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A primary impetus of the modern hospice movement was the disparity, during the later 20th century, between the care provided to persons with illnesses considered “curable” and the treatment – or lack of it – accorded the incurably or terminally ill. In its transformation from a reform-oriented, interdisciplinary response to the needs of the dying to an integrated component of the American healthcare system, hospice care's original mission, target population, and modality of service delivery were all significantly altered in ways that generated new disparities in access to “death with dignity.” This chapter attempts to trace the political, economic, and institutional dimensions of this transformation as reflected in the experiences of one Northeastern hospice during a 6-month period in 2001. Using an analytic approach known as institutional ethnography (IE), the authors focus on the work of the Hospice's Interdisciplinary Group (IDG) to uncover the linkages between local problems in the delivery of hospice care and extra-local sites of power and constraint at the mezzo- and macrolevels of the American healthcare system. The significance of these linkages for patients, frontline workers, and other stakeholders are interpreted from several perspectives. Implications for change are discussed.

This chapter explores geopolitics, garbage cans, the need for interdisciplinary insight, and the lures and limitations of one-sided mono-disciplinary conceptual models in understanding strategic decision making. We argue that a combination of the garbage can model and Nathan Leites’ psycho-cultural approach to decision making might be useful in giving insights for events and for organizational behavior. As a decision making case, we consider the 1941 decision of the Empire of Japan to declare war on the Allied Powers. We find that there could be useful lines of integration between the garbage can framework and other perspectives in geopolitical decision making. In using a historical example to illustrate the possible integration, we argue that there are inherent limits to single-model decision making approaches. Developing interdisciplinary frameworks for understanding foreign policy decision making may lead to better insights in real-world processes and seems like a step in a fruitful direction.

Industrial relations, organizational behavior, and human resource management scholars have studied numerous aspects of internal workplace conflict resolution, ranging from the design of conflict resolution systems to the processes used for resolving conflicts to the outcomes of the systems. Scholars from these specialties, however, have paid considerably less attention to external workplace conflict resolution through litigation. This chapter analyzes certain areas of such litigation, focusing specifically on workplace conflicts involving issues of managerial and employee misclassification, independent contractor versus employee status, no-poaching agreements, and executive compensation.

Leading recent cases involving these issues are examined, with particular attention given to the question of whether the conflicts reflected therein could have been resolved internally or through alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods rather than through litigation.

Implications of this analysis are drawn for workplace conflict resolution theory and practice. In doing so, I conclude that misclassification disputes could likely be resolved internally or through ADR rather than through litigation, but that no-poaching and executive compensation disputes could very likely not be resolved internally or through ADR.

The chapter draws on and offers an integrated analysis of particular types of workplace conflict that are typically treated separately by scholars and practitioners. These include misclassification conflicts, no poaching and labor market competition conflicts, and executive compensation conflicts. The originality and value of this chapter are to show that despite their different contexts and particular issues, the attempted resolution through litigation of these types of workplace conflicts has certain common, systematic characteristics.

This paper presents the safety case for the consideration of cross-cultural factors in aviation by focusing on cultural interfaces, those situations where members of one culture encounter people or artifacts from other cultures. Global aviation is strongly influenced by the USA and Western Europe as the largest manufacturers and largest customers; hence almost all cultural interfaces are weighted in favor of the dominant users. The challenge for safety is not to ignore or eliminate these interfaces but to manage the potential threats they pose. To move forward, there is a role for those inside and outside the dominant model.

This paper examines the application of real option theory to sequential investment decision-making. In an effort to contribute to the development of criteria that discriminate between investments that confer growth options from those that confer deferral options, we introduce a conceptual model that explains technological adoption as a sequence of embedded options. Upon the introduction of each successive technological generation, a firm may either defer investment and wait for the arrival of a future generation or invest immediately to obtain experience that provides a claim on adoption of subsequent generations. We propose that deferral and growth option value is dependent on the magnitude, frequency, and uncertainty of inter-generational change, and the nature of rivalry.

Real options theory begins by drawing an analogy between real options and financial options. A financial option is a derivative security whose value is derived from the worth and characteristics of another financial security, or the so-called underlying asset. By definition, a financial option gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell the underlying asset at a specified price (i.e., the exercise price) on or before a given date (i.e., the expiration date). Financial economists Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) pioneered a formula for the valuation of a financial option, and their methodology has opened up the subsequent research on the pricing of financial assets and paved the way for the development of real options theory.

US Navy warships are capital-intensive national defense assets that require periodic depot and intermediate level maintenance availabilities (periods). Oftentimes, ship maintenance is deferred or forgone altogether due to geopolitical strife or fiscal challenges. The impacts of missed maintenance are not only a burden on ships’ crews, but they also have a deleterious effect on current and future readiness. It is a difficult task to strike a balance between current and future readiness when insufficient resources are available to sustain a fleet of warships. This paper draws from multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) to develop a ship maintenance decision-making model that considers attributes from the current and life cycle readiness cohorts. Using the current maintenance plans for two DDG 51-class ships entering availabilities in same fiscal year, this model determines which ship is more capable of absorbing a loss of maintenance and planned modernizations relative to the context of the decision environment. Five attributes are considered for the overall decision: mandatory maintenance, non-mandatory maintenance, mission impact from maintenance, mission impact from planned modernizations, and maintenance backlog. The model presented here is generalizable to a number of U.S. Navy ships and watercraft and can be used to inform decision-makers of the short- and long-term impacts of deferring critical maintenance.

This article examines the extent to which costs imposed on customers and other factors influence tax-motivated income shifting when corporate taxpayers expect tax rates to decline. I find that sellers of durable goods shift defer less income to lower tax rate periods than sellers of nondurable goods. This is consistent with shifting firms considering the effect of their income shifts on their customers. There is also limited evidence that firms with greater market power shift more income than other firms. In addition, I find evidence that, controlling for political costs and scale effects, smaller firms shifted more income than larger firms. This result is inconsistent with a “tax sophistication” hypothesis that larger firms are better able to engage in tax planning activities than smaller firms.

This paper categorizes and critiques the empirical research strategies that have been employed to test real options theory. Existing research has sought to detect valuable options in firms’ strategic investments as well as to investigate the payoffs from these investments. Our review highlights some of the evidence that has accumulated in recent years for real options theory. We flag some of the most important challenges and tradeoffs associated with the use of different empirical research approaches for testing real options theory in strategic management. The paper concludes by offering a number of research priorities to advance the theory by probing its descriptive validity as well as by addressing its normative aspirations to bridge corporate finance and strategy.

This chapter explores the making of the colonial state in Samoa in the 1890s. The Samoan case offers new insights into the workings of the colonial state precisely because nowhere else were Euro-American colonial projects as intertwined with and dependent on local support. In an unprecedented experiment in colonial rule, German, British, and American officials shared control over the Samoan islands from 1889 to 1899. This so-called tridominium, I argue, served as a colonial strategy of deferral for Euro-American officials anxious to diffuse escalating conflict over the distant islands. Contrary to plan, ongoing tensions among German, British, and American interests allowed Samoans to maintain considerable political and economic autonomy. The main reason for the ultimate failure of the tridominium for Euro-American policy-makers lay in the uneven and incomplete exercise of colonial power over Samoans. Limitations in geography, people, and finance made the tridominium a weak colonial state. In addition, the lack of resources the respective metropolitan governments devoted to the distant archipelago in the South Pacific increased the relative influence of Samoan leaders and of the growing number of Samoans who joined the administration. Samoa in the 1890s serves as an important reminder that colonial rule was rarely clear-cut and never complete.