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The financial crisis that hit countries worldwide in 2007 tested and tried deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) and their ability to protect consumers’ bank deposits. The crisis also served as a reality check for regulators, institutions and the general public alike. Against this backdrop, there was a significant rationale by governments and regulators to protect consumers and at the same time maintain financial stability through expansion of coverage offered in existing DGS arrangements or setting up such a scheme where this was not already in place.

Consumers need other possible safety net in addition to the already set-up lender-of-last resort facilities provided by central banks, banking supervision regulations, assistance granted by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank and also the recently enacted EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).

In this chapter the authors evaluated whether the launch of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) as a single deposit guarantee in Europe which is now being recognised as one of the three main pillars, together with the single supervisory and resolution mechanisms, would enhance depositors’ protection in times of banking crisis and also reinforce financial stability in the EU as part of the proposed Banking Union.

The chapter made reference to academic literature and also recent EDIS political dossier to outline the developments. Apart from political insensitivity to the proposed EDIS, the chapter also concluded that the introduction of EDIS raises questions about moral hazard amongst banks in the EU, issues on bank’s contributions during the transition period and difficulty in comparing banks across EU countries through banks’ deposits and risk profiles.

This chapter examines one of the most contested issues in Public Administration, namely political–administrative relationships. The first part of the chapter begins with a brief overview of the features of an ideal-type bureaucracy. Next is a literature review of political–administrative relationships. This is followed by an analysis of typologies of political–administrative relationships, with particular reference to developing countries. The second part of the chapter analyses the evolution of political–administrative relationships since the dawn of South African democracy in 1994. It examines the growing politicisation of the public service, the weakening of the powers of public officials vis-a-vis Ministers and the emasculation of the PSC. Data indicate that the government is unable to fill posts at the Senior Management Service (SMS) level and that there are a high number of acting HoDs, an indicator of instability. Finally, it uses Dasandi and Esteve’s typology of political–administrative relationships in developing countries to interpret the South African case.

Illicit substance use can have a detrimental effect on a young person's life, abilities, psychosocial well-being, educational participation, attainment and outcomes. It is associated with and can lead to increased vulnerability and be a serious safeguarding concern. This chapter explores the concept of illicit substance as a process of ‘normalisation’ among children and young people. It also explores the concept of ‘game playing’, poly and tertiary substance use and considers some of the implications of illicit substance use and of young people becoming involved in ‘County Lines’. Understanding the nature, scale, extent and consequences of illicit substance use, and how young people are portrayed and stigmatised by those around them are important in relation to responding appropriately to need, and in assessing safeguarding concerns. This chapter will also discuss these concerns and conclude by critically considering the implications of illicit substance use for teachers and schools, whilst considering appropriate responses which identify and reduce risk.

This chapter examines performance management, which has arguably been the kernel of New Public Management inspired version of public sector reform. The first part is a literature review that looks at experiences of performance management in both developed and developing countries. It looks at the difficulty in transferring public sector reforms from developed to developing countries. This is followed by the evaluation of performance management in the post-1994 public service in South Africa. Both the individual and organisational performance systems are highlighted, followed by an analysis of performance management reforms. There is a well-developed performance management system but the empirical data and qualitative reports found that it has not worked particularly well. There are concerns around a number of issues, including the measurement of targets; the signing of performance targets; a focus on outputs rather than outcomes; a lack of harmonisation between individual and organisational performance; a lack of capacity of managers, which in some cases is due to unskilled patronage appointments; a focus on compliance rather than performance; and a lack of accountability.

This chapter provides a framework for organisational analysis of the newly created position of ‘independent’ Commissioner, especially whether it is sufficiently backed by administrative capacities.

In the many variables that determine organisational behaviour (Mintzberg, 1989), this approach follows Olsen (2005) in its analysis through communication structures and strategic directions, and adds procedures (networks) and personnel to this. The chapter is primarily based on interview data in addition to literature and document analysis.

