experience. US policymakers and legislators can learn from an original, recent discussion of barriers.

If employee ownership sectors are to be developed, a careful discussion of barriers is most relevant.

Original document by the authors based on original interviews.

Using a population study, we provide evidence on the important but understudied issue of company survival under employee ownership, as well as on the performance effects of employee ownership and the issue of whether employee ownership substitutes for other pension benefits.

Company survival and pension benefits are assessed using a unique dataset from Dun & Bradstreet of privately held Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) companies over the 1988–1999 period, matched to non-ESOP companies in the same industry. Performance is assessed using pre/post-comparisons of ESOP adopters in the 1988–1994 period.

Privately held ESOP companies in 1988 were only half as likely as non-ESOP firms to go bankrupt or close over the 1988–1999 period, and only three-fifths as likely to disappear for any reason. The ESOP companies had significantly higher post-adoption annual employment and sales growth, along with higher sales per employee. ESOP companies are four times more likely than their non-ESOP pairs to have defined benefit pension plan and other forms of defined contribution plans.

The greater survival was not explained by higher productivity, or by greater compensation flexibility. The higher survival may instead be tied to complementary policies adopted along with ESOPs to create a more committed and engaged workforce that contributes ideas to enhance survival and is more flexible when economic difficulties arise. The pension results are consistent with other studies on compensation under employee ownership, suggesting that employee ownership is generally used as a form of efficiency wage to provide above-market compensation.

Higher survival among ESOP companies could result in lower job loss and unemployment, potentially providing a public policy rationale for support of employee ownership.

The chapter provides the first examination of company survival in privately held ESOP companies, and one of the few examinations of how ESOPs relate to other pension benefits.

This chapter and case study examine how and which structured elements of an employee-owned business contribute to building the economic security and asset wealth of the lowest-wage and skilled employees of the firm. It paves the way for greater understanding about how intentionally structured workplaces can address wealth inequality and economic security through income and non-income opportunity systems.

The study draws upon qualitative interviews with four members of management, two plant managers, and 12 low-income employee-owners. Company documents and confidential employee data were provided for direct research analysis. Interviews took place at company locations, and covered employees from all shifts.

Employee ownership structures provide an important tool for advancing policy support and management practices to rebuild the wealth building benefits of work for low-income workers.

To ensure confidentiality, the study is anonymized and does not directly draw on the worker-owner interviews. This limits the opportunity to demonstrate the effect of structure on workforce; nonetheless, the empirical data tell an important story.

Expanding wealth inequality and economic precarity among low- and moderate-income workers has raised broad debates about how shifts in the structure of work, through new business, capital, and ownership structures, may be contributing to these social problems.

The employee benefits of employee ownership are not fully studied. This case contributes to understanding how employee ownership may reduce gender and racial wealth gaps, build family well-being, and become a model for structuring opportunity for those traditionally left out of the economic mainstream.

Drawing on bargaining power and the inequality aversion perspective, this study aims to probe employees’ influence on addressing income inequality between top executives and nonexecutive employees. Meanwhile, it examines the moderating role of employee-related factors and plan attributes.

This study uses a staggered difference-in-differences design with a propensity scoring match approach and verification of the parallel trend assumption to test the hypotheses.

The results support the hypothesis that employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) significantly reduce within-firm income inequality. The negative effect is amplified by both the presence of trade unions and the unemployment rate at the regional level, as well as the duration of the lock-in period and the scale of participants within the stock ownership plan.

This study has implications for income inequality research and ESOP design and provides theoretical support for policymakers and corporate governance.

This study contributes to the literature on income inequality by examining the implementation of ESOPs from the employee perspective. Furthermore, it extends the current literature by investigating the strengthening effects of regional factors and ESOP attributes on the relationship between ESOPs and income inequality. The conclusions provide new empirical evidence to promote the effective implementation of ESOPs by combining internal and external factors.

The purpose of this paper is to compare three models of employee ownership and to identify pros and cons in relation to how the models can overcome the barriers. Which choices are important when defining the overall rules around the models and the specific possibilities for variations and combinations and what are the pros and cons for these choices?

The comparison is based on the three main models of employee ownership identified from the country descriptions in this special issue.

The models do not exclude each other. The models can all be promoted in a specific country, leaving the choice of specific model to the stakeholders involved in the establishment of the employee-owned company. The article also shows the possibility of combining different models and in this way to adjust to specific preferences and conditions – e.g. whether employees and other stakeholders want collective or individual ownership and whether it concerns a start-up or a succession company.

This paper identified the key differences and similarities of different models for employee ownership including pros and cons of worker cooperative vs the Employee Ownership Trust (EOT) and the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) models.

The purpose of this paper is to give an updated overview over the development of employee-ownership in Italy, France, Spain including Mondragon, the UK and the US with relatively many employee-owned firms. How have the barriers for employee-ownership been overcome in these countries?

The overview is based on updated descriptions of the development of employee-ownership included in this special issue. The analysis follows the structure of overcoming five barriers: the organization problem; the problem of entry and exit of employee-owners; the startup and takeover problem; the capital- and the risk problem.

Italy, France and Spain have overcome the barriers by specific legislation for worker cooperatives, this includes rules for entry and exit of employee members. Cooperative support organizations play an important role for monitoring and managing the startup problem and for access to capital. The Mondragon model includes individual ownership elements and a group structure of cooperatives. The EOT and ESOP models are well suited for employee takeovers, financing are eased by tax advantages and they are all-employee schemes. While the EOT has no individual risks, the ESOP model has the possibility for capital gains for employees but also the risk of losing these gains.

Comprehensive and updated overview of the development in employee-ownership in the five countries to identify successful formats of employee-ownership for implementation in countries with few employee-owned firms.

This paper aims to identify the key lessons to learn from the US employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)-model. The lessons are, broad-based employee ownership is difficult to attain and sustain if employees have to use their own money to purchase shares. The paper works better when the shares are held in trust rather than being held individually. Broad-based employee ownership improves corporate performance and employee financial security. Employees care more about how employee ownership affects the stability of their jobs and retirement than having governance rights. If laws require democratic governance there will not be widespread employee ownership. Tax incentives are critical to induce companies and their owners to share ownership.

This paper is based on results from National Center for Employee Ownership research, a review of other research in the field, and the author’s own 45 years of experience in this field.

About one-quarter of the private sector workforce in the USA participates in some kind of employee ownership plan. There are 6,700 ESOPs in the USA with 14 million participants. The ESOPs hold over $1.4 trillion in assets. About 6,000 of these plans are in non-listed companies and the companies employ about two million people. Public companies ESOPs generally own under 10% of company stock; private company ESOPs usually own at least 30% of the stock and a majority of the plans own 100% of the stock. Most of these companies have between 20 and 500 employees.

The article gives a practitioner's overview over the main reasons behind the success of the ESOP model in the USA.