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This chapter develops a sketch of a critical social ontology and contrasts it to a theory of sociality as presented in the work of Michael Brown. I argue that the ontology of our social forms requires categories for understanding them descriptively, functionally as well as in evaluative terms. I contend that a theory of power is needed for an understanding of the ontology of our social forms and that this can contribute to the construction of a more critical social ontology. I argue that a critical social ontology is a more attractive and satisfying paradigm for critical theory than current post-metaphysical approaches that emphasize discourse, recognition or other neo-Idealistic aspects of human sociality.

To defend the thesis that the base-superstructure hypothesis central to Marxist theory is also central paradigm of the tradition of Critical Theory. This is in opposition to those who see this hypothesis as determinist and eliminating the possibilities for the autonomy of social action. In doing so, it is able to retard and atrophy the critical capacities of subjects.

Emphasis on the return to a structural-functionalist understanding of social processes that places this version of Critical Theory against the more domesticated forms that consider “discourse ethics” and an “ethic of recognition” as the normative research program for Critical Theory. Also, an analysis of the purpose and logic of functional arguments and their relation to Marx’s concept of “determination” is undertaken.

The essence of Critical Theory hinges upon the ways that social structures are able to deform and shape structures of consciousness of modern subjects to predispose them to forms of domination and to view the prevailing hierarchical structures of extractive domination as legitimate in some basic sense.

The foundations of Critical Theory need to be rooted in a renewed understanding of the relation between social structure and forms of consciousness. This means a move beyond theories of social practices into the realm of social epistemology as well as the mechanisms of consciousness and their relation to ideology.

Few analyses of the relation between the base and the superstructure or material organization of society and the social-epistemological layer of consciousness delineate the mechanisms involved in shaping consciousness. I undertake an analysis that utilizes insights from the philosophy of mind such as the theory of intentionality as well as the sociological approach to values through Parsons.

In 2009, the Third Circuit decided Hydrogen Peroxide, which announced a more rigorous standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for assessing whether a putative class could establish antitrust injury. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court decided Comcast v. Behrend, a case that carries potentially broad implications for both antitrust cases and Rule 23(b)(3) class actions generally. A review of the case law starting with Hydrogen Peroxide and continuing through Comcast and its progeny reveals the new rigor in antitrust class action decisions and suggests what the future may hold, including the type of arguments that may provide defendants the most likely chance of defeating class certification. After Comcast, rigor under 23(b)(3) can no longer be avoided in assessing all class actions questions, and courts should now apply Daubert fully in the class setting concerning both impact and damages. Courts should also closely evaluate plaintiffs’ proposed methodologies for proving impact to determine if they apply to each class member. Finally, courts will inevitably have to determine how rigorously to scrutinize experts’ damages methodologies and whether Comcast requires or suggests more scrutiny in assessing common evidence for measuring damages.

This chapter examines the potential and limitations of criminal law as a policy tool for fighting against the trade in counterfeit goods in Tanzania. It uncovers major challenges involved in tackling the counterfeiting business in Tanzania using criminal law. The chapter shows that counterfeit goods have infiltrated many supply chains in Tanzania. Both law-related and non-law factors drive the counterfeit goods trade. The counterfeiting business affects consumers, traders, the economy and the general society in Tanzania. The counterfeiting business presents serious societal risks during the crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic owing to the possible infiltration of counterfeit pharmaceuticals into the medical supply chain. Criminal law is part of Tanzania's legal embodies for fighting against the counterfeit goods trade. Both law-related and non-law limitations and challenges undermine the efficacy of criminal law in tackling the trade in counterfeit goods in Tanzania. The chapter recommends policy, legal and institutional reforms that will help to augment the efficacy of the anti-counterfeiting legal regime in Tanzania.

This chapter examines the role of the person in modern constitutional law. Through a reading of two Canadian Supreme Court decisions – RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery and R. v. Malmo-Levine – it suggests that while the person is the subject of modern constitutional law’s protective gaze, it can also sometimes function as a scapegoat, taking the fall for harms engineered in part by the state (harms, in other words, that really ought to attract constitutional scrutiny given constitutional law’s orienting preoccupation with ‘state action’). Rather than dismissing these gestures as a result of defective legal reasoning in the cases examined, the chapter suggests that the selective erasure or forgetting of state action is in fact essential to the production of the suffering subject – the constitutional person – that modern constitutional law is supposed to protect, precisely, from the state. In effect, then, the chapter claims that modern constitutional law produces the person by ignoring or at least downplaying the role of the state in certain contexts and, hence, by reneging intermittently on its primary task: the application of legal scrutiny to coercive state action.

This paper is a translation of the third and most important chapter of Keizaigaku shi (History of Political Economy) by the Japanese Marxist economist Samezō Kuruma (1893–1982), first published in 1948. Kuruma discusses in detail the achievements and limitations of the Classical school of political economy. He examines the fundamental ideas of Adam Smith and David Ricardo regarding the determination of commodity value and the source of surplus-value, and then looks at how these ideas are connected to production price and profit. Kuruma notes that Smith and Ricardo managed to arrive at the essential labor theory of value, but that neither could correctly apply this theory to adequately explain phenomena in the realm of competition – either abandoning the labor theory of value altogether to embrace a composition theory of value (Smith) or directly applying the theory to explain phenomena without grasping the intermediary processes of development (Ricardo). Kuruma's critique of Smith and Ricardo highlights the achievement of Marx in overcoming the limitations that ultimately led to the breakdown of the Classical school of political economy.

This chapter documents how eugenics, scientific racism, and hereditarianism survived at Harvard well into the interwar years. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Thomas Nixon Carver and Frank W. Taussig published works in which they established a close nexus between an individual’s economic position and his biological fitness. Carver, writing in 1929, argued that social class rigidities are attributable to the inheritance of superior and inferior abilities on the respective social class levels and proposed an “economic test of fitness” as a eugenic criterion to distinguish worthy from unworthy individuals. In 1932, Taussig, together with Carl Smith Joslyn, published American Business Leaders – a study that showed how groups with superior social status are proportionately much more productive of professional and business leaders than are the groups with inferior social status. Like Carver, Taussig and Joslyn attributed this circumstance primarily to hereditary rather than environmental factors. Taussig, Joslyn, and Carver are not the only protagonists of our story. The Russian-born sociologists Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin, who joined the newly established Department of Sociology at Harvard in 1930, also played a crucial role. His book Social Mobility (1927) exercised a major influence on both Taussig and Carver and contributed decisively to the survival of eugenic and hereditarian ideas at Harvard in the 1930s.

This chapter explores some of the complexities involved when undertaking research at an international level in the area of “inclusive” education and “special needs” education. The complexities encountered by researchers working in these fields, mirror many of the challenges that comparativists in education studies find themselves addressing. Drawing from earlier investigations and from reports by international organizations, this chapter highlights some of the dilemmas and challenges that researchers face when considering inclusion and special needs education in different countries. Differing interpretations of “inclusion” are discussed and then contrasted with thinking around “special needs” practices. The chapter moves forward to analyze how the adoption of differing theoretical frameworks can influence the way that “disability” is conceptualized and therefore how inclusive and special needs education are interpreted and then put into practice. The chapter argues that cross-cultural work opens up opportunities for further development and learning in this field. We further argue that such cross-cultural work can become a mechanism to instigate fundamental change in education.