This chapter acknowledges the ‘stickiness’ of institutions and the difficulties in reorganising (formal) institutions. The conclusion shows that there are multiple problems in the current process of institutionalisation of the independent Commissioner. Generalising the findings to the use of an administrative approach, the frugal framework used here indicates that ‘independence’ cannot simply be proclaimed but also demands attentions for organisation design. Organisational analysis helps to understand the organisation and the organisational weaknesses behind the policy objective.

As is often the case with MLG it gives a perspective on governance, but must be complemented with an approach for analysis, in this case organisational design. In the chapter the approach is limited to organisational values, personnel and communication lines. It provides a basic framework to evaluate one of the key elements of European integration – independence. However, additional work is needed to further develop this framework as well as other components of the organisational behaviour of the Commission.

This chapter comes up with suggestions for organisational redesign of the Commission in order to restore trust in its tasks and responsibilities. With the instalment of the new Juncker Commission these findings might provide useful insights for the ongoing process of reorganisation of the Commission.

The new economic legislation and the role of the independent Commissioner have a direct impact on member state budgets (cuts), with a far reaching societal impact. Therefore, the level of (public) trust is critical in the acceptance of the process. Trust is established inter alia by the organisational implementation of principles of good administrative behaviour such as transparency, capability, independence, etc.

The chapter uses the MLG perspective in order to get a comprehensive picture of the organisational implications to effectively embed the ‘independent’ Commissioner in the organisation. The added value is based on the extensive amount of interviews over a longer period of time (2011–2014) during the operationalisation of the European semester.

Today’s young people were born and raised in a digitally dominated world, therefore they quickly and intuitively navigate the web, which brings them undeniable advantages in the search for health information, but at the same time posing some risks. The authors conducted a narrative review of Portuguese and international scientific publications using the MeSH terms [Health literacy], [digital], [young people], [education] and [social media]. Among the various solutions presented, and considering the ease and speed to which young people are accustomed to when accessing digital information, the paths to be taken towards safe and effective navigation are related to solutions that promote a greater health literacy (HL). To bet on the promotion of HL in the younger generations is to invest in the improvement of their health and well-being, considering the ACCESS Young people are more likely to search and have access to health information through the digital environment, therefore it is important to reach them by means of interactive and appealing online content (e.g. short videos); COMPREHENSION, it is essential to disseminate reliable information and to involve their close social networks, including parents/legal guardians, social workers, teachers, among other community members; USE ensuring a correct and responsible use of health resources requires involving young people in the process of creating HL programs since its early steps. Results show that the digital promotion of HL as a valuable tool to reach younger generations, who are avid consumers of social media and many other online platforms.

The economic and financial crisis, especially the sovereign debt crisis, discovered many deficiencies and weaknesses in the banking sector in the European Union (EU). The need for special surveillance and supervision of cross-border banking cooperation and termination of the toxic link between sovereign debt and banking sector have accelerated the process of forming and establishing a Banking Union (BU). An integrated financial framework has been established in which the European Central Bank (ECB) through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has a key role and the responsibility for the overall supervision of the banking sector of the euro zone. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and schemes of the Single Deposit Guarantee Mechanism (SDGM) are under the national supervisory authorities while the European Banking Authority (EBA) is responsible for developing the Single Rules. From the new architecture is expected the preservation of the single market and a common currency, breaking “toxic connections” between sovereign debt and banks, mitigation and removal of financial instability and economic growth. The research shows that the BU together with the ECB in a certain sense, also contributes to the normalization of credit and financial conditions in the single mark. Estimates through SSM, conducted by the ECB and the EBA, during, 2014 and 2015 on 107 banks in 21 countries indicate progress toward solvency and resilience of the banking system of the euro area. Despite some initial success the entire project BU seems to have missed on opportunities, resulted in late reactions, and was too complex to be feasible. The political will of national governments to give up sovereignty over its banking sector and transfer competencies to the supranational institutions is a key factor in the success or failure of a BU. It seems so but past experience indicates that there is no political willingness to solve problems. Mainly most of the government avoids cleaning a hidden “skeleton in closets” due to lack of means for recapitalization while some are trying for loans from the ECB to help their banks. The ECB plays a key oversight role at the EU level and has too much power, which can cause risks caused by conflicting goals. The ECB is losing the role of the final refuge of liquidity, which is the main disadvantage of a BU. The SSM is susceptible to criticism due to difficulty in operation because of slow incorporation of European legislation into national law. Slow implementation carries risks of fragmentation of the market, regardless of the responsibility of the ECB. The financial capacity of the temporary agreement with the SRM is insufficient in solving the crisis of more banks while procedural application is complex and time-consuming. Planned backstop with a centralized resource is a resolution that is insufficient for solving the failure of big systemic banks, which are too big to bail. The heterogeneity of the existing Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the banking systems of the member states of the euro zone caused controversy in terms of setting of common insurance schemes. The procedures for the recovery and resolution of critical banks are problematic.

This chapter examines one of the specific manifestations of political–administrative relationships, namely the delegation of powers to managers. The first part of the chapter is a literature review of political–administrative relationships in both developed and developing countries. This is followed by a discussion of the framework for delegation in South Africa that was laid down in the late 1990s. Next is an analysis of the implementation of delegation in the 2000s, along with the National Planning Commission recommendations in 2012, which has led to a resurgence in delegation initiatives. There is a well-developed government monitoring system of delegation that has led to some improvement in compliance with delegation, but the overall delegation levels are on the low side. Delegation to officials is often thwarted by Ministers who wish to retain control and/or promote patronage. Further, in some cases, managers lack capacity or are unwilling to manage and take responsibility for delegated authority.

This chapter provides a summary of the main findings, indicating that none of the public service reforms studied has worked particularly well. It then looks at ‘The Way Forward’ by analysing current proposals of the Ramaphosa government to reform the public sector. There are legislative proposals to give HoDs powers to appoint and dismiss staff, along with provisions devolving administrative powers to HoDs, while retaining strategic powers. There is a provision for the EA to intervene in the event of HoDs failing or refusing to fulfil a power or duty in terms of the proposed Act. This does provide a back door for Ministers to intervene in administration. Further, there is likely to be resistance against proposals to reduce politicians’ role in human resources, including members of the President’s own political party who are reluctant to lose delegation powers. Finally, it is suggested that the government should move away from centralised policies, particularly in respect of performance management, towards network governance-type approaches which promote a non-hierarchical approach to Public Administration.

This chapter examines the roles and challenges for the Irish economy in the aftermath of the collapse of the Celtic Tiger and the onset of the 2008 economic crisis. Specifically, it does review the role that Government, the Central Bank of Ireland, and the Financial Regulator had before, during and after the collapse of both the Irish banking system and property market. This chapter explains the drivers behind the growth of the Celtic Tiger and the sources of leverage that amplified the severity of the subsequent collapse. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the changes that have since been made and provides a review of the lessons that can be obtained from the collapse.

The results presented in this chapter are based on analysis of secondary sources and a literature review to determine conceptual and theoretical frameworks for identifying the specific issues that the Irish economy endured since the 2008 economic crisis and the red flags and signals that were either missed or ignored.

Combined with the subprime collapse of 2007 and the international sovereign debt crisis evident since 2008, Ireland and the actions of its regulators and policy makers undoubtedly generated not only a catalyst to financial ruin, but also an incubator to aid its severity. The precise drivers that created the Celtic Tiger remained unchanged and played a significant role in the subsequent collapse. Banks were leveraged towards the Irish property market and the role of leverage in financial markets created mispricing, to which the basic principles of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) failed. This miscalculation of risk was severe and destructive for the real economy. The reward for this error was a place in history as an ‘I’ in the derogatory term ‘PIIGS’.

This chapter could be used as teaching material for undergraduate and masters programmes in economics and finance. It provides a response to further understand the behaviour of the Irish economy during the development of the Celtic Tiger and the subsequent financial collapse that enveloped the Irish state.

This chapter discusses the role of leverage throughout a financial system and the necessity for financial monitors to promote an environment of sustainability and financial endurance; that which can survive an international financial crisis event